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Suppose you have an online, text-based chat with a stranger. 
 
You can talk about whatever you want; and your interlocutor always 
replies something in an appropriate and convincing style, although it is 
not always cooperative, or even correct. 
 
Suddenly, you ask yourself: is your interlocutor intelligent? Or, better, 
is it human?  
 
This is a – simplified – Turing Test. Here, a human judge decides 
whether an unknown entity is human or machine, based on its 
interactions during a text-based conversation. However, evaluating the 
entity’s ability to provide the correct responses, or probing its 
methodology in doing so, is not contemplated. This means that the 
entity can pass by producing uncooperative, parrot-fashion or even 
incorrect interactions, as long as they are human-like enough. 
 
To prevent this, I propose a new version of the Turing Test: the 
Questioning Turing Test, where the unknown entity has to accomplish 
an enquiry by asking as few human-like questions as possible to a 
human judge. Here, three factors are evaluated: (i) the style of the 
entity’s questions, (ii) the entity’s ability to accomplish the enquiry, and 
(iii) the entity’s strategy in doing so, in terms of the number of questions 













“Il est encore plus facile de juger de l’esprit d’un homme par ses questions que par 
ses réponses.” 
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The Turing Test (TT) is an experimental paradigm to test for 
intelligence, where an entity’s intelligence is inferred from its ability, 
during a text-based conversation, to be recognized as a human by the 
human judge. The advantage of this paradigm is that it encourages 
alternative versions of the test to be designed; and it can include any 
field of human endeavour. However, it has two major problems: (i) it 
can be passed by an entity that produces uncooperative but human-like 
responses (Artificial Stupidity); and (ii) it is not sensitive to how the 
entity produces the conversation (Blockhead). 
 
In light of these two problems, I propose a new version of the TT, the 
Questioning Turing Test (QTT). In the QTT, the task of the entity is not 
to hold a conversation, but to accomplish an enquiry with as few 
human-like questions as possible. The job of the human judge is to 
provide the answers and, like in the TT, to decide whether the entity is 
human or machine. 
 
The QTT has the advantage of parametrising the entity along two 
further dimensions in addition to ‘human-likeness’: ‘correctness’, 
evaluating if the entity accomplishes the enquiry; and ‘strategicness’, 
evaluating how well the entity carries out the enquiry, in terms of the 
number of questions asked – the fewer, the better. Moreover, in the 
experimental design of the QTT, the test is not the enquiry per se, but 
rather the comparison between the performances of humans and 
machines. The results gained from the QTT show that its experimental 
design minimises false positives and negatives; and avoids both 








In “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) Turing proposes his 
approach to test for intelligence, the Turing Test (TT). According to the 
main interpretation of the TT, intelligence is inferred from the ability of 
a hidden entity to produce, during a text-based conversation, 
sufficiently human-like interactions for a human judge to decide that 
the entity is human. The article, which introduces the idea of thinking 
machines, that is, of machines able to do anything the human brain can, 
is regarded as a milestone of Artificial Intelligence research. 
 
Turing, is worth noting, was not a cognitive scientist or an engineer, he 
was a mathematician and logician. So, what is the link between 
Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence? One obvious answer is that 
Artificial Intelligence involves computers, and using computers in 
those early days required a deep understanding of computer science, as 
well as the math involved. It is certainly true, but the answer fails to 
explain why Turing was not simply interested in building a mechanical 
calculator or even a computer in the sense we know today, but rather a 
“thinking machine”. It’s useful to make a brief historical excursus. 
 
Turing, during his years at Cambridge, focused his study to Hilbert’s 
problem of decidability. The results of Turing’s research were 
published in the paper “On Computable Numbers, with an Application 
to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1936), where he developed one of the 
first definitions of computation and, more importantly, he came to the 
conclusion, along with Gödel (1931) and Church (1936), that 
computation cannot achieve everything. In the paper, Turing proposes 





“a human calculator, provided with pencil and paper and 
explicit instructions, can be regarded as a kind of Turing 
machine.” (42) 
 
It’s worth noting that a Turing machine is a purely theoretical device, 
and its components and actions (the paper tape, moving left and right, 
testing for the presence of a symbol, deleting a symbol and printing a 
symbol) are very basic ones. Turing also designed the hypothetical 
device that became known as Universal Turing machine. Church and 
Turing’s results inspired the so-called Church-Turing thesis, which 
formalises the definition of computable functions, stating that a 
function is effectively computable, that is, it can be mechanically 
computed by an algorithm, if and only if it is computable by a Turing 
machine. Because Turing’s results can be said to be more intuitive than 
Church’s, and because Turing explicitly uses machines is his 
arguments, the importance of “On Computable Numbers…” (1936) is 
highlighted in Copeland (2004), who argues that it can be regarded as 
the founding work of modern computer science. 
 
There is a number of possible Turing machines, each able to carry out 
a different procedure, by virtue of having a certain program (or table of 
behaviour). So, whereas a Turing machine corresponds to a program, a 
Universal Turing machine corresponds to a computer, which can be fed 
different programs as data. Turing (1936), describing a Universal 
Turing machine, states: 
 
“It is possible to invent a single machine which can be used 
to compute any computable sequence.” (241) 
 
In other words, any computer can be simulated by another computer, 
given that the second computer has the appropriate program. Since a 
Universal Turing machine can in principle do everything a human brain 
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can do, it may be possible to hold that Turing’s work not only shows 
what machines can or cannot do, but also what procedures the human 
brain can or cannot carry out (no matter the time and resources needed). 
 
Turing identifies, among others, two types of machines with interesting 
implications on machine intelligence. One is proposed in “Systems of 
Logic Based on Ordinals” (1939), where Turing introduces the idea of 
a Turing machine connected to an oracle, which is able to compute 
incomputable functions. For this reason, the oracle would be way more 
powerful than any machine, since its working could not be purely 
mechanical. As Turing (1939) emphasises: 
 
“We shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle 
apart from saying that it cannot be a machine.” (173) 
 
The oracle is intended to introduce the conflict between ‘intelligence’ 
and ‘infallibility’, and to undermine the notion that a machine should 
never fail. As Turing (1947) holds: 
 
“[…] if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also 
be intelligent. There are several mathematical theorems 
which say almost exactly that. But these theorems say 
nothing about how much intelligence may be displayed if a 
machine makes no pretence at infallibility.” (118) 
 
The second type of machine is called unorganised machine. It is a 
machine with no hand-coded program except for one: a learning 
program, which enables it to acquire new knowledge and to develop 
new skills, just as a child’s brain is able to do. The unorganised 
machine, or child machine, shows that Turing was not only interested 
in physical realisations and engineering problems (involving, for 
instance, finding a way to store more memory or to increase the speed 
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of the machine), but also on the construction of “instruction tables” (that 
is, the programming of a machine). More than once he argues that it is 
possible to build a thinking machine by implementing it with “adequate 
storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an 
appropriate programme.” (Turing 1950, p. 442). But, as Turing (1946) 
clarifies, speed and storage are important factors insomuch as they are 
functional for the running of the system’s programs. Moreover, he 
foresees that such programs would require a new domain expertise. As 
Turing (1946) holds, such programs will not be made by engineers, but 
rather they: 
 
“will have to be made up by mathematicians with 
computing experiences and perhaps a certain puzzle-
solving ability. There will probably be a great deal of work 
to be done, for every known process has got to be translated 
into instruction table form at some stage.” (391) 
 
These remarks about the importance of software reflect the trajectory 
of computer science. Moreover, the insight that machines and the 
human brain can compute the same functions or, in other words, that 
they can learn to do the same things, led Turing to the idea of learning 
machines. As proof of this, Turing (1948) states: 
 
“It is pointed out that the potentialities of the human 
intelligence can only be realized if suitable education is 
provided. The investigation mainly centres round an 
analogous teaching process applied to machines. […] If one 
also decided on quite definite ‘teaching policies’ these 
could also be programmed into the machine. One would 
then allow the whole system to run for an appreciable 
period, and then break in as a kind of ‘inspector of schools’ 
and see what progress had been made. One might also be 
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able to make some progress with unorganised machines.” 
(428-432) 
 
So, Turing did not limit his interest in processes that a machine can 
carry out mechanically. His ultimate goal was to build a device able to 
behave as the human brain does. He envisioned unorganised machines 
able to modify their own programs and simulate the cognitive 
development and the cognitive capabilities typical of humans. 
 
In 1948, Turing and his associates develop the first chess engine ever, 
Turochamp. Two years later, Turing (1950) proposes the TT. The 
soundness of the TT as a test of intelligence has been constantly 
debated, and the number of arguments in support of it equals the number 
of rejections. In the thesis, I focus on the experimental weaknesses of 
the TT, as pointed out, among others, by Hernández-Orallo (2017), who 
argues that: 
 
“The standard Turing test is not a valid and reliable test for 
HLMI [Human Level Machine Intelligence]. […] the 
Turing test aims at a quality and not a quantity. Even if 
judges can give scores, in the end any score of humanness 
is meaningless.” (p. 129) 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to propose a new test, which I call the 
Questioning Turing Test (QTT), in order to improve the original 
experimental design of the TT. 
 
I argue that the problem with the TT is that it doesn’t care if or how well 
an entity produces a conversation, as long as its interactions are human-
like enough. As a consequence, the TT attracts projects that concentrate 
on how best to fool the judges, or to produce frivolous exchanges that 
are only questionable exhibitions of intelligence. In the QTT, the hidden 
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entity has to produce an enquiry rather than a conversation, asking 
questions to the human judge in order to accomplish the aim of the 
enquiry. The experimental design of the QTT has the advantage to 
parametrise the entity along two further dimensions in addition to 
‘human-likeness’: what I call ‘correctness’, evaluating if the entity 
accomplishes the aim of the enquiry; and what I call ‘strategicness’, 
evaluating how well the entity produces the enquiry. The thesis is 
divided into three parts. 
 
Part I is dedicated to the review of the literature related to the TT. In 
Ch. 1, I describe the experimental concept and discuss the experimental 
design proposed by Turing (1950), and I distinguish between the 
“Literal Interpretation”, advocated by Sterrett (2000), and the “Standard 
Interpretation”, advocated by Moor (2001). In Ch. 2, I introduce one of 
the two main difficulties with the test: Artificial Stupidity, that is, the 
potential exploitation of ‘human-likeness’ by the entity, as shown, for 
instance, by Eliza’s conversational strategies (Weizenbaum, 1966). In 
Ch. 3, I discuss the other major difficulty with the test, the logical 
possibility of Blockhead, a humongous look-up table which is able to 
produce an appropriate response to whatever stimulus (Block, 1981). 
 
In Part II, I present my proposal for a new version of the TT, called 
QTT. In Ch. 4, I consider two alternative versions of the TT that 
inspired the experimental design of the QTT: the MIST (Minimum 
Intelligent Signal Test) proposed by McKinstry (1997, 2009); and the 
FT (Feigenbaum Test) proposed by Feigenbaum (2003). I also consider 
the extended versions of the TT: the 3T (Total Turing Test), proposed 
by Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000) and the 4T (Truly Total Turing Test), 
proposed by Schweizer (1998, 2012a). In Ch. 5, I describe the QTT, the 
new test that I propose with the purpose to avoid both Artificial 
Stupidity and Blockhead. In Ch. 6, I consider the objections to the QTT, 
in particular, that the QTT is redundant and chauvinistic. In Ch. 7, I 
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justify the importance that the questioning process plays in – at least – 
three disciplines related with intelligence: Developmental Psychology, 
Pedagogy and Epistemology, as argued, among others, by Hintikka 
(1985, 1999, 2007). 
 
Finally, Part III is focused on my experiment. In Ch. 8, I describe my 




1 The Turing Test 
In Ch. 1, I present the TT, followed by the discussion of Turing’s 
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950). Here I discuss the 
two main interpretations of the experimental design of the TT: the 
“Literal Interpretation” (Sterrett 2000, Traiger 2000), which I advocate; 
and the “Standard Interpretation” (Copeland 2000, Moor 2001). I also 
discuss the interpretation of Turing’s conception of intelligence 
proposed by Proudfoot (2013). Furthermore, I analyse the dialogues 
Turing (1950) provides as examples of potential conversations during 
the test. I show the strategies Turing has in mind for the entity to pass 
the TT; and, following Fokker (2012) in the interpretation of the chess 
puzzle, I suggest that the TT is not intended to evaluate ‘human-
likeness’ alone. I rather hold that, in the TT, ‘human-likeness’ is 
conflated with another dimension, that I proposed to evaluate 
independently: I call this dimension ‘correctness’, that is, the ability to 
provide the right response to a given question (or, more generally, the 
right output to a given input). 
 
2 Artificial Stupidity 
In Ch. 2, I discuss Artificial Stupidity. With Artificial Stupidity I refer 
to the set of strategies that can be used by the hidden entity (either 
machine or human) to exploit the judge’s beliefs by holding an 
x 
 
uncooperative and evasive, but human-like, conversation; in other 
words, by violating Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle. The first and 
most well-known example of Artificial Stupidity is Eliza, a chatbot 
programmed by Weizanbaum (1966). My argument, according to 
which the TT can generate false positives or negatives because of 
Artificial Stupidity, does not imply that the hidden entity should be 
infallible. Therefore, I distinguish between Artificial Stupidity and 
Artificial Fallibility, and I claim that the experimental design of the TT 
should prevent entities that implement artificially stupid strategies from 
passing. In order to do so, as anticipated in Ch. 1, I propose to 
parametrise the hidden entity along a further dimension in addition to 
‘human-likeness’: ‘correctness’. It is worth noting that whereas 
Artificial Fallibility is compatible with both ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’, Artificial Stupidity is compatible only with ‘human-
likeness’, not with ‘correctness’. To clarify this distinction, I show the 
Computer Game Bot TT, proposed by Hingston (2009), where 
Artificial Stupidity is used to exploit videogame players’ beliefs and to 
enhance their recreational experience (fooling them into believing they 
are actually good at the game). 
 
3 Blockhead 
In Ch. 3, I review Block’s “Psychologism and Behaviourism” (1981), 
and I describe the thought experiment which is known as Blockhead: 
an unimaginably huge pre-coded look-up table, or search tree, 
containing the appropriate verbal response to any possible verbal 
stimulus whatsoever. Blockhead undermines the validity of the TT 
showing that it can be passed by means of brute-force processes. In 
order to prevent Blockhead from passing the test, I propose a further 
dimension, in addition to ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, along 
which to parametrise the entity: ‘strategicness’, intended to evaluate 
how well the entity accomplishes the task set by the test. In order to 
evaluate ‘strategicness’, I propose to switch from the SISO setup 
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(symbols in, symbols out), where a brute-force approach can always be 
successful, to the SOSI one (symbols out, symbols in), where a brute-
force approach alone can never be successful. Whereas in a SISO test 
(TT) the task of the entity is to reply to the judge’s questions, in a SOSI 




4 The Alternative Versions of the TT 
In Ch. 4, I show two alternative versions of the TT which inspired the 
QTT: the Minimum Intelligent Signal Test (MIST), proposed by 
McKinstry (1997, 2009); and the Feigenbaum Test (FT), proposed by 
Feigenbaum (2003). The MIST is an automatable and quantitative test, 
where the hidden entity has to answer 20 yes/no subcognitive questions, 
the kind of questions that French (1990) argues to be the critical ones 
to show ‘human-likeness’. The FT is a subject matter expert test, where 
the hidden entity has to answer expert questions about a certain domain, 
asked by a human judge, who is required to be an expert in that domain. 
I conclude that both the MIST and the FT can avoid Artificial Stupidity, 
by evaluating the replies given by the entity under scrutiny in terms of 
‘correctness’. However, they cannot avoid Blockhead, since they are 
SISO tests. I also discuss the extended versions of the TT: the Total 
Turing Test (3T), proposed by Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000); and the 
Truly Total Turing Test (4T), proposed by Schweizer (1998, 2012a). 
 
5 The Questioning Turing Test 
In Ch. 5, I describe the new version of the TT that I propose. The QTT 
is a SOSI test, where the hidden entity asks questions to the human 
judge, in order to accomplish the aim of an enquiry. The judge, in turn, 
has to decide (i) whether the entity is human or machine and (ii) whether 
the entity is able to accomplish the aim of the enquiry. The dimensions 
along which the entity is parametrised are three: ‘human-likeness’, 
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‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. ‘Human-likeness’ evaluates the 
entity’s ability to ask questions in a convincingly enough human-like 
fashion to be recognised as human by the judge. ‘Correctness’ evaluates 
the entity’s ability to accomplish the aim of the enquiry. And 
‘strategicness’ evaluates the entity’s ability to show a good 
interrogative method, where good is defined in terms of the number of 
questions needed to accomplish the aim of the enquiry (the fewer the 
questions, the better the strategy). My claim is that the QTT, thanks to 
its experimental design, has the advantage to prevent both Artificial 
Stupidity and Blockhead from passing. 
 
6 The Objections 
In Ch. 6, I discuss the objections that can be raised against the QTT. 
The three main arguments are the following: (i) the QTT is redundant, 
for the TT can contain any verbal test whatsoever, QTT included; (ii) 
the QTT is chauvinistic, for only a good questioner can pass it; and (iii) 
the QTT cannot avoid Blockhead, for a questioning Blockhead would 
be able to ask any possible question. 
 
7 The Questioning Process 
In Ch. 7, I justify the importance that the questioning process plays in 
intelligence; and why the interrogative model should be preferred in 
testing for intelligence. I point out that – at least – three disciplines 
focus on the ability to ask good questions: (i) Developmental 
Psychology, specifically the relationship between questions and the 
cognitive development of individuals; (ii) Pedagogy, specifically the 
relationship between questions and learning; and (iii) Epistemology, 
specifically the relationship between questions and knowledge. I also 
discuss the work of Hintikka (1985, 1999, 2007) and in particular his 
Interrogative Game, intended to highlight the relationship between 






8 The Experiment 
In Ch. 8, I describe the practical QTT that I designed in order to conduct 
my study and to show the advantages of the QTT over the TT. I recall 
the distinction between SISO (symbols in, symbols out) and SOSI 
(symbols out, symbols in); and I recall the two dimensions, in addition 
to ‘human-likeness’, along which the hidden entity is parametrised: 
‘correctness’, intended to prevent Artificial Stupidity from passing by 
exploiting the judge’s beliefs; and ‘strategicness’, intended to prevent 
Blockhead from passing by means of a brute-force approach. The 
experiment is divided into four phases. In the first phase, I conduct the 
original TT, where the hidden entity – either human or machine – is 
evaluated in terms of ‘human-likeness’. In the second phase, I conduct 
the TT2, an alternative version of the TT where the hidden entity – 
either human or machine – is evaluated in terms of ‘human-likeness’ 
and ‘correctness’. In the third phase, I conduct the QTT, where the 
hidden entity – either human or machine – is evaluated in terms of 
‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. And, finally, in the 
fourth phase, I conduct the Hybrid QTT, where the hidden entity is 
played by both a human and a machine, and the performance is 
evaluated in terms of ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’. 
 
9 The Results 
In Ch. 9, I show and analyse the data gained from my study. First, the 
results of the original TT, which evaluates the hidden entity in terms of 
‘human-likeness’ alone, confirm the potential unreliability of the TT’s 
experimental design due to the false positives and negatives. Second, 
the results of the TT2 show that, by testing the entity in terms of both 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, the judge’s biases are largely 
prevented: false positives are factored out, and false negatives are 
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minimised. Third, the results of the QTT, where the hidden entity is 
parametrised along ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, 
show that false positives and negatives are further reduced in 
comparison with the TT. Finally, the results of the Hybrid QTT, where 
the hidden entity is played by both a human and a machine, show the 
best performances and the best ratings in terms of ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, outscoring the performances of both 

























The Turing Test 
 
 
Abstract. The first part of the thesis is dedicated to the discussion of 
the Turing Test (TT), the different interpretations that have been 
proposed and the difficulties with its experimental design. The TT is a 
procedure to evaluate whether a target entity can be considered 
intelligent, thanks exclusively to its conversational competency during 
a text-based conversation with a human judge. In this chapter, I present 
Turing’s paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950) and I 
review the two main interpretations of the TT, the “Literal 
Interpretation” (Sterrett 2000, Traiger 2000) and the “Standard 
Interpretation” (Copeland 2000, Moor 2001). I agree with Sterrett 
(2000) that the “Original Imitation Game” (OIG) provides the proper 
experimental design for the test, where the results are given by the 
comparison between the human’s performance and the entity’s 
performance; and with Traiger (2000) that the experimental design of 
the TT “invites generalization”. 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of Turing’s procedure to 
evaluate whether a target entity can be attributed with intelligence. In 
his seminal paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (1950), 
Turing proposes the Imitation Game (IG), renamed after its author the 
Turing Test (TT). In the TT, the property of intelligence is inferred from 
‘human-likeness’, that is, the ability to be recognised as human by a 
human judge during a text-based conversation1. The TT has been at the 
centre of a lively debate in the last 70 years, which involves a 
philosophical and a practical problem: the former can be summarised 
by Turing’s question “can machines think?” (and, by extension, by the 
 
1 With “text-based conversation” I mean a conversation carried out via text exchange, where 
not only are all visual cues unavailable, but also all cues from modalities such as sound, touch, 
smell, and so on. 
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question “what is it to think?”); the latter is focused on the project of 
building a machine that is able to pass the TT. 
 
In the next section, I describe the Imitation Game, as presented by 
Turing (1950). In section 1.2, I discuss the “Literal Interpretation” and 
the “Standard Interpretation” of the TT. In section 1.3, I examine the 
role of the human judge in the TT. In section 1.4, I show the two 
dialogues Turing (1950) provides as examples of conversations during 
the TT. In section 1.5, I consider Turing’s conception of intelligence. 
And In section 1.6, I discuss French’s (1990) subcognitive argument. 
 
 
1.1 Turing’s Test: The Imitation Game 
 
Turing, in his seminal paper “Computational Machinery and 
Intelligence” (1950), asks the following question: “Can machines 
think?”2 This question, Turing argues, is not a well-posed one, since it 
implies definitions that we do not have, and it should be reformulated 
to be “expressed in relatively unambiguous words.”3 According to 
Turing, to answer the question we would need a definition of ‘thinking’ 
or ‘intelligence’, which is a problem. Turing, “instead of attempting 
such a definition [of intelligence],”4 intends to reformulate in different 
terms the original question by proposing the Imitation Game. The IG, 
referred by Turing as a test in more than one occasion, and therefore 
renamed the TT, has been criticised by several authors. Hernández-
Orallo (2017), among others, claims that: 
 
“The Standard Turing Test is not a valid and reliable test 
for HLMI [Human-level Machine Intelligence].” (129) 
 
 





In this section, I describe the IG as presented by Turing (1950). To do 
so, I would like to begin by summarizing the first paragraph of 
“Computational Machinery and Intelligence” in current terminology, to 
clarify the scale and scope of Turing’s project: 
 
Turing’s purpose is to answer the question “can machines 
think?” by proposing a different method, since the original 
question is expressed in ambiguous terms which need strict 
definitions that are not readily available (especially the 
definition of intelligence). The goal of the IG, therefore, is 
not to provide a definition of intelligence whatsoever, but 
rather to provide a different way to answer the question 
whether a target entity can be said to be intelligent. 
 
There is no evidence in Turing’s literature that the IG is intended to 
provide a definition of (that is, to provide the logically necessary and 
sufficient conditions for) intelligence. There is, on the other hand, 
evidence that shows the contrary. In a BBC broadcast, when replying 
to Jefferson demanding what intelligence is, Turing (1952) explicitly 
admits: 
 
“I don’t want to give a definition of thinking, but if I had to 
I should probably be unable to say anything more about it 
than that it was a sort of buzzing that went on inside my 
head. But I don’t really see that we need to agree on a 
definition at all.” (494) 
 
So, according to Turing, the problem of evaluating whether an entity 
thinks5 should be replaced with a new, more tractable problem, that is, 
whether the entity passes the IG. The IG, as described by Turing (1950), 
involves three participants per round, and two rounds in total. In every 
 
5 I use “to think” and “to show intelligence” interchangeably. 
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round there are two contestants (player A/M and B) and a judge (player 
C). 
 
The first round is played by A (a man), B (a woman) and C (a human 
judge, no matter the sex). The two contestants and the judge are in 
separate rooms, and their conversation is carried on indirectly (in order 
to rule out any physical features that may simplify C’s task). Most 
usually, this is done via text-based interactions, no matter the 
technological support: typewritten, teletyped, telegraphed, and so on.6 
So, it is worth noting, upgrading the test to the current technological 
level (by using, for instance, modern computers and chatrooms) does 
not affect its original design. The goal of C is to determine which of the 
two contestants is the woman and which is the man. More in detail, A 
must pretend to be a woman, by giving appropriate responses to C in 
order to make C misidentifying A as the woman; and B should help C 
into making the right identifications, namely that B is the woman and 
A is the man. 
 
The second round is played in the exact same way and with the exact 
same task as the first, except that A is replaced by M. So, the second 
round of the IG involves M (a machine), B (a woman) and C (a human 
judge, no matter the sex). Just like in the first round, the goal of C is to 
determine which of the two contestants is the woman and which is the 
man. More in detail, M must pretend to be a woman, by giving 
appropriate responses to C in order to make C misidentifying M as the 
woman; and B should help C into making the right identifications, 
namely that B is the woman and M is the man. 
 
The judge C asks questions to A/M and B by means of two terminals, 
simply labelled X and Y. At the end of each round, after a given period 
 
6 It is not important how the interactions are delivered, as long as they are indirect ones. As 
Turing (1950) points out, they could even “be repeated by an intermediary.” (434) 
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of time and a series of unrestricted questions, C claims either: “X is A 
and Y is B or X is B and Y is A.”7 
 
1.1.1 The TT’s Two Procedures 
The IG, inspired by the parlour games, popular during the Victorian 
age, is intended to deal with the original question “can machines think?” 
by reformulating it into a new one. By testing A and B and then 
replacing A with M, Turing (1950) states, the new question is the 
following: 
 
“Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the 
game is played like this [between M and B] as he does when 
the game is played between a man and a woman [A and 
B]?” (434) [Italics added] 
 
To clarify the IG, it is useful to distinguish between its two procedures: 
the AB-IG, that is, the first round of the IG; and the MB-IG, that is, the 
second round of the IG. The first refers to the IG played between two 
human contestants (a man and a woman); the second refers to the IG 
played between a machine and a human (a machine and a woman). 
 
Along with Sterrett (2000), I hold that the results of the two procedures 
are not properly analysed if considered independently. Instead, the 
experimental design of the IG requires the outcomes of the two 
procedures to be compared. More specifically, the AB-IG provides the 
rate of C in misidentifying A or B, that is, the benchmark for the 
machine’s success in the MB-IG; and the MB-IG is based on that 
benchmark in order to determine whether C misidentifies M as B with 
the same frequency with which C misidentifies A as B. Both the pairs 
must carry out the same impersonation task (which, in the IG, involves 
the impersonation of a woman, but, as I will show, it can be modified 
 
7 Turing (1950, p. 433). 
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and adapted). If C misidentifies M in the MB-IG as frequently as C 
misidentifies A in the AB-IG, then the machine passes the IG, and it is 
attributed with intelligence as much as the man is. The following (fig. 





There is a significant debate on what the IG exactly means: does Turing 
intend that a machine should successfully impersonate someone in 
order to be legitimately considered intelligent? Or does he rather intend 
that a machine should simply show a sufficient level of ‘human-
likeness’ in order to convince C that it is human (and by extension 
intelligent), with no regard for impersonation? This is the long-standing 
debate between, respectively, the “Literal Interpretation” and the 
“Standard Interpretation” of the TT, which I discuss in section 1.2. 
 
1.1.2 The Advantages of the TT 
The advantage of the experimental conditions of the IG, Turing (1950) 
claims, is that they allow us to rule out a number of idiosyncrasies – of 
either humans or machines – from the test, making them irrelevant, as 
irrelevant for intelligence should be considered, for instance, the 
aesthetic features of machines or the cognitive limits of humans. As 
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Turing (1950) remarks, considering the problem of thinking machines 
from the IG perspective 
 
“has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between 
the physical and intellectual capacities of a man.” (434) 
 
Moreover, the task set by the IG is, according to Turing (1950), suitable 
to include any field of human endeavour whatsoever, without the need 
of any physical demonstration. This highlights the versatility of the TT. 
However, it’s worth noting, it is not what the participants talk about that 
helps C making the right identifications. Instead, it is how the 
participants talk about something. In other words, the participants can 
reply anything they want during the IG, but it’s only thanks to the style 
of their replies that C can formulate a judgement about their nature. For 
instance, a machine being asked something like “are you a woman?” 
could reply in the following way: “yes I am a woman: as a matter of 
fact I have two eyes, a nose, a mouth, two arms, two legs...” and so on, 
listing all the human features that it is possible to find in an anatomy 
manual. However, it is not likely that C would misidentify that as a 
woman-like reply, not even a human-like one to begin with. On the 
contrary, if the reply were something like: “yeah, you might say so... 
even though sometimes my boyfriend insists that I cannot be human 
due to my snoring”, C would have more troubles in deciding whether 
the reply comes from a woman or not (as well as whether it comes from 
a human or not). So, what really matters in the TT is the style of the 
interactions, not their contents. The dimension along which the entity is 
parametrised, and thanks to which C formulates her judgements, is what 
I call – conversational – ‘human-likeness’, that is the ability to be 
recognised as human by a human judge during a text-based 
conversation. As Turing (1950) puts it, the hidden entity’s “best 
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strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be given by a 
man.”8 
 
Turing’s original question “can machines think?” could be rephrased in 
the following one: 
 
could a machine, during the text-based conversation in the 
MB-IG, be identified as human with at least the same 
frequency with which a human, during the text-based 
conversation in the AB-IG, is identified as human? 
 
It is necessary to clarify, however, that Turing’s goal is not to design an 
objective method to determine with certainty whether an entity is 
intelligent. In other words, he does not intend to provide the logically 
necessary and sufficient conditions for intelligence. Turing rather 
intends to propose the IG as an appropriate substitute for the question 
whether “machines can think”. It is also worth noting that building a 
machine that could do well in the IG would not mean to create a 
machine replicating the human cognitive processes. As Turing (1950) 
argues: 
 
“May not machines carry out something which ought to be 
described as thinking but which is very different from what 
a man does? This objection is a very strong one, but at least 
we can say that if, nevertheless, a machine can be 
constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily, we 
need not be troubled by this objection.” (435) 
 
Moreover, it is important to underline that Turing holds neither that 
machines could pass the IG and, consequently, that it’s feasible to build 
a machine that can be considered intelligent; nor that machines could 
 
8 Turing (1950, p. 435). 
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not pass it, and, consequently, that it’s not feasible to build a machine 
that can be considered intelligent. His purpose, as Turing (1952) 
explicitly writes, is simply to suggest that the new question posed by 
the IG is what should be considered: 
 
“I am not saying at present either that machines really could 
pass the test, or that they couldn’t. My suggestion is just 
that this is the question we should discuss.” (4) 
 
1.1.3 The Interrogator in the TT 
The proper conversation during the IG is described by Turing as 
normal; moreover, the proper judge, Turing states, should not be an 
expert, but rather an average person. With “normal conversation” and 
“average interrogator”9 it is intended, respectively, a conversation that 
does not require a particular background or knowledge to be held and, 
consequently, a human judge who is not required to have such a 
background or knowledge. Most notably, Turing holds that the judge 
“should not be expert about machines”10; and Copeland holds that the 
judge should not be “expert about the human mind”11 either. In other 
words, a computer scientist and a cognitive scientist would be banned 
from taking the test, in order to prevent, respectively, a machine from 
being unmasked due to its technical features, and a human from being 
recognized due to her cognitive characteristics. As Copeland (2000) 
remarks: 
 
“certain characteristic weaknesses in human reasoning – for 
example, a willingness in certain circumstances to assign a 
lower probability to a conjunct than to the conjunction, or 
the tendency to fail to take notice of certain disconfirming 
instances of conditional statements (weaknesses which are 
 
9 Turing (1950, p. 442). 
10 Turing (1952, p. 495). 
11 Copeland (2000, p. 525). 
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easily detectable by Wason tests and the like) – could be 
used to unmask any computer not specifically programmed 
to reproduce these human foibles.” (525) 
 
1.1.4 The TT’s Setups 
Finally, the IG has been described in three distinct setups by Turing. 
First, the parallel-paired version, where a human judge engages text-
based interactions with two hidden entities at the same time, either both 
human or one human and one machine12, in order to decide which is 
which. Second, the “viva voce”13 version, where a human judge engages 
text-based interactions one-to-one with a hidden entity in order to 
decide whether it is a human or a machine. And third, the jury-based 
version, where the hidden entities, either humans and machines, are 
“kept in a far away room and the jury are allowed to ask [them] 
questions”14 in order to rate each of them as human or machine. In this 
work, I will focus on the viva voce version of the TT, discussing the 
parallel-paired version and discarding the jury-based version along 
with Copeland (2000), who argues that it 
 
“is open to a biassing effect, which disfavours the 
machine.” (525) 
 
The results from the jury-based tests reveal that there is a strong 
tendency among jurors to consider, for safety, humans as machines 
rather than the opposite. This bias in disfavour of the machine is called 
the Confederate Effect and, as Copeland (2000) puts it, 
 
“presumably this phenomenon is the result of a 
determination on the part of the jurors not to be fooled by a 
program.” (ibid.) 
 
12 Turing (1950, p. 433). 
13 Turing (1950, p. 446). 




Summing up, Turing (1950) introduces the IG in order to reformulate 
the question whether “machines can think” into the following one: 
could a machine do so well in holding a text-based conversation with 
an average human judge in order to be recognised as human with – at 
least – the same frequency with which a human can? Where ‘average’ 
is intended to factor out potential false positives or negatives 
(Proudfoot, 2013) by precluding computer scientists15, or experts of the 
human mind16, from playing the role of the judge. The IG, as described 
by Turing (1950) involves three participants: player A/M (a man or a 
machine); player B (a woman); and a human judge C (whose sex is 
irrelevant). And it is divided into two stages: the AB-IG, where the 
participants are both humans; and the MB-IG, where the machine 
challenges the human. Contestants A, B and M communicate with C in 
separate rooms and by indirect ways (e.g. text-based interactions on a 
computer chatroom). In the AB-IG, the goal of C is to decide which 
player is the man and which one is the woman; and the goal of both A 
and B is to be identified as the woman. In the MB-IG, player A is 
replaced by a machine M, and the game is played in the same way as 
the AB-IG. Turing does not intend to provide the logically necessary or 
sufficient conditions for intelligence, and the machine is not required to 
have the same processes which occur in the human brain. The test is 
intended to compare the rate of the judge’s misidentifications when 
questioning a machine and a human with the rate of the judge’s 
misidentifications when questioning two humans. In the next section, I 
discuss the two interpretations of the TT: the (i) Literal Interpretation, 
where both the AB-IG and the MB-IG are played; and the (ii) Standard 
Interpretation, where the AB-IG is skipped as merely introductory, and 
only the MB-IG is played. 
 
 
15 See Turing (1952). 




1.2 The “Literal” and “Standard” Interpretations 
 
A critical passage in Turing (1950) is the second formulation of the IG, 
that is, when player A is replaced by a machine, which has 
 
“to play satisfactorily the part of A in the imitation game, 
the part of B being taken by a man.” (442) 
 
This passage has generated two different interpretations, since player 
B, in the first formulation of the IG, is a woman, not a man. 
 
The “Literal Interpretation” (LI) holds that what Turing proposes is a 
test made of two procedures: in the first, the contestants are two 
humans; in the second, the contestants are a machine and a human (see 
fig. 1). And the results are given by the comparison of their 
performances in both the procedures. Or better, by the comparison of 
the frequency with which the judge makes the wrong identifications in 
the AB-IG, with the frequency with which the judge makes the wrong 
identifications in the MB-IG.  
 
The “Standard Interpretation” (SI) holds that what Turing intends is to 
test the hidden entity for its ability to be human-like enough to be 
indistinguishable from a real human: according to the SI, only the 
machine vs human test is important, whereas the human vs human one 









1.2.1 Literal Interpretation 
Sterrett (2000) and Traiger (2000) both argue in favour of the LI, 
holding that the two procedures of the IG (AB-IG and MB-IG) should 
be kept distinct, and that it is necessary to run both of them in order to 
conduct the test properly. The main idea, supported by Sterrett (2000), 
is that: 
 
“the advantage of Turing’s first formulation of the test 
[OIG] is that it provides a context in which the computer 
and the man are put on a more equal footing: both the 
computer and the man will need to critically evaluate their 
responses, and fabricate appropriate ones that are based on 
vicarious experiences of womanhood.” (552) 
 
This, however, does not imply that ‘womanness’ or femininity are the 
properties to evaluate when testing for intelligence. In other words, 
cross-gendering is not a necessary condition to test for intelligence. As 




“I stated that gender impersonation and discrimination were 
inessential to the test, while explaining why it was a good 
task to employ in a test of intelligence: “The significance of 
the cross-gendering in Turing’s Original Imitation Game 
Test lies in the self-conscious critique of one’s ingrained 
responses it requires. And, that the critique has two aspects: 
recognizing and suppressing an inappropriate response, and 
fabricating an appropriate one” (Sterrett, 2000, p. 551).” 
(132) 
 
Traiger (2000) argues in favour of the LI for two reasons. The first is 
that the LI-IG (that is, the OIG) can provide a less biased basis due to 
the kind of questions that the judge would ask. As he holds, given the 
experimental design of the LI-IG, 
 
“the kinds of questions posed by the interrogator will be 
those that would typically be posed to human participants. 
The interrogator in the Imitation Game will not begin with 
the hypothesis that one participant is a computer, and hence 
the computer participant, like its human counterpart, can 
devote its energies to answering the same kinds of questions 
that would typically be posed to a human.” (569) 
 
The second is that, in the LI-IG, it is not possible for the contestants to 
exploit the judge’s beliefs. On the other hand, in the SI-IG, Traiger 
(2000) holds, 
 
“the computer and the human competitor may exploit 






1.2.2 Standard Interpretation 
Rejecting the LI, Moor (2001),Copeland (2000) and Piccinini (2000) 
argue in favour of the SI. The reason is that Turing never points out 
femininity – or gender in general – to play a role in intelligence, as 
argued by Copeland (2000)17 and Moor (2001)18. And Piccinini (2000) 
claims that, throughout Turing’s works, it is possible to find “plenty of 
evidence that the standard reading of his rules is correct.”19 One piece 
of evidence in support of the SI, Piccinini (2000) argues, is found in 
Turing (1950), when he explicitly writes that there would be 
 
“little point in trying to make a thinking machine more 
human by dressing it up in […] artificial flesh.” (434) 
[Italics added] 
 
According to Piccinini (2000), the quoted passage above not only tells 
us that Turing does not consider aesthetic features to be necessary for 
intelligence, but also that he does not intend to make a thinking machine 
more “manly” or “womanly”, just more “human”. Turing does not 
mention, as Moor (2000) underlines, femininity or masculinity, but 
rather humanity; and so, as Moor insists, the IG should be intended to 
test for ‘human-likeness’, irrespective of gender. Moor (2001), 
however, goes as far as claiming that the AB-IG, 
 
“is at most an intermediary step toward the more 





17 Copeland (2000) holds that the TT is intended “[…] to determine whether or not a computer 
can ‘imitate the brain’. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Turing’s intention in 1950 was to 
endorse only the female-impersonator form of the test, or that he saw himself as describing 
different tests […].” (526) 
18 See Moor (2001): “Turing continues throughout the rest of his paper to emphasize humanity 
not femininity.” (78) 
19 See Piccinini (2000, p. 580). 
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1.2.3 Advantages of the LI over the SI 
I support the view according to which both the AB-IG and the MB-IG 
are necessary procedures in order to test the hidden entity properly, that 
is, in order to run the TT properly. I agree with Sterrett (2000) and 
Proudfoot (2013) in holding that the AB-IG scores the MB-IG and 
provides a benchmark for the machine’s success. I also agree with 
Traiger (2000), who holds that the description of the IG in Turing 
(1950) implicitly “invites generalization”20. That is, when Turing 
specifies that the goal of the judge is to claim either “X is A and Y is B 
or X is B and Y is A”21, those abbreviations are not intended for brevity 
only. As Traiger (2000) writes: 
 
“As many commentators have noted, there’s nothing 
special about the game determining whether someone is a 
male or a female. [...] If this is right, “A” and “B” could be 
placeholders for whatever characteristics may be used in 
different versions of the game.” (565) 
 
The IG, in other words, can be played in different variations, involving 
other characteristics rather than those related to gender. For instance, 
instead of a man and a woman, the IG could be played between an 
eastern and a western woman, a young boy and an old man, a native 
speaker and a non-native one, and so on. This is compatible with 
Sterrett (2000), who argues: 
 
“[…] cross-gendering is not essential to the test; some other 
aspect of human life might well serve in constructing a test 
that requires such self-conscious critique of one’s ingrained 
responses.” (pp. 550-551) 
 
 
20 Traiger (2000, p. 565). 
21 Turing (1950, p. 433). 
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According to Sterrett (2002a), the essential characteristic of the TT, 
which should be preserved in any experimental variations that can be 
designed, is that it is a nested test: 
 
“One distinctive feature is the “nested algorithm” structure 
of the test. The Original Imitation Game is played 
repeatedly in the course of a single test, and is nested inside 
the test. The test is a practical test, which, if passed, would 
be evidence for regarding a machine’s behavior as 
intelligent. The game is not the test; the game is nested 
inside the test, as a DO or DO WHILE loop is nested in an 
algorithm.” (132) 
 
So, whereas in the STT the machine is penalised, and the role of the 
judge is vested with heavy responsibilities, the OIG, as Sterrett (2002a) 
points out: 
 
“(1) […] permits the result that the machine does better than 
the man, (2) […] tends to screen off lack of interrogator 
skill, and (3) both man and machine are required to 
impersonate. The machine’s performance is not directly 
compared to the man’s, but their rates of successfully 
impersonating against a real woman candidate are 
compared.” (131) 
 
Against the LI, Moor (2001) holds the OIG to be redundant, since “the 
aspects of intelligence that Sterrett identifies as important to test can be 
tested in the standard game.”22 However, as Sterrett (2002a) observes, 
even if the STT can test some of the aspect that are important in the 
OIG, it does not follow that the STT is a better test than the OIG. On 
the contrary, there are two crucial differences between the OIG and the 
 
22 See Moor (2001, p. 80). 
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STT: one is that the interrogator’s gullibility plays a bigger role in the 
STT than in the OIG; and the other is that in the STT, only the machine 
has a task, whereas in the OIG both the machine and the human have 
one. Therefore, as Sterrett argue, the OIG does have a normative 
advantage23 over the STT. 
 
The role of the judge in the STT is summed up by Sterrett (2002a) as 
follows: 
 
“[…] The “Standard Turing Test” is just too sensitive to the 
skill of the interrogator to even be regarded as a test.” (135) 
 
In other words, in the experimental design of the STT, the outcome 
heavily depends on how good the interrogator is at discriminating the 
entities24. This is not the case in the OIG, and the reason is that the task 
involved in the STT and in the OIG is not the same. As Sterrett (2002b) 
specifies: 
 
“In ‘the original imitation game test’, both the man and the 
computer are called upon to impersonate. What the test 
results reject is their relative success in achieving this goal. 
In the standard Turing test, the man is not called upon to do 
 
23 As Sterrett (2002b) clarifies, the differences between STT and OIG are (i) qualitative, since 
“[…] the standard Turing test is far more sensitive to the interrogator’s skill.” (44); and (ii) 
quantitative, since in the OIG “[…] there is nothing in the structure of the game to prevent a 
machine scoring higher than a man: […] here there is an independent measure of success other 
than the interrogator’s direct comparisons of the responses of the man and the machine, because 
there is a task at which each can either fail or succeed, independently of the other. […] The 
standard Turing test does not even admit of such a result; there, the responses of the man and 
the machine are directly compared and only the machine is judged as to having exhibited a 
requisite skill or having failed to do so” (43).  
24 See Sterrett (2002b): “Sensitivity of the results of a test to the skill of the interrogator running 
it is hardly a virtue of any test. […] In ‘the original imitation game test’ the machine’s 
intelligence is being tested by comparing the frequency with which it succeeds in causing the 
interrogator to wrongly identify it as the woman with the frequency with which a man succeeds 
at doing the same. Thus, C’s skill level affects both frequencies. More fundamentally, the 
differences between the two tests are due to this: In `the original imitation game test’, unlike in 
the standard Turing test, scoring as a thinker does not amount to simply being taken for one by 




anything very novel, whereas the computer must converse 
under the pretence that it is human! In contrast, ̀ the original 
imitation game test’ compares the abilities of man and 
machine to do something that requires resourcefulness of 
each of them. […] for both the man and the machine, the 
task set has these aspects: recognizing an inappropriate 
response, being able to override the habitual response, and 
being able to fabricate and replace it with an appropriate 
response.” (44) 
 
Finally, as Sterrett (2000) concludes, the relevance of the OIG over the 
STT lies not just in the different experimental design, but in how 
intelligence is characterised: 
 
“the importance of the first formulation [OIG] lies in the 
characterization of intelligence it yields. If we reflect on 
how the Original Imitation Game Test manages to succeed 
as an empirical, behavior-based test that employs 
comparison with a human’s linguistic performance in 
constructing a criterion for evaluation, yet does not make 
mere indistinguishability from a human’s linguistic 
performance the criterion, we see it is because it takes a 
longer view of intelligence then linguistic competence. In 
short: that intelligence lies, not in the having of cognitive 
habits developed in learning to converse, but in the exercise 
of the intellectual powers required to recognize, evaluate, 
and, when called for, override them.” (558) 
 
Summing up, I agree with Sterrett (2000) that both the AB-IG and the 
MB-IG are necessary for running the TT properly; and with Traiger 
(2000) that the TT is intended to “invite generalization”. I reject Moor’s 
(2001), Piccinini’s (2000) and Copeland’s (2000) perspective that the 
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AB-IG is just an intermediary step (with the only purpose to introduce 
the test to the reader). I hold that the human vs human game is rather 
intended to provide the benchmark with which the machine’s 
performance will be scored in the machine vs human game. As 
Proudfoot (2013) puts it: 
 
“Turing used the man-imitates-woman game to score the 
computer-imitates-human game: a machine does well in the 
latter game when the interrogator in that game is fooled no 




1.3 The Role of the Human Judge 
 
In this section, I discuss the role of the human judge in the TT, who 
makes a decision about the nature of a target entity based on indirect 
interactions during a text-based conversation. 
 
Turing (1950) argues that a conversational test of intelligence allows 
the experimenter to include almost any field of human endeavour, 
without penalising the inabilities of the machine (such as the inability 
to be hungry) or those of the human (such as the inability to make huge 
calculations). The experimental design of the TT, Turing holds, “make 
these disabilities irrelevant.”25 In other words, the TT discourages 
chauvinism. 
 
Moreover, a test of intelligence where the outcome is decided by the 
human judge, and not objectively obtained, has no presumption to 
provide the logically necessary conditions for intelligence26. And, since 
 
25 Turing (1950, p. 435). 
26 Shieber (2004, p. 270). 
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passing the TT is not a necessary condition for intelligence, failing the 
TT does not rule out intelligence27. According to this reading, however, 
the TT should still be considered to provide the logically sufficient 
conditions for intelligence. This is compatible with Turing (1950), who 
seems to reject the idea that imitation is the adequate metric for 
intelligence. He argues that an optimal cognitive strategy for a machine 
“may possibly be something other than imitation of the behaviour of a 
man”28, where it is assumed that the best strategy is “to try to provide 
answers that would naturally be given by a man.”29 And it is compatible 
with Cowen & Dawson (2009) as well, who point out that a further 
proof that Turing’s intention is not to claim that the appropriate metric 
for intelligence is imitation is that, as Turing holds, lacking the ability 
to imitate does not mean lacking intelligence: 
 
“Imitation and intelligence are simply not the same and lack 
of imitation, or failure to be indistinguishable, does not 
mean lack of intelligence—or lack of humanity.” (6) 
 
So, given the experimental design of the TT, it is often claimed that 
passing it would provide a proof of the presence of intelligence, 
whereas failing it would not provide a proof of its absence. The problem 
with this reading, is that it is not that obvious that the TT is intended to 
provide the logically sufficient conditions for intelligence. The reason 
is that the outcome of the test does not depend solely on the entity’s 
performance, but also on the judge’s impression. I will discuss this in 
more detail below (see section 1.5). 
 
27 See Dennett (2004). See also Schweizer (1998): “I view such tests as dealing with evidence 
for intelligence, but I do not view them as constitutive or definitional. In particular, this means 
that their value is mainly for drawing positive rather than negative conclusions, and hence 
failure on such tests is not tantamount to lacking intelligence (or a mind); rather, the system has 
simply failed to exhibit the ‘canonical’ signs. The main role of behavior is inductive or 
evidential, and so behavioral tests do not provide a necessary condition nor a reductive 
definition. It then follows that failure to exhibit the relevant sort of behavior warrants no 
conclusion whatever.” (264) 





1.3.1 Problems with the judge 
In the TT, the human judge plays a crucial role, for she is the only one 
who makes a decision about the nature of the entity under scrutiny. 
However, this decision is based on the judge’s personal beliefs when 
evaluating a target entity. This leads the TT to provide potentially 
biased results, both in the LI-IG (where the verdict is given by the rate 
of the judge’s misidentifications) and the SI-IG (where the verdict is 
given directly by the judge’s decision): it could be the case where the 
judge always misidentifies the target entity due to her personal beliefs. 
In other words, the experimental design of the original TT, either LI-IG 
or SI-IG, is not screened out from the personal beliefs that potentially 
lead the judge to misidentifies the machine as human (Eliza Effect) or 
the human as machine (Confederate Effect). 
 
Another important aspect of the experimental design of the TT is how 
the judge is to be chosen. This is still a widely debated topic: Hayes & 
Ford (1995), for instance, point out that:  
 
“the imitation game conditions say nothing about the judge, 
but the success of the game depends crucially on how 
clever, knowledgeable, and insightful the judge is.” (973) 
 
Turing does not require the judge to be particularly “clever, 
knowledgeable or insightful”: on the contrary, as discussed above, the 
judge should simply be an average human (while computer or cognitive 
scientists should be banned). 
 
Traiger (2000) argues that, on the one hand, in the OIG the judge does 
not know that one of the human participants is replaced with a machine. 
In the STT, on the other hand, the judge is aware that the interlocutor 
can be either a human or a machine. By trying to determine which is 
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which, “the judge brings to the game his or her beliefs about computers 
and machine intelligence.”30 Consequently, in the STT, the 
conversation is no longer held as intended, that is, the judge does not 
behave in the same way as she would with other human fellows. Unlike 
the judge in the OIG, the judge in the STT will rather engage the target 
entity in a difficult and odd conversation, made of paradoxical questions 
and semantic traps in order to unmask any potential machine31. The 
STT is responsible for giving importance to those very factors that the 
IG was intended to rule out from the judge’s judgement. As Traiger 
(2000) writes: 
 
“Interrogators setting out to unmask a computer will 
mobilize and rely on their own conceptions of what 
computers are and what they can and can’t do, just as the 
computer program may successfully exploit those very 
beliefs in order to appear human-like. And this makes the 
test dependent on such conceptions of computation and 
mechanism, precisely the uninteresting question bypassed 
by Turing’s Imitation Game.” (570) 
 
1.3.2 The unaware judge 
Traiger (2000) agrees about the role of the judge in the TT with Mauldin 
(1994), who proposes the Unsuspecting Turing Test (where the judge 
is not aware that the target entity might be a machine) as the proper 
setup in which the test should be run. In the UTT, the judge is not aware 
that the target entity might by a machine, and it is inspired by TinyMUD 
(a sandbox videogame descendent of MUD, which stands for Multi-
User Dungeon), developed by James Aspnes in 1989. Mauldin’s project 
was to program an automated player able to independently explore the 
text-based world of TinyMUD. The resulting program, called 
 
30 Traiger (2000, p. 565). 
31 Traiger (2000, p. 569). 
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ChatterBot, was observed to be often taken for a human by other 
humans players. As Mauldin (1994) writes: 
 
“The ChatterBot succeeds in the Tiny-Mud world because 
it is an unsuspecting Turing test, meaning that the players 
assume everyone else playing is a person, and will give the 
ChatterBot the benefit of the doubt until it makes a major 
gaffe.” (17) 
 
Among Mauldin’s programs there are Gloria, focused on gradually 
accreting more and more linguistic ability; and Julia, able not only to 
become a more capable conversational agent, but also to assume duties 
in the TinyMUD text-based world, such as tour guide, information 
assistant, note-taker, message-relayer, and so on. Mauldin’s TinyMUD 
bots were able to pass the UTT because of the unaware judges, who had 
no reason to suspect that one of the other players was a program rather 




1.4 Turing’s Dialogues 
 
In this section, I consider the two dialogues Turing provides (1950) as 
examples of conversations occurring during the TT. The setup in which 
the dialogues are presented is the viva voce, that is, as Turing (1950) 
specifies, when the test is conducted “with the player B omitted, 
frequently used in practice.”32 Here I consider each question and reply 





32 Turing (1950, p. 446). 
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1.4.1 First Dialogue 
The first dialogue that Turing (1950) provides is the following: 
 
“Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth 
Bridge. 
A: Count me out on this one. I never could write poetry. 
Q: Add 34957 to 70764 
A: (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 
105621. 
Q: Do you play chess? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I have K at my Kl, and no other pieces. You have only 
K at K6 and R at Rl. It is your move. What do you play? 
A: (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate.” (435) 
 
The first dialogue unveils a number of strategies that the hidden entity 
can use to pass the TT. In the first line, the judge asks the entity to write 
a sonnet, and the entity replies that it cannot write poetry. The answer 
has a convincingly human-like form, and it is also plausible that a 
human would reply in that way if asked to write offhand a poem. This 
first entry already reveals a potential exploit: the entity can evade or 
refuse any of the judge’s interactions, as long as in a human-like 
fashion. I call this Artificial Stupidity (which I discuss in Ch. 2). 
 
The second request of the judge is to perform an arithmetical addition. 
There are two different strategies used in the entity’s reply. The first is 
that, as Turing explicitly indicates, the machine waits 30 seconds before 
giving the answer. The lesson here is that, no matter how fast the entity 
(human or machine) can make additions, it should delay its reply. More 
in general, an entity which instantly types difficult or long replies would 
be easily unmasked (a typist, for instance, may have problem if she 
types faster than an average person). This case also shows the 
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importance of having the average human performance as a benchmark, 
in order to rule out exceptions like, for instance, people affected by 
autism (that might be extremely fast at calculating numbers and, 
therefore, misidentified as machines). The second strategy is even more 
subtle. The answer given by the entity is not the correct one: the exact 
result is 105.721, and not 105.621. However, it would be much more 
plausible for a human to give a slightly wrong result. So, the entity 
(either human or machine), given the experimental design of the TT, 
where intelligence is inferred from ‘human-likeness’, should adapt to 
the replies that an average human would give, in order not to be 
unmasked too easily or misidentified. In other words, the entity should 
have good strategies to avoid revealing its mechanic nature or its 
extraordinary skills (e.g. by delaying its replies and making mistakes). 
I refer to this as Artificial Fallibility (which I discuss in Ch. 2). 
 
The final case that Turing provides in the first dialogue is a chess 
puzzle. Fokker (2012) analyses this case, and he draws some interesting 
conclusions. The judge provides the position of the three pieces on the 
board, two kings and one rook, and asks for the entity’s move. The case, 
however, is more subtle and more interesting than it looks at first, as 
Turing sets aside something for the alert reader. The chess case, per se, 
is not a problematic one: it is not difficult to program a machine to play 
chess at a very expert level. So why Turing chooses such a simple 
problem, that even in the 50s would have been hardly challenging for a 
machine? It is not for brevity: on the contrary, the chess case represents 
the most difficult challenge in the first dialogue, since it requires access 
to common-sense understanding. First of all, the chess case is presented 
with the – now obsolete – Descriptive Notation, widely used until the 
late 20th century, but then replaced by the Algebraic Notation. And 
Turing does not even use the Descriptive Notation rigorously; he rather 
uses a mixed style: “K at my K1”, “K at K6”, “R at R1”, “no other 
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pieces”33. Thus, the entity needs to deal with some natural language 
processing, in order to gain the right data from the question (for 
instance, by distinguishing the formal language, that is the Descriptive 
Notation, from the other unusual phrasing). Moreover, the Descriptive 
Notation, unlike the Algebraic one, needs to be disambiguated: “R at 
R1” means that the rook could be the left one as well as the right one; 
in both cases, however, the entity’s reply “R-R8” is the correct one, as 
moving the rook, be it the left one or the right one, to R8 leads to 
checkmate. Even more important, in the Descriptive Notation the 
positions of the pieces are not fixed, but relative to the player: if the 
judge is white and the entity is black, “K at K6” would not work if it 
meant “King in K6”: it rather means “King in K3” (Ke3); on the other 
hand, if the judge is black and the entity is white, than “K at my K1” 
means “King in K8” (Ke8). This information is not provided, and it 
should be inferred by the entity (as shown in fig. 2). 
 
 






Moreover, the judge simply asks the entity “what do you play?”35, and 
the entity is tacitly assumed to make a winning move, above all because 
it is a mate-in-one chess puzzle. But it is worth noting that it’s a 
common-sense assumption that the move in the chess puzzle should be 
a winning one. As Halpern (2006) observes: 
 
“Turing’s sample dialogue awards the computer just that 
property that programmers have never been able to give 
their computers: common sense.” (46) 
 
 
34 Fokker (2012, p. 95). 
35 Turing (1950, p. 435). 
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In other words, it would not be that impressive if the entity could solve 
the problem; and the entity indeed solves it, by replying “R-R8”36, after 
a pause of 15 seconds – for the same reason as the delayed reply in the 
arithmetical case. Turing’s example shows an entity that is able to 
understand natural language and deal with common-sense implications. 
In the chess case, the real task of the entity is not to solve the problem, 
but rather to show understanding. As Fokker (2012) puts: 
 
“the mere parsing of the questions is far more difficult to 
program than the actual chess problem solver.” (96) 
 
I argue that the chess puzzle, as analysed by Fokker (2012), shows a 
major problem in the experimental design of the TT: the conflation 
between ‘human-likeness’, that is, the ability to be indistinguishable 
from a human being, and what I call ‘correctness’, that is, the ability to 
provide the right verbal response to a verbal stimulus. As I discuss in 
Ch. 2, the conflation of these dimensions weakens the TT, making it 
vulnerable to Artificial Stupidity: since the hidden entity needs to give 
human-like replies to be considered human, it does not matter if the 
replies are incorrect or even not pertinent at all. As long as those replies 
have a human-like style, the entity may be recognised as human and 
pass the TT, even by giving only wrong and uncooperative replies. In 
order to prevent this potential exploit of the TT, I propose to keep 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ independent dimensions along 
which to parametrise the entity. I will argue this proposal more 
extensively in the next chapters. 
 
1.4.2 Second Dialogue 






“Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads 
‘Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day’, would not ‘a 
spring day’ do as well or better? 
Witness: It wouldn’t scan. 
Interrogator: How about ‘a winter’s day’ That would scan 
all right. 
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a 
winter’s day. 
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you 
of Christmas? 
Witness: In a way. 
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter’s day, and I do not 
think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison. 
Witness: I don’t think you’re serious. By a winter’s day one 
means a typical winter’s day, rather than a special one like 
Christmas.” (446) 
 
The second dialogue is more explicitly intended to deal with discourse 
representation and common-sense understanding. The dialogue is 
intended as a reply to Jefferson (1949), who writes: 
 
“Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a 
concerto [...] could we agree that machine equals brain.” 
(1110) 
 
Jefferson’s argument supports the view that machines cannot be said to 
think until they are intentional agents, and not acting merely “by the 
chance fall of symbols”37. Turing (1950) calls it the Argument from 
Consciousness, and rejects it due to its solipsistic consequence: how can 
we know that our fellow creatures act intentionally and not merely by 
chance? In other words, how can we know that other humans, except 
 
37 Turing (1950, p. 445). 
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ourselves, think? The dialogue is intended to reply to Jefferson’s remark 
by providing a discussion about a poem between an entity and the judge. 
 
The questions asked by the judge involve the prosody and the reasons 
why the entity uses a particular metaphorical dictionary, in order to 
unveil some human poetic sensibility. Turing picks one of the most 
praised sonnets by Shakespeare, Sonnet 18.38 But what would Jefferson 
say, as Turing asks, “if the sonnet writing machine was able to answer 
like this in the viva voce?”39 Would it be possible to describe it just an 
assembly of words, “an easy contrivance?”40 It’s safe to assume that 
here Turing implies that originality and creativity are rather problematic 
parameters, anticipating Lady Lovelace’s objection, according to which 
“a machine can never do something new”41. 
 
I argue that the judge in the second dialogue provided by Turing is a 
poetry expert. It seems reasonable to say that the judge is required to be 
a poetry expert in order to test a sonnet-writing entity properly, since 
any judge could ask the entity to produce a poem, but only one with 
certain poetry expertise could evaluate the poem properly. And, 
moreover, another clue that might confirm the judge to be a literature 
expert, is that she mentions another literature character, namely Mr. 
Pickwick, and asks the entity a question the answer of which requires 
knowing “The Pickwick Papers” by Dickens. Because of Turing’s 
suggestion of a test involving a “sonnet-writing machine” 42 and the 
dialogue above designed as a poetical version of the TT, I argue that 
Turing, as claimed by Traiger (2000), not only invites generalization in 
the TT, in terms of the task set by the test, but he also allows to run the 
test with experimental design variations, for instance, to run the TT as 
 
38 The sonnet provides a clear example of fine poetry that anyone could recognise as such. 
Interestingly enough, this could be a reference of Turing’s private life, since Sonnet 18 can be 
interpreted, as the modern critics do, as “the articulation of same-sex love.” (Cohen, 2008) 
39 Turing (1950, p. 446). 
40 Turing (1950, p. 447). 
41 Turing (1950, p. 450). 
42 Turing (1950, p. 446). 
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an Expert System test (allowing the judges to be expert in a certain 
field). So, according to this interpretation, the TT can be run as an 
Expert System test, in which the judge should not be just an average 
person, but rather an expert in a certain domain; and the conversation 
would not be a normal one, but rather specifically focused on that 
domain. If this is true, Turing anticipated the Feigenbaum Test (which 
I discuss in Ch. 4), proposed by Feigenbaum (2003), in which Expert 
Systems have to show advanced knowledge in a certain domain, by 
answering questions from a human expert in that domain, and by 
justifying the answers. An example of an Expert System TT such as the 
poetical TT, would thus involve a sonnet-writing entity and a poet 
judge, and the goal of the entity would be to “impress” the poet judge, 
by producing a good poem and by explaining it. Similarly to the poetical 
TT, it is possible to design a number of different tests: an example 
would be, following Jefferson (1949) in the quotation above, the 
musical TT, involving a concerto-composing entity and a musician. 
This, I hold, confirms Traiger’s (2000) view discussed in section 1.3, 
according to which the IG is intended to invite generalization, and the 
task can be modified to infer intelligence from a number of different 
characteristics and abilities (not necessarily impersonation). 
 
Summing up, I argue that Turing (1950) makes a few implicit and 
underestimated remarks when he provides the two dialogues as 
examples of conversations occurring during the TT. The first remark, 
made in the first dialogue, is that (i) the target entity, in order to pass 
the TT, should be as fallible as a human (for instance, it should reply in 
a delayed and, from time to time, wrong way to certain kind of 
questions). The second remark, made in the first dialogue, is that, in 
order to pass the TT, (ii) the target entity should have access to a 
common-sense knowledge base, and it should be parametrised not only 
along the dimension of ‘human-likeness’, but also along the dimension 
of ‘correctness’. The third and the fourth remarks, made in the second 
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dialogue, are (iii) that the experimental design of TT is intended to 
invite generalization and modifications; and (iv) that it allows more 
specific versions of the test to be played with experts, where 
‘correctness’ is evaluated along ‘human-likeness’ (anticipating the 
Feigenbaum Test, which I describe in Ch. 4). Alternative versions of 
the test could be the Poetry TT or the Music TT (involving, for instance, 
Botpoet43, a bot able to produce haiku poems; and Bachbot44, a bot able 
to produce music inspired by Bach). 
 
 
1.5 Turing’s Conception of Intelligence 
 
In this section, I present Turing’s conception of intelligence, as Turing 
discusses and as Proudfoot (2013) analyses. Here, I address the 
following question: why did Turing choose to keep the judge an average 
person, with the risk for the TT to get biased results? 
 
In “Intelligent Machinery” (1948), Turing explicitly describes 
intelligence as an “emotional concept”45, that is, a concept the 
applications of which are 
 
“determined as much by our own state of mind and training 
as by the properties of the object under consideration.” (19) 
 
This stance, Proudfoot (2013) holds, is a response-dependent one. In 
other words, an agent’s intelligence is in part determined by our 





45 Turing (1948, p. 19). 
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“Turing undermined the idea that intelligence is a feature of 
the world independent of our tendency to “imagine” 
intelligence in things.” (397) 
 
There is enough evidence, as shown above, to hold that Turing does not 
intend the TT to provide the logically necessary conditions for 
intelligence. What about the logically sufficient ones? The TT is 
commonly considered to provide at least the sufficient conditions for 
intelligence, that is, an operational definition of intelligence, in terms 
of the ability to produce such a behaviour which is indistinguishable 
from that of a human. The response-dependent interpretation, however, 
is no longer compatible with the view that the TT is intended to provide 
sufficient conditions for intelligence. As Proudfoot (2013) argues: 
 
“It fails to explain the fact that success in Turing’s test is 
determined not solely by the machine’s behavior but also 
by the interrogator’s response.” (394) 
 
Similarly to Proudfoot, Copeland argues that the TT is intended to 
provide neither the logically necessary or sufficient conditions for 
intelligence, but only to show that the principle that Turing proposes is 
true. The principle in question, as Copeland (2000) describes it, is the 
following: 
 
“Turing’s Principle: A machine that by means of 
calculation imitates –or, better, ‘emulates,’ for Turing is 
concerned with faithful imitation– the intellectual 
behaviour of a human brain can itself appropriately be 
described as a brain, or as thinking.” (529) 
 
I agree that the TT is best regarded as a test for the presence of a 
response-dependent property, where “x is intelligent (or thinks) if, in an 
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unrestricted computer-imitates-human game, x appears intelligent to an 
average interrogator”46, under normal conditions. However, I claim that 
the experimental design of the TT needs to be improved in order to 
consider not only the “state of mind and training”47 of the judge, but 
also “the properties of the object under consideration.”48 I argue that by 
modifying the experimental design of the TT, which is compatible with 
Turing’s description of the test and with the examples he provides, in 
order to evaluate more of the hidden entity’s properties in addition to 
‘human-likeness’, it is possible to avoid two major difficulties with the 
TT. I hold these difficulties to be Artificial Stupidity, which I discuss 
in the next chapter; and Blockhead, which I discuss in chapter 3. 
 
 
4.1 French’s Subcognitive Competency 
 
In his paper “Subcognition and Limits of the Turing Test” (1990), 
French claims that the TT can only provide a guarantee of “culturally 
oriented human intelligence”49, rather than intelligence in general. As a 
consequence, a genuinely intelligent agent – no matter whether human 
or artificial – could still fail the TT by not responding in a thoroughly 
human-like way to the judge. However, French argues, in order to 
respond in a thoroughly human-like way, it is necessary to have 
experienced the world as a human. This conjecture is similar to the one 
made by Harnad50, and summarised by Hauser (1993): 
 
“The sensorimotor capacities […] are causally necessary 




46 Proudfoot (2013, p. 399). 
47 Turing (1948, p. 19). 
48 Ibidem. 
49 French (1990, p. 54). 
50 See Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000). 
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From this assumption, French (2000a) concludes: 
 
“No computer that has not experienced the world as we 
humans had could pass a rigorously administered standard 
Turing Test.” (331) 
 
In apparent agreement with Harnad, French seems to suggest that a fully 
sensorimotor entity, with the same ability to perceive the world and 
interact with it as a human, would be able to pass the TT. In section 6 
of French’s paper, eloquently entitled “The Impossibility of Isolating 
the Physical Level from the Cognitive Level”51, he argues that a crucial 
assumption of the TT is that it is possible to disassociate the body from 
the mind. In other words, French argues that, according to Turing, it is 
possible to design a fully cognitive machine without implementing it 
with an artificial body to experience the world. This is because the 
physical level is “unimportant to the essence of cognition”52, that is, the 
physical level is not necessary for the cognitive one. This is the reason 
why, in the TT, the hidden entity is screened off from the human judge, 
and the communication is carried on via indirect text-based interactions. 
Let’s imagine, as French continues53, an entity like a human in every 
aspect except for the position of the eyes, located not on the face but on 
the knees. Such a bizarre physical feature would cause a huge difference 
in terms of cognitive processes (for instance, the way in which the entity 
should coordinate movements in order to see properly, reading a book, 
wearing glasses, riding a bike, driving a car and so forth) and, 
consequently, would engender a huge difference in terms of its 




51 French (1990, p. 62). 
52 Ibidem. 
53 French (1990, p. 63). 
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“While no one would claim that the physical location of 
eyes had anything essential to do with intelligence, a Turing 
Test could certainly distinguish this individual from a 
normal human being. The moral of the story is that the 
physical level is not disassociable from the cognitive level.” 
(63) 
 
Since the physical level and the cognitive level are argued not to be 
disassociable, French claims that it is possible not only to reveal 
fundamental differences in cognitive abilities of an entity, but even to 
detect its physical features54, by means of what he calls subcognitive 
questions. French (2000a) writes: 
 
“the use of ‘subcognitive’ questions allows the standard 
Turing Test to indirectly probe the human subcognitive 
associative concept network built up over a lifetime of 
experience with the world. Not only can this probing reveal 
differences in cognitive abilities, but crucially, even 
differences in physical aspects of the candidates can be 
detected.” (331) 
 
Subcognitive questions are described as questions able to “provide a 
window on low level (i.e. unconscious) cognitive structure”55, while by 
low-level cognitive structure French (1990) refers to the 
 
“subconscious associative network in human minds that 
consists of highly overlapping activatable representations 
of experience.” (57) 
 
 
54 French (2000a, p. 331). 
55 French (1990, p. 56). 
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The subcognitive processes could play a crucial role in the TT for 
unmasking a machine and, consequently, they are the core of French’s 
argument against the possibility that a disembodied machine could pass 
the TT. This implies, although French does not explicitly say it, that the 
judge should be trained to ask subcognitive questions during the TT. I 
discuss this proposal in Ch. 2, where I disagree with the idea of training 
the judge in order to improve the experimental design of the TT. 
 
Examples of subcognitive questions are rating questions, to which an 
entity should reply by rating on a scale of 0-10 a particular thing or a 
particular concept association. French (1990) proposes a number of 
these Rating Games, in the form of “on a scale of 0 (completely 
implausible) to 10 (completely plausible), please rate x”56, where x is 
something that can show the presence of a subcognitive substrate. He 
describes five of these games: (i) the “Neologism Rating Game”, 
consisting in rating the suitability of new words, like “Flugblogs” as a 
company’s name or a breakfast cereal brand57; (ii) the “Category Rating 
Game”, consisting in rating concept associations, like dry leaves as 
hiding places58; (iii) the “Poetic Beauty Rating Game”, consisting in 
rating a poem, where 0 means “absolutely not poetic” and 10 means 
“absolutely poetic”59; (iv) the “Joke Rating Game”, consisting in rating 
a joke, where 0 means “totally not funny” and 10 means “totally 
funny”60; and (v) the “Advertising Rating Game”, consisting in rating 
the efficacy of a slogan, where 0 means “definitely not catchy” and 10 
means “definitely catchy”61. According to French, these games allow 
the judge to unmask any hidden entity that is not human, being the TT 
a test not for intelligence in general, but rather for human-like 
intelligence. 
 
56 French (1990, p. 58). 
57 French (1990, p. 59). 
58 French (1990, p. 60). 






The distinction between intelligence in general and human intelligence 
plays an important role in French’s argument. On the one hand, he 
argues that a subcognitive substrate is not necessary for intelligence in 
general; on the other hand, however, he holds that a certain subcognitive 
substrate is necessary for human intelligence. As French (1990) states: 
 
“[...] a human subcognitive substrate is definitely not 
necessary to intelligence in general. The Turing Test tests 
precisely for the presence of a human subcognitive 
substrate and this is why it is limited as a test for general 
intelligence. On the other hand, I believe that some 
subcognitive substrate is necessary to intelligence.” (63) 
 
It may seem that French is in apparent agreement with Harnad (1989, 
1991, 2000), in considering a conversational machine not adequate to 
show intelligence and, implicitly, in suggesting a replacement with a 
fully embodied robot that can acquire a subcognitive competency by 
interacting with the world, just like humans do. However, French rejects 
this view, since the main implicit assumption of an embodied TT is to 
remove the teletype (or monitor and keyboard) limitation, that is, to 
remove the screen between the judge and the entity in order to let them 
interact directly. As he holds, there is no need for redesigning the test 
in order to switch it from being text-based to being based on direct 
interactions: simple subcognitive questions are enough to reveal 
physical features of the hidden entity and thus to unmask it. Due to the 
subcognitive questions, in other words, an embodied TT is claimed to 
be redundant. As French (2000a) argues: 
 
“the underlying idea of subcognitive questions is that they 
tap into those things which are associated with our uniquely 
human manner of interacting with the world, which, among 
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other things, is a product of the presence, precision and 
location of our sense organs, as well as our lifetime of 
cultural and social interactions.” (335) 
 
Summing up, French claims that the symbolic level is not adequate for 
building an intelligent machine; and the main reason is that a huge 
subcognitive look-up table like Blockhead is not physically feasible. In 
other words, a physical symbol system would not be able to contain all 
the lines of code needed to recreate human cognition and, especially, 
human subcognition (namely, conceptual associative competency, 
categorization ability, knowledge adaptation, and so forth) for which a 
full range of sensorimotor experiences in the world is required. 
However, as French (2000b) points out, the symbolic level is adequate 
for testing an allegedly intelligent machine, since the lower levels of 
cognitions can be probed by the symbolic level (in the form of 
subcognitive questions). In other words, given that the physical 
attributes play such an important role in cognition, he claims that they 
can be detected by “subtle high-level (symbolic) questioning”62, 
implicitly suggesting that the judge of the TT, rather than average, 
should be prepared to ask subcognitive questions. French (2000a), 
finally, rejects the view that the TT needs any experimental update or 
improvement, for it is already too hard: 
 
“[I]t is unnecessary to propose even harder versions of the 
[Turing] Test in which all physical and behavioural aspects 
of the two candidates had to be indistinguishable before 
allowing the machine to pass the Test. Any machine that 
passed the ‘simpler’ symbols-in/symbols-out test as 
originally proposed by Turing would be intelligent. The 
problem is that, even in its original form, the Turing Test is 
already too hard and too anthropocentric for any machine 
 
62 French (2000a, p. 333). 
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that was not a physical, social and behavioural carbon copy 
of ourselves to actually pass it.” (331) 
 
I disagree with the view that the experimental design of the TT does not 
need to be improved. The reason is that, I hold, the TT is too easily 
exploitable by Artificial Stupidity (Ch. 2), and Blockhead (Ch. 3); and 
my claim is rather that the experimental design of the TT needs to be 





In this chapter I describe the IG, better known as the TT, where an 
average human judge can decide, by means of a text-based conversation 
with a putatively minded entity, whether the entity is human-like (and 
by extension intelligent) or not (where it does not necessarily mean for 
the entity to be unintelligent). I review Turing (1950), contextualizing 
it with his other works (especially 1948 and 1952). I discuss the two 
main interpretations of the TT, the “Literal Interpretation”, advocated 
by Sterrett (2000) and Traiger (2000); and the “Standard 
Interpretation”, advocated by Copeland (2000), Piccinini (2000) and 
Moor (2001). 
 
I hold the LI over the SI and, in particular, I agree with Sterrett (2002b) 
who argues that the insight of Turing’s approach to test for intelligence 
 
“is that behaviour that requires an agent to recognize when 
the response that would be produced by habit (including 
cognitive habits) is inappropriate, to override that habitual 
response, and construct and carry out an appropriate 





Moreover, I pay particular attention to the two dialogues provided by 
Turing (1950), which I claim to contain interesting remarks, that can 
unveil some helpful clarifications about the experimental design of the 
TT. Finally, following Proudfoot (2013), I discuss Turing’s conception 
of intelligence as a response-dependent concept. 
 
In the next chapter, I consider one of the two main difficulties with the 
TT: Artificial Stupidity (the other one being Blockhead, which I discuss 






























Abstract. In this chapter, I discuss one of the two main difficulties with 
the TT: Artificial Stupidity. With Artificial Stupidity, I refer to a set of 
certain uncooperative strategies that the hidden entity can use to pass 
the test by exploiting the judge’s beliefs. The kind of strategies involved 
in Artificial Stupidity can be exemplified by the following response: 
“I'm not in the mood, let’s talk about something else.” The reason why 
Artificial Stupidity can exploit the TT is that it infers intelligence from 
‘human-likeness’. It means that the entity, as long as it produces human-
like responses, can simply evade any interaction. In other words, the TT 
does not care about the content of the conversation: all that matters is 
the style. I argue that Artificial Stupidity shows that the experimental 
design of the TT is flawed, and I identify the flaw in the conflation 
between two dimensions that, I claim, should rather be evaluated 
independently: ‘human-likeness’, that is, the ability to produce verbal 
interactions indistinguishable from human ones; and ‘correctness’, that 
is, the ability to produce the right and pertinent responses. 
 
In this chapter, I discuss Artificial Stupidity, which I argue to be one of 
the two main problems of the TT, the other one being Blockhead (which 
I discuss in Ch. 3). Artificial Stupidity, I argue, allows the hidden entity 
to pass the TT by holding a conversation in an uncooperative way: by 
rejecting or evading any of the judge’s questions or interactions and 
exploiting her personal beliefs. My claim is that this is due to the 
conflation between ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, which makes it 
far more convenient for the entity to focus on the style of its replies 
rather than their content. To avoid this exploit, I propose to keep 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ two independent dimensions along 
which the entity should be parametrised. 
 
In the next section, I recall Turing’s (1950) conception of Artificial 
Stupidity and Fallibility. In section 2.2, I present two examples of 
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‘artificially stupid’ programs: Eliza (Weizenbaum, 1966) and Eugene 
Goostman (Demchenko & Veselov, 2009). In section 2.3, I show the 
false positives and negatives in the TT: the Eliza Effect and the 
Confederate Effect. In section 2.4, I discuss what can arguably be 
considered the most advanced field where Artificial Stupidity is studied 
and applied, that is, video games; and I describe two alternative versions 
of the TT, Soar Quakebot, proposed by Laird & Duchi (2000), and the 
Computer Game Bot Turing Test, proposed by Hingston (2003). 
Finally, in section 2.5, I discuss the Cooperative Principle proposed by 
Grice (1975), in order to discriminate between a genuine conversation 
and an artificially stupid one. 
 
 
2.1 Turing’s Artificial Stupidity and Fallibility 
 
The experimental design of the TT, it’s worth recalling, does not care 
if the entity gives wrong, evasive or uncooperative replies, as long as 
they are human-like enough to convince the judge. In other words, 
given the experimental design of the TT, the content of the entity’s 
replies does not matter: the only thing that matters is their human-like 
style. So, as long as the hidden entity’s replies are sufficiently human-
like to convince the judge that they are produced by a human, the hidden 
entity can adopt a number of strategies to avoid or bypass any of the 
judge’s interactions. An example of Artificial Stupidity is provided by 
Turing (1950), as discussed in the previous chapter: 
 
“Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth 
Bridge. 





In the example above, the judge asks the hidden entity to compose a 
poem, and the entity refuses with a plausible human-like reply. Since 
the TT is not intended to probe the ability to write a poem (or any other 
specific ability except being recognised as human, during a text-based 
conversation, as frequently as a human is), it is plausible that a human 
would give the same reply, or something similar like “I’m not good with 
words” or “I’m not inspired right now”. The flaw in the TT, I argue, is 
that it is not possible to discriminate between human-like intelligence 
and human-like stupidity. The reason is that the dimension of ‘human-
likeness’, which evaluates the ability to produce conversational 
behaviours indistinguishable from those of a human, is conflated with 
what I call the dimension of ‘correctness’, which is intended to evaluate 
the entity’s ability to produce the right responses. The conflation 
between ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ in the experimental design 
of the TT can be supported by the following statement by Turing 
(1950), who argues that a human pretending to be a machine would 
perform poorly: 
 
“He would be given away at once by slowness and 
inaccuracy in arithmetic.” (435) [Italics added] 
 
Where slowness, in the case of an arithmetic performance, refers to the 
style of the reply, that is its ‘human-likeness’; and inaccuracy to its 
‘correctness’. But even if Turing, when he discusses the arithmetical 
case, implicitly distinguishes between these two dimensions, they are 
not independently evaluated during the TT. 
 
Due to the conflation between ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, it is 
possible to hold that it is far more convenient for the hidden entity, 
either human or machine, to behave stupidly (or uncooperatively) rather 
than intelligently (or cooperatively), in order to pass the TT. By 
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rejecting Artificial Stupidity, I need to clarify, I am not holding that the 
hidden entity should be infallible. 
 
It is important to distinguish between Artificial Stupidity and Artificial 
Fallibility. Whereas the former is a strategy that the entity can adopt to 
pass the TT by exploiting the judge’s beliefs, the latter is a required 
characteristic of the hidden entity in order to be considered human. A 
general example of Artificial Fallibility is the following: the entity 
should delay providing the results of certain arithmetical operations, 
and this is true both for a machine, which would likely be unmasked by 
its ability to calculate numbers too quickly, as well as for a human 
extremely good with calculations, who would likely be mistaken for a 
computer. As shown in Ch. 1, Turing (1950) provides the following 
example of Artificial Fallibility: 
 
“Q: Add 34957 to 70764 
A: (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 
105621.” (434) 
 
It is worth noting that not only the entity takes some time to reply, but 
also that the reply is not correct (the correct one is 105721). 
 
Finally, in order to clarify Artificial Stupidity, I provide a few examples 
of it. Cases of ‘artificially stupid’ replies to the question “Who are 
you?” could be the following: 
 
• Answering with another question: “Who do you think I am?” 
• Changing the subject: “No one, let’s talk about something else.” 
• Giving an answer out of context: “What time is it?” 
• Providing a general reply: “I’m someone.” 
• Lying: “I’m an elf.” 
• Questioning the question: “Why are you asking who I am?” 
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• Refusing to answer: “I’m not going to tell you that.” 
• Repeating the question: “And who are you?” 
• Challenging the question: “Why do you care so much?” 
 
Although the replies above are arguably incorrect and uncooperative 
ones, since they do not answer the question at all, they appear 
convincingly human-like. The aim of this chapter is to propose to keep 
the dimensions of ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ independent, and 
to parametrise the hidden entity along both. This, I argue, allows to 
prevent Artificial Stupidity from exploiting the judge’s personal beliefs 
and passing the TT, without implying chauvinistically that the entity 
should be infallible. The reason is that, whereas Artificial Fallibility is 
compatible with both ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, Artificial 
Stupidity is only compatible with ‘human-likeness’, not ‘correctness’. 
 
Summing up, one problem with the experimental design of the TT is 
that, due to the conflation between ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, 
it allows what I call Artificial Stupidity to be an effective strategy for 
passing the test. Artificial Stupidity refers to those uncooperative 
conversational strategies which can potentially bypass every possible 
verbal interaction (for instance, by changing the topic or pleading the 
fifth63), and exploit the judge’s beliefs during the TT. I distinguish it 
from Artificial Fallibility, which refers to the natural boundaries of 
knowledge that an average human can possess, and, by extension, that 
a machine can show. To prevent Artificial Stupidity from exploiting the 
judge’s beliefs, I propose to parametrise the target entity along two 
independent dimensions: ‘human-likeness’, evaluating the ability to be 
recognised as human; and ‘correctness’, evaluating the ability to 




63 See Warwick & Shah (2017). 
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2.2 Eliza and Eugene’s Artificial Stupidity 
 
In this section, I provide two examples of ‘artificially stupid’ systems 
that can pass the TT by exploiting the judge’s beliefs. The first one, 
which is also chronologically the first implementation of Artificial 
Stupidity, is the chatbot called Eliza, programmed by Weizenbaum 
(1966). Eliza is a program that can manipulate text by means of certain 
transformation rules, thanks to which it can act the part of a Rogerian 
psychotherapist. Block (1981) synthesises such rules by providing 
examples of some of the strategies that Eliza can use during the 
conversation: 
 
“Its major technique is to look for key words such as “I,” 
“you,” “alike,” “father,” and “everybody.” The words are 
ranked – for example, “father” is ranked above 
“everybody,” and so if you type in “My father is afraid of 
everybody,” the machine will respond with one of its 
“father” responses, such as “What else comes to mind when 
you think of your father?” If you type in “I know everybody 
laughed at me,” you will get one of its responses to 
“everybody,” for example, “Who in particular are you 
thinking of?” It also has techniques that simultaneously 
transform “you” into “I” and “me” into “you,” so that if you 
type in “You don’t agree with me,” it can reply: “Why do 
you think that I don’t agree with you?” It also stores 
sentences containing certain key words such as “my.” If 
your current input contains no key words, but if you had 
earlier said “My boyfriend made me come here,” it will 
“ignore” your current remark, saying instead, “Does that 
have anything to do with the fact that your boyfriend made 
you come here?” If all other tricks fail, it has a list of last 
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ditch responses such as, “Who is the psychiatrist here, you 
or me?” (8-9) 
 
Weizenbaum (1966) provides a dialogue in which it is possible to see 
how Eliza, by means of a set of simple transformation rules, as shown 
above, exploits the human’s beliefs by asking seemingly sincere and 
empathic questions, as a Rogerian psychotherapist would do: 
 
“Human: Men are all alike. 
Eliza: In what way? 
Human: They’re always bugging 
us about something or other. 
Eliza: Can you think of a specific 
example? 
Human: Well, my boyfriend 
made me come here. 
Eliza: Your boyfriend made you 
come here. 
Human: He says I’m depressed 
much of the time. 
Eliza: I am sorry to hear you are 
depressed. 
Human: It’s true. I am unhappy. 
Eliza: Do you think coming here 
will help you not to be unhappy? 
Human: I need some help, that 
much seems certain. 
Eliza: What would it mean to you 
if you got some help? 
Human: Perhaps I could learn to 
get along with my mother. 
Eliza: Tell me more about your 
family. 
Human: My mother takes care of 
me. 
Eliza: Who else in your family 
takes care of you? 
Human: My father. 
Eliza: Your father. 
Human: You are like my father in 
some ways. 
Eliza: What resemblance do you 
see? 
Human: You are not very 
aggressive but I think you don’t 
want me to notice that. 
Eliza: What makes you think I am 
not very aggressive? 
Human: You don’t argue with 
me. 
Eliza: Why do you think I don’t 
argue with you? 
Human: You are afraid of me. 
Eliza: Does it please you to 
believe I am afraid of you. 
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Human: My father is afraid of 
everybody. 
Eliza: What else comes to your 
mind when you think of your 
father? 
Human: Bullies. 
Eliza: Does that have anything to 
do with the fact that your 
boyfriend made you come here?” 
(36)
  
The second example that I provide of an ‘artificially stupid’ system is 
the chatbot called Eugene Goostman, programmed by Vladimir 
Veselov, Eugene Demchenko and Sergey Ulasen in 2001, who admit to 
be “[…] much closer to natural stupidity than to artificial 
intelligence.”64 Eugene acts the part of a 13 years old Ukrainian boy, 
and during the 5 minutes parallel-paired tests conducted at the Royal 
Society in 2014, as reported by Warwick & Shah (2015), it achieved a 
33% success rate of convincing the human judges of its ‘human-
likeness’. The result was considered to be the fulfilment of the 
following prediction made by Turing (1950): 
 
“I believe that in about fifty years’ time it will be possible 
to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 
109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an 
average interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent, 
chance of making the right identification after five minutes 
of questioning.” (442) 
 
However, the relevance of Eugene’s success was rapidly criticised, and 
the claim that a system finally achieved to pass the TT dismissed. The 
reason lies in the design of Eugene’s personality, namely its age and 
nationality, which have the purpose of biasing the judge with whom it 
interacts to overlook anything that is not adult human-like, as the lack 
of common knowledge, local cultural knowledge, pragmatics 
understanding, and so on. Several transcripts of Eugene’s dialogues in 
 
64 Demchenko & Veselov (2009, p. 453). 
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which it managed to pass the TT are provided by Warwick & Shah 
(2015). The following is an illustrative one: 
 
“Judge: what did you have for 
breakfast today 
Entity: Is it ‘the third degree’? 
I’m not going to answer such a 
provocative question! Well, let’s 
go on though. 
Judge: do go on… your call? 
Entity: It is highly possible. By 
the way, what’s your occupation? 
I mean – could you tell me about 
your work? 
Judge: so you are asking me now 
eh? I am an actress and writer 
Entity: Well, I’ll read something 
of your books, if they ain’t too 
tedious (which is highly possible 
:-) 
Judge: grammar… aren’t too 
tedious! A bit rude of you… 
Entity: Calm down, please. 
Judge: i asure you i am very 
calm… are you? 
Entity: Don’t even bother me 
with the fact that you are very 
calm… are mine. And I forgot to 
ask you where you are from… 
Judge: I am from Dorset… where 
are you from? 
Entity: I am from Ukraine, from 
the city called Odessa. You might 
have heard about it.” (6) 
 
Summing up, Eliza and Eugene are programmed to exploit the human 
judge’s beliefs during the TT, by acting a certain part in order to mislead 
her decisions. As Block (1981) points out, the possibility of Artificial 
Stupidity raises concerns about the role of the judge within the 
experimental design of the TT: 
 
“Since our tendency to be fooled by such programs seems 
dependent on our degree of suspicion, sophistication about 
machines, and other contingent factors, it seems silly to 
adopt a view of the nature of intelligence or thought that so 
closely ties it to human judgment. Could the issue of 
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whether a machine in fact thinks or is intelligent depend on 
how gullible human interrogators tend to be?” (10) 
 
I reject the view that Block (1981) seems to suggest, according to which 
it is the judge’s responsibility to prevent Artificial Stupidity from 
passing. And, since it would be incompatible with the average judge 
advocated by Turing, I also reject any proposal that involves training 
the judge to be less gullible (as in Warwick & Shah, 2015, which I 
consider in the next section). As anticipated in the previous chapter and 
above, the solution I propose is rather to keep ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’ independent and to parametrise the target entity along 
both these dimensions. This, I hold, improves the experimental design 
of the TT, preventing Artificial Stupidity from passing without 
requiring any training for the judge. 
 
 
2.3 The Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect 
 
The Eliza Effect occurs when the human judge anthropomorphises the 
hidden entity (machine), that is, when the judge assumes that the 
machine is a human. Turkle (1997) defines the Eliza Effect as a: 
 
“general tendency to treat responsive computer 
programmes as more intelligent than they really are, [due to 
our tendency to] project our own complexity onto 
undeserving objects.” (101) 
 
The Confederate Effect is the opposite of the Eliza Effect, and it occurs 
when the human judge ‘mechanomorphises’ the hidden entity (human), 
that is, when “a human’s textual discourse is considered machine-
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like.”65 The Confederate Effect does not occur due to Artificial 
Stupidity: it is a bias which entirely depends on the judge’s personal 
beliefs. The Eliza Effect, on the other hand, is caused by Artificial 
Stupidity exploiting the judge’s beliefs, and it is one of the two main 
difficulties with the TT that I intend to solve. 
 
Before discussing the Eliza Effect and Artificial Stupidity in more 
detail, I consider the Confederate Effect for the rest of this section, 
which can represent a problem for the reliability of the judge. It can be 
said that the Confederate Effect depends on the level of Artificial 
Fallibility that the entity shows, in relation to the level of fallibility 
expected by the judge. Halpern (2006) points out that it can be the case 
for a human candidate, who shows too much accurate knowledge about 
a particular topic, to fail the test by being judged as a machine by the 
judge. This was the case of Cynthia Clay in the first Loebner Prize 
Competition, held in 1991. I leave aside the question about the validity 
of the Loebner Prize as a contest; suffice to say that many believe that 
the Loebner Prize and the jury-based setup is not the proper realization 
of the TT. 
 
It’s useful to recall how the Loebner Prize was organized on that 
occasion: ten human judges had to interrogate eight terminals (six of 
which driven by computers and two by humans) in order to unmask 
them. Furthermore, each of the terminals had a particular 
conversational topic assigned, specifically: (i) Women’s Clothing, (ii) 
Small Talk, (iii) Second Grade School Topics, (iv) Shakespeare’s Plays, 
(v) Whimsical Conversation, (vi) Problems in Romantic Relationships, 
(vii) Burgundy Wine, and (viii) Dry Martinis. Cynthia was driving 
terminal 4, dedicated to Shakespeare’s plays. Due to her vast 
knowledge of the eminent playwright, three of the ten judges regarded 
her as a machine. It is worth noting, however, that her answers did not 
 
65 Shah & Henry (2005, p. 1). 
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directly show a deep and detailed knowledge of Shakespeare’s works: 
they showed, as Halpern (2006) notes, “responsiveness and cogency 
rather than mere factual content.”66 For instance: 
 
“Judge 9: Are you familiar with Hamlet? 
Terminal 4: The college kid who came home and found his 
mom had married the guy who murdered his dad just a little 
month before? You might say so.” (ibid.) 
 
Cynthia avoids repeating any of the keywords used in the question: she 
does not directly reply something like “Yes, I’m familiar with...”; and 
she even avoids repeating the name of the tragedy. And at the top of it, 
she adds a final sarcastic touch with “You might say so”, that suits a 
Shakespeare expert being asked if she is familiar with his most well-
known play. Yet three judges considered the terminal driven by a 
machine, two of whom ranked her even lower on the human/computer 
scale than two other terminals that were actually driven by machines67. 
Here is another exchange, provided by Halpern (2006), between a 
different judge and Cynthia Clay: 
 
“Judge 1: What is your opinion 
on Shakespeare’s plays?” 
Terminal 4: That’s pretty 
general; would you be more 
specific? 
Otherwise, I’ll just say I like them. 
Judge 1: Learning that you like 
them answers my question. Which 
of his plays is your favourite? 
 
66 Halpern (2006, p. 57). 
67 Ibidem. 
Terminal 4: Well, let’s see. . . 
Pericles. 
Judge 1: Why is it your favourite? 
Terminal 4: Because he was 
obviously called in to play-doctor 
somebody’s awful script. It was 
one of the few (maybe only two?) 
plays written with somebody else. 
It’s really rather an ucky play. 
What play do you like? 
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Judge 1: I did not understand 
your response. However, to 
answer your question, I do not 
have a favourite.” (58) 
 
Again, here Cynthia provides good replies, both in terms of the contents 
(the unusual choice, Pericles, motivated by her clarifications; no 
attempts to change the topic; no repetition of words appeared in the 
questions) and in terms of the form (for instance, the question in 
brackets and the colloquial term “ucky” which suggests a human-like 
style). The judge does not seem to understand, likely due to a poor 
knowledge of Shakespeare; nor does she seem to be trying to learn what 
Cynthia is talking about. Interestingly, Halpern (2006) underlines that 
a reader may find herself checking more than once which reply is 
produced by the terminal and which one by the judge, since it is often 
the latter “who seems to be avoiding the kind of closely engaged 
conversation that a computer program would be incapable of.”68 
 
The question that may arise now is the following: shouldn’t the judge 
recognise that Cynthia Clay was an intelligent human rather than an 
unintelligent machine? It seems that the judge failed to recognize her 
due to a poor knowledge of Shakespeare. Then the question could be 
rephrased in the following way: shouldn’t the judge be at least familiar 
with the topic of the conversation, that is, in this case, with the 
Shakespearean works? The question raises an important issue: the 
subject matter competence of a TT judge (anticipated in the previous 
chapter considering the Poetry TT or the Music TT69). In the first 
Loebner Prize Competition, each of the terminals was committed to a 
specific topic, replacing the general conversation advocated by the TT. 
So, the terminals are better regarded as Expert Systems. Such setup 
appears to be more suitable for the Feigenbaum Test (FT), proposed by 
Feingebaum (2003), where the judges are intended to be experts, rather 
 
68 Halpern (2006, p. 58). 
69 See p. 33. 
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than average persons; and the conversation is intended to be an expert 
one rather than an open one. I will discuss the FT in Ch. 4. 
 
2.3.1 Training the Judge 
Even though the Confederate Effect case shown above is not from a 
genuine TT, it is important to clarify that it may happen during a general 
conversation in the TT as well. The judge’s misjudgement may 
similarly occur not only with experts of a particular field, but also with 
players affected by particular conditions (like autism) or due to the 
judge’s biased beliefs (about, for instance, the level of knowledge that 
a human can possess about a certain topic). Block (1981) summarises 
the concern about the Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect in the 
following way:  
 
“human judges may be unfairly chauvinist in rejecting 
genuinely intelligent machines, and they may be overly 
liberal in accepting cleverly-engineered, mindless 
machines.” (10) 
 
Warwick & Shah (2015), in order to prevent the Confederate Effect 
from occurring, provide a list of suggestions according to which the – 
human – candidate of the TT should be trained: 
 
“(i) Do not show that you know a lot of things – the judge 
may conclude that you are too clever to be human. 
(ii) Do not try to take over the conversation, by powering it 
in a different direction – let the judge always feel that they 
are in control. 
(iii) Do not add new material of a different nature even if 
you feel this is helpful, otherwise the judge may feel that 
you know too much to be human. 
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(iv) Do not be humorous, the judge may not understand. For 
some strange reason humour appears to be associated with 
machine behaviour! 
(v) Answer all of the judge’s questions directly, do not give 
a slightly different, out of the box, response. 
(vi) Try not to be completely boring, flavour your answers 
at least. 
(vii) Try to answer general questions to the best of your 
ability, read the question! 
(viii) Try not to dominate the conversation or to throw in 
knowledge that the judge may not be aware of. The judge 
maybe will not want to admit that he/she does not know 
something. 
(ix) Try to make sure that your first and last lines of 
response are reasonable, to the point and not misleading. 
Both first and last impressions are important.” (133) 
 
So, Warwick & Shah (2015), similarly to Block (1981), are implicitly 
holding that, in order to avoid false positives or negatives, such as the 
Confederate Effect, the hidden human participants should be trained. I 
disagree, for it would be incompatible with the average judge advocated 
by Turing, making the test intrinsically chauvinistic. I rather hold that, 
in order to avoid the Confederate Effect, as well as – at least – minimise 
the Eliza Effect, the solution is not to train the judge, but rather to update 
the experimental design of the test. 
 
 
2.4 Artificial Stupidity in Video Games 
 
Artificial Stupidity plays a particularly interesting role in video games. 
Laird & Duchi (2000), discussing the potential of designing 




“we could apply the Turing Test more broadly to interactive 
dynamic environments with the goal of improving the 
humanness of AI systems.” (79) 
 
The kind of test that can be derived from the TT and applied to a 
simulated environment is similar to the Total Turing Test70, proposed 
by Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000): instead of evaluating a real robot in a 
real environment, it evaluates a virtual entity in a virtual environment. 
Laird & Duchi (2000) propose a test to evaluate the ‘human-likeness’ 
of characters from an FPS (First Person Shooter) video game71, called 
Soar Quakebot, which is parametrized along four dimensions: (i) 
decision time, (ii) aggressiveness, (iii) aiming skill, and (iv) tactical 
knowledge.72 
 
Soar Quakebot is not omniscient about the battleground: it rather has 
the same perceptual ability of a human player (for instance, it can only 
“see” inside its cone view and it can only “hear” nearby sounds). 
Moreover, the human judge has 2 main differences with the TT judge: 
she not only evaluates the character under scrutiny, she also plays the 
game as best as she can; and she cannot constantly monitor the character 
under scrutiny, for she can only see it when it is in her visual range. 
 
As Laird & Duchi (2000) specify, Soar Quakebot is intended to 
highlight the correlation between “humanness and skill level”73 
required to be considered intelligent. It is worth reiterating that Soar 
Quakebot is not tested for ‘human-likeness’ only, as the hidden entity 
in the TT; it is tested for both its ‘human-likeness’ and skill level, which, 
 
70 Harnad’s Total Turing Test extends the experimental design of the original TT to involve 
sensorimotor and neurophysiological capabilities in addition to conversational ones. I discuss 
it in more detail in Ch. 4. 
71 The game used is Quake II. 
72 Laird & Duchi (2000, p. 75). 
73 Laird & Duchi (2000, p. 76). 
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I hold, is analogous to ‘correctness’. Similarly to the TT, however, a 
certain degree of naivete is required from the judge, who should not be 
an expert of videogames developing nor an expert of the video game on 
which the test is based. As Lidén (2003) remarks, 
 
“any knowledge of artificial intelligence techniques and 
tricks will influence the playtester’s interpretation of 
events.” (46) 
 
Similarly, he argues that designing a non-playable character (NPC) in 
video games is very similar to designing a bot that can pass for a human. 
However, he underlines that an NPC cannot be supposed to win, as a 
video game is an entertaining product for the human consumer to enjoy. 
As a consequence, the NPC must be relatively ‘stupid’, without giving 
up its ‘human-likeness’. Lidén (2003) summarises this view as follows: 
 
“Creating an NPC that can beat a human player is relatively 
easy. Creating one that can lose to the player in a 
challenging manner is difficult.” (42) 
 
The most common video game genre where Artificial Stupidity is 
involved is FPS. In an FPS scenario, the player generally has to move 
purposely through the environment, to pick some weapon and ammo, 
to “kill” the opponents and, ultimately, to survive. Usually, in this kind 
of video games, the player alone can take down an entire army. As a 
consequence, the player’s gullibility and naivete are exploited in order 
to let the player enjoy the game and win with some sense of 
gratification. There would be no point in commercializing a video game 
that is impossible to beat (in the case of an FPS, for instance, due to the 
opponent NPCs’ omniscience of the game environments or their 
infallibility in aiming and shooting). Lidén (2003) provides an example 
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which is useful in order to understand how a video game can be 
characterized by Artificial Stupidity: 
 
“By swapping who is attacking and keeping the opponents 
moving, a fast-paced combat situation is created in which 
the player is confronted by many enemies but only attacked 
by a few. Surprisingly, players confronted with this 
scenario usually don’t realize that only two opponents are 
actively attacking them at a time, even when confronted 
with a large number of enemies.” (45) 
 
This kind of strategies is intended to exploit the beliefs of the 
player/judge, fooling her into believing that the success of a mission is 
due to her skilled gameplay, which allows her to survive even in 
desperate situations. Lidén (2003), moreover, shows how the NPCs are 
supposed to gradually become more and more ‘stupid’ once the player 
is in critical conditions (e.g. when the player has very low health): 
 
“Once the player has reached the edge, the AI will pull 
back, attack less effectively, and become easier to kill. After 
winning, a player experiencing this scenario really feels like 
he or she accomplished something.” (46) 
 
Artificial Stupidity plays thus an important role in video games, where 
the goal is to “create tension”74 rather than to beat the player; and to 
leave the player with a sense of gratification by exploiting her beliefs. 
 
Analogously to Laird & Duchi (2000), Hingston (2009) proposes an 
alternative version of the TT based on the interactions in video gaming 
sessions. The Computer Game Bot Turing Test (CGB-TT) involves 
three participants: a human player (A) who plays the video game; an 
 
74 Lidén (2003, p. 43). 
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NPC bot (B) which plays the video game; and a human judge (C) who 
observes the gameplay. The test is run as follows. A and B engage in a 
video game duel, where both have the goal to beat the opponent; C 
observes both of them by means of two monitors (X and Y). 
Analogously to the TT, C ends up claiming either “X is A and Y is B 
or X is B and Y is A”, and B passes the test if C cannot discriminate 
between A and B. 
 
The CGB-TT run by Hingston is based on the video game Unreal 
Tournament 2004, an FPS where the player can move in a digital 
environment and interact with various objects with the purpose to “kill” 
the opponents, no conversations involved. As Hingston (2009) admits, 
 
“the task [of the CGB-TT] is much more restricted than that 
of carrying out a conversation in natural language.” (172) 
 
The players can move and interact in a number of determined ways only 
(such as going forward, going backwards, turning right, turning left, 
jumping, picking up objects, use objects, opening doors, changing 
weapon, shooting and reloading). Similarly to Lidén (2003), Hingston 
(2009) points out that the ‘artificially stupid’ strategies in video games 
are designed to exploit the player’s beliefs: 
 
“Game developers are happy to ‘cheat’ to get the effects 
they want in their games and that if something in a game 
has to look intelligent, then the appearance of intelligence 
is all that is needed. [We should use] the term 
pseudointelligence.” (170) 
 
I do not agree with Hingston’s conclusion, according to which the 
appearance of intelligence is all that is needed. Let’s imagine an NPC 
which shows human-like strategies in an FPS (such as jumping to dodge 
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bullets or frequently reloading rather than waiting to be out of ammo), 
but which can never accomplish its task successfully or strategically: 
no matter the appearances, it would give away its nature very quickly. 
 
I rather agree with Laird & Duchi (2000) in holding that the correlation 
between “humanness and skill level”75 is a crucial factor. It is worth 
noting that skill level can differ dramatically depending on the genre of 
the video game played. Just to mention a few different genres, in the 
case of an FPS, skill level could be defined, for instance, in terms of the 
elapsed time, the remaining health, the number of kills, and so on; in 
the case of an RTS (Real-Time Strategy, where the player has to 
micromanage a civilization and to beat the rivals), it could be defined, 
for instance, in terms of the amount of resources gathered, the state of 
diplomatic relationships, the number of steps required to improve the 
military, and so on; in the case of an RPG (Role-Playing Game, where 
the player is free to explore an open world and to interact with it and its 
inhabitants), it could be defined, for instance, in terms of the 
consistency between the character’s class and its course of actions, the 
number of quests completed, the reputation gathered with the different 
factions, and so on. 
 
 
2.5 The Cooperative Principle 
 
In a BBC broadcast, Turing (1952) explains what the dimension of 
‘human-likeness’ implies in the TT, along which the hidden entity – in 




75 Laird & Duchi (2000, p. 76). 
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“[…] the machine would be permitted all sorts of tricks so 
as to appear more man-like, such as wait a bit before giving 
the answer, or making spelling mistakes.” (5) 
 
Here, Turing suggests that “all sorts of tricks” should be permitted to 
achieve ‘human-likeness’. This means that the entity is not only allowed 
to hide those non-human abilities that may unmask its nature, but it is 
also allowed to use those human-like strategies that can sabotage the 
conversation rather than holding it properly. But when is a conversation 
a proper one? 
 
2.5.1 Grice’s Cooperative Principle 
I argue that, in order to define how we can consider a conversation a 
proper one, it is possible to use the Cooperative Principle proposed by 
Grice (1975). And, conversely, it is possible to define a bad 
conversation as a conversation in which the Cooperative Principle is not 
observed. The Cooperative Principle is described by Grice (1975) as 
follows: 
 
“at each stage [of a conversation], some possible 
conversational moves would be excluded as 
conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a 
rough general principle which participants will be expected 
(ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage 
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might 
label this the Cooperative Principle.” (45) 
 
To clarify the distinction between Artificial Stupidity and Artificial 
Fallibility, it is possible to say that the latter is compatible with the 
Gricean Cooperative Principle, whereas the former is not. So Artificial 
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Stupidity can be now defined as the violation of the Gricean maxims of 
the Cooperative Principle. The four maxims, as described by Grice 
(1975), are the following: 
 
“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect 
your contribution to be neither more nor less than is 
required. [...] 
2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and 
not spurious. [...] 
3. Relation. I expect a partner’s contribution to be 
appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the 
transaction; […] 
4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what 
contribution he is making, and to execute his performance 
with reasonable dispatch.” (47) 
 
A number of authors claim that that the Gricean maxims are useful to 
identify certain characteristics among human conversational habits. 
Among them, Keenan (1976) holds that: 
 
“Grice does offer a framework in which the conversational 
principles of different speech communities can be 
compared. We can, in theory, take any one maxim, and note 
when it does and does not hold. The motivation for its use 
or abuse may reveal values and orientations that separate 
one society from another and that separate social groups 
(e.g. men, women, kinsmen, strangers) within a single 
society.” (79) 
 
2.5.2 The Gricean Turing Test 
With Keenan’s suggestion that the Gricean maxims are useful to reveal 
certain human conversational characteristics, and the Cooperative 
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Principle intended to discriminate between good (cooperative) and bad 
(uncooperative) conversations, it is possible to design a special TT to 
evaluate the entity not only in terms of ‘human-likeness’, but also in 
terms of the content of the entity’s replies. A new test combining the 
TT with the Gricean maxims, called the ‘Gricean Turing Test’ (GTT), 
has been proposed by Saygin & Cicekli (2002) and Jwalapuram (2017). 
who explains: 
 
“There is no agreed upon standard for the evaluation of 
conversational dialog systems, which are well-known to be 
hard to evaluate due to the difficulty in pinning down 
metrics that will correspond to human judgements and the 
subjective nature of human judgment itself. We explored 
the possibility of using Grice’s Maxims to evaluate 
effective communication in conversation.” (17) 
 
Saygin & Cicekli (2002) also identify two maxims as the most 
important ones in order to evaluate a conversation. They conclude: 
 
“Our study indicates that the most important maxims to 
avoid violating in TT situations are Relevance [Relation] 
and Quality.” (29) 
 
And more recently, showing the results of a similar experiment76, 
Jacquet et al. (2019) agree that: 
 
“[…] the maxim of Relation had a particularly important 
impact on response times and the perceived humanness of 
a conversation partner. Violations of the first maxim of 
 
76 See Jacquet et. al (2019) “The following experiment tests the ability to discriminate between 
sentences with a high cognitive cost and sentences with a low cognitive cost using the response 
time of the participants during an online conversation in a protocol inspired by the Turing Test. 
We have used violations of Grice’s Cooperative Principle to create conditions in which 
sentences with a high cognitive cost would be produced.” (1) 
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Quantity and the fourth maxim of Manner had a lesser 
impact […].” (1) 
 
2.5.3 Cooperativeness 
The dimension, in addition to ‘human-likeness’, along which the entity 
is parametrised in the GTT could be called ‘cooperativeness’. But, how 
Saygin & Cicekli (2002) and Jacquet et al. (2019) show, the two 
maxims of the Cooperative Principle that play a dominant role in the 
TT are Relation (according to which the hidden entity’s responses 
should be relevant and pertinent) and Quality (according to which the 
hidden entity’s responses should be, as far as possible, correct). The 
maxims of Quantity and Manner (according to which an entity’s 
responses should be, respectively, concise and clear) seem to be 
intended to evaluate a response’s style, whereas Quality and Relation 
seem to be intended to evaluate a response’s content. Following Jacquet 
et al (2019), I leave the maxims of Quantity and Manner alone, since, 
in the TT, the hidden entity should be able to express her style freely, 
above all because it is her style that determines whether she’s attributed 
with ‘human-likeness’ and, thus, with intelligence. I focus on the 
maxims of Relation and Quality, in order to guarantee the conversation 
during the TT to be pertinent and competent. So, instead of 
‘cooperativeness’, I call the second dimension along which the hidden 
entity should be parametrised in addition to ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’. The reason is that whereas ‘correctness’ is not included 
in ‘cooperativeness’ (for instance, we can imagine a cooperative entity 
which is never able to provide the right response), ‘cooperativeness’ is 
included in ‘correctness’ (it seems contradictory to classify a response 
as both uncooperative and correct). If the entity’s response is the correct 
one, in terms of the Maxim of Quality, it presumably is also a 
cooperative one, in terms of the Maxim of Relation (that is, the response 
is pertinent); but nothing, it’s worth noting, prevents the response from 
being, let’s say, verbose or even rude, breaking thus the Maxim of 
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Quantity and Manner. Therefore, I intend the dimension of 
‘correctness’ to be focused on the Gricean maxims of Quality and 
Relation. 
 
Summing up, I argue that by parametrising the hidden entity along the 
dimension of ‘correctness’, in addition to the dimension of ‘human-
likeness’, the experimental design of the test is improved, and Artificial 
Stupidity prevented from passing by exploiting the judge’s beliefs. The 
entity that passes a TT evaluating ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ 
(which I call TT2 and which I describe in Ch. 7) would be required to 
interact in a human-like way, but would also be required to accomplish 
a task, without the possibility of evading it and still being able to pass 
the test. Coherently with the Literal Interpreation of the TT (discussed 
in Ch. 1), in the TT2 ‘human-likeness’ is evaluated by comparing the 
frequency with which a machine is recognised as human by the judge 
with the frequency with which a human is recognised as human by the 
judge; and ‘correctness’ is evaluated in terms of the hidden entity’s 
ability to produce the correct (and pertinent) responses. Finally, I justify 
‘correctness’ by discussing the Cooperative Principle, proposed by 
Grice (1975), and its four conversational maxims: (i) Quantity, (ii) 
Quality, (iii) Relation and (iv) Manner. I highlight that whereas the 
dimension of ‘human-likeness’ is compatible with both Artificial 
Stupidity and Artificial Fallibility, the dimension of ‘correctness’ is 
compatible with Artificial Fallibility only, not with Artificial Stupidity. 
So, whereas ‘human-likeness’ allows Artificial Stupidity, ‘correctness’ 
prevents it. My claim is that by parametrising the TT along ‘human-
likeness’ alone, it is not possible to guarantee the Cooperative Principle 
to be observed (for only the maxims of Manner and Quantity would be 
evaluated). On the contrary, by parametrising the TT along both 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, it is possible to make sure that the 
Cooperative Principle is observed (for the maxims of Manner and 
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Quantity would be evaluated by ‘human-likeness’; and the maxims of 





In this chapter, I discuss what I argue to be one of the two major 
difficulties with the TT: Artificial Stupidity (the other one being 
Blockhead, which I discuss in Ch. 3). With Artificial Stupidity, I intend 
a particular attitude that the entity can adopt to sabotage the 
conversation during the TT, by being ‘uncooperative’, as long as in a 
human-like fashion. A general example of an artificially stupid 
response, no matter the question, is the following: “I’m not in the mood, 
let’s talk about something else”. My claim is that, given the 
experimental design of the TT, Artificial Stupidity can exploit the 
judge’s beliefs, by holding an uncooperative conversation, to appear 
convincingly human and, thus, intelligent. Therefore, I argue that, 
because of Artificial Stupidity, the experimental design of TT 
encourages false positives and negatives. To prevent Artificial 
Stupidity, I propose to score the TT on two dimensions: ‘human-
likeness’, evaluating the ability of the entity to appear human to a 
human judge, during a text-based conversation, as frequently as a 
human does; and ‘correctness’, evaluating the hidden entity’s ability to 
provide the right (and pertinent) replies. 
 
To clarify, I distinguish between Artificial Fallibility and Artificial 
Stupidity. With the former, I refer to the cognitive boundaries that a 
system should show (not necessarily have) in order to match the human 
fallibility. With the latter, I refer to the uncooperative strategies that the 
entity can use to pass the TT by exploiting the judge’s beliefs. It is worth 
noting that whereas Artificial Fallibility is compatible with both 
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‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’, Artificial Stupidity is compatible 
with ‘human-likeness’ only, not ‘correctness’. 
 
I discuss two systems implementing Artificial Stupidity: the chatbots 
Eliza (Weizenbaum, 1966) and Eugene Goostman (Demchenko & 
Veselov, 2001); and I consider two biased results that can occur during 
the TT: the Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect (Warwick & Shah, 
2015). And, finally, I discuss the role of Artificial Stupidity in video 
games, as the privileged scenario in which it is implemented. I review 
Laird & Duchi (2000), Lidén (2003) and Hingston (2009), who propose 
a new version of the TT based on video gaming sessions rather than 
conversational ones, arguing that NPC (non-playable character) entities 
should be evaluated in terms of “humanness and skill level”, which, I 
hold, are analogous to ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’. 
 
Along with Jwalapuram (2017), Saygin & Cicekli (2002), and Jacquet 
et al. (2019), I propose to consider Grice’s Cooperative Principle (1975) 
as the benchmark to evaluate proper conversations from malicious ones 
during the TT, such as the conversations exploited by Artificial 
Stupidity. I consider the four maxims of the Cooperative Principle 
(Quantity, Quality, Manner and Relation) and I argue that, on the one 
hand, the maxims of Quantity and Manner probe the style of the replies 
and are evaluated by ‘human-likeness’; on the other hand, the maxims 
of Quality and Relation probe the content of the replies and are 














Abstract. The third chapter concludes Part I of this work. In this 
chapter, I consider Block’s Look-Up Table argument (hereafter LUT), 
commonly known as Blockhead. Here I review Block (1981); I consider 
the objections to Blockhead, especially Copeland (2000), Proudfoot 
(2013) and McDermott (2014); and I propose two other possible 
versions of Blockhead: (i) Stupid Blockhead, the table of which 
contains human-like uncooperative interactions (like those involved in 
Artificial Stupidity); and (ii) Ultimate Blockhead, the table of which is 
independently learnt rather than hand-coded. Turing (1950) seems to 
ban Blockhead from the TT, by advocating a learning child machine 
rather than a pre-programmed adult machine. I hold, however, that it is 
logically possible and physically feasible to exploit the experimental 
design of the TT by brute-force (as Stupid Blockhead shows). One goal 
of the new version of the TT that I propose is to prevent this from 
happening. 
 
The Look-Up Table (LUT) argument, against the validity of the TT as 
a test of intelligence, can be stated as follows: 
 
LUT Argument: if the responses of an entity are produced 
by brute-force, then the entity is not intelligent. 
 
Brute-force is an exhaustive method of problem-solving. In the case of 
a conversational brute-force approach, it could be described as a 
systematic enumeration of all the responses with which the system is 
supposed to reply. Block’s (1981) thought experiment Blockhead is an 
example of a conversational brute-force approach. As described by 




“is a hypothetical program able to play the imitation game 
successfully, for any fixed length of time, by virtue of 
incorporating a large, but finite, ‘lookup’ table containing 
all the exchanges with the interrogator that could occur 
during the length of time in question.” (532) 
 
In the next section, I review “Behaviourism and Psychologism” (Block, 
1981) and I describe Blockhead. In section 3.2, I show the views against 
Blockhead. In section 3.3, I discuss a version of Blockhead 
implementing Artificial Stupidity, which I call Stupid Blockhead. And 
in section 3.4, I consider an advanced version of Blockhead, able to 
independently learn its look-up table, which I call Ultimate Blockhead. 
 
 
3.1 Block’s Blockhead 
 
The first formulation of the LUT argument is given by Shannon & 
McCarthy (1956), who hold that a definition of ‘thinking machine’ 
should involve something about the inner workings of the machine: 
 
“A disadvantage of the Turing definition of thinking is that 
it is possible, in principle, to design a machine with a 
complete set of arbitrarily chosen responses to all possible 
input stimuli [...]. Such a machine, in a sense, for any given 
input situation (including past history) merely looks up in a 
‘dictionary’ the appropriate response. With a suitable 
dictionary such a machine would surely satisfy Turing’s 
definition but does not reflect our usual intuitive concept of 
thinking. This suggests that a more fundamental definition 
must involve something relating to the manner in which the 
machine arrives at its responses – something which 
corresponds to differentiating between a person who solves 
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a problem by thinking it out and one who has previously 
memorized the answer.” (v-vi) 
 
Similarly, Block rejects the TT by drawing a comparison between two 
entities: one of them works by implementing a brute-force approach, 
the other one works by implementing certain internal information 
processes. More specifically, Block (1981) argues: 
 
“The two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and 
potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and 
capacities [...], yet there could be a difference in the 
information processing that mediates their stimuli and 
responses that determines that one is not at all intelligent 
while the other is fully intelligent.” (5) 
 
Block does not discuss further or specify the inner workings that, 
according to him, a target entity should be required to possess in order 
to be attributed with intelligence during the TT. ‘Intelligence’, it’s 
worth noting, always refers to the kind of intelligence involved in the 
TT, which is defined by Block (1981) as follows: 
 
“Intelligence (or more accurately, conversational 
intelligence) is the disposition to produce a sensible 
sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of verbal 
stimuli, whatever they may be”. (11) 
 
 
3.1.1 Block’s objections to the TT 
The first difficulty raised by Block against the TT is that it is intended 
to provide an operational definition of intelligence, where ‘operational 
definition’ gives an analysis of the meaning of the term ‘intelligence’. 
As Boyd (1983) explains, operationalism was a positivist proposal for 
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rationally reconstructing the use of theoretical terms (that is, those terms 
which refer to ‘unobservables’, such as electrons). The point of the 
proposal was to treat a theoretical term as having an ‘operational’ 
meaning, defined in terms of analytic laboratory procedures and 
measurements that would be used to test its presence and quantify it. As 
discussed in Ch. 1, I hold that this interpretation is inconsistent with 
Turing’s externalist conception of intelligence. And Block (1981), as 
well, abandons the operational interpretation in favour of a dispositional 
one: 
 
“According to the operationalist interpretation of the Turing 
Test as a definition of intelligence, it is absurd to ask of a 
device that passes the Turing Test whether it is really 
intelligent, and it is equally absurd to ask of a device that 
fails it whether it failed for some extraneous reason but is 
nonetheless intelligent. This difficulty can be avoided by 
going from the crude operationalist formulation to a 
familiar behavioral disposition formulation. On such a 
formulation, intelligence is identified not with the property 
of passing the test (if it is given), but rather with a 
behavioral disposition to pass the test (if it is given).” (8) 
 
Nevertheless, according to Block, even if an entity has the disposition 
to pass the TT, it cannot be considered intelligent unless there is a way 
to inspect its internal functioning. So, Block designs a logically possible 
machine with the capacity and the disposition to pass the TT, which 
uses an unintelligent method nonetheless: at each interaction with its 
interlocutor, it looks up a gigantic table – or search a gigantic tree – of 
instructions in order to pick an appropriate reply. This, according to 





“I conclude that whether behavior is intelligent behavior is 
in part a matter of how it is produced. Even if a system has 
the actual and potential behavior characteristic of an 
intelligent being, if its internal processes are like those of 
the machine described [Blockhead], it is not intelligent.” 
(21) [Italics added.] 
 
The second difficulty that Block raises regards the human judge. 
According to him, the judge has too much responsibility in the 
experiment, for she is the one who decides upon the entity’s nature and 
attributes it with intelligence. And since Block (1981) designs an entity 
which is able to pass the test without intelligence, he is worried by the 
following question: 
 
“Could the issue of whether a machine in fact thinks or is 
intelligent depend on how gullible human interrogators tend 
to be?” (10) 
 
My answer is no. Blockhead, I hold, is not a case of Artificial Stupidity 
and, therefore, I disagree that it is a matter of the human judge’s 
gullibility. As discussed in the previous chapter, a gullible human judge 
may be deceived by an ‘artificially stupid’ entity (either human or 
machine), which uses certain uncooperative strategies to evade the 
conversation rather than to hold it properly.77 Blockhead, on the other 
hand, is a machine able to look up a gigantic table and to always pick a 
sensible reply to whatever verbal input, not only to the inputs that are 
indeed sent, but to the input that might have been sent as well. As Block 
(1981) clarifies: 
 
“in order to be intelligent according to the above-described 
conception, the system must be disposed to respond 
 
77 Where ‘properly’ means following the Gricean Cooperative Principle (see Ch. 2). 
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sensibly not only to what the interlocutor actually says, but 
to whatever he might have said as well.” (ibid) 
 
So, I hold that no human, or any other smarter judge for that matter, 
would be able to discriminate Blockhead from a human during the TT. 
Since no human judge could unmask Blockhead, my claim is that it 
should rather be the experimental design of the TT itself to be improved 
in order to prevent Blockhead from passing. 
 
Finally, Block (1981) makes this last point against the TT: 
 
“The fault of the Turing Test […] is one of experimental 
design, not experimental concept. The trouble is that your 
Turing Test has a fixed length. […] It is certainly true that 
my machine’s capacity to pass Turing Tests depends on 
there being some upper bound to the length of the tests.” 
(34) 
 
I agree with Block when he says that the fault of the TT is one of 
experimental design rather than one of experimental concept. In other 
words, the fault of the TT is not in the idea that it is possible to test for 
intelligence by evaluating a target entity’s verbal competency, but 
rather in the way along which the entity is parametrised and evaluated. 
However, I hold that Block points out the wrong fault. He points out 
that Blockhead’s capacity to pass the TT depends on there being some 
upper bound to the length of the tests, in the same way as the human 
capacity to pass the TT does. In other words, Blockhead would fail an 
unlimited TT by eventually running out of space in its table (which is 
huge but finite), just as a human would fail by eventually passing away 
before the test ends. The unlimited TT, because of such 
impracticability, does not seem a proper update for the TT in order to 
rule out Blockhead from passing. Since the unlimited TT would be 
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failed not only by Blockhead but by any human being as well, I argue 
that a different attempt to update the test is required. A preferable 
updated version of the TT would thus be a test which any human could 
pass, but that Blockhead could not. 
 
Moreover, despite Block’s argument, even a time-limited TT seems 
dangerous for Blockhead, since it cannot always be able to work fast: 
given the size of its table, even if it were able to search at light-speed, 
it could potentially take years to emit a reply. As Copeland (2000) 
remarks: 
 
“firstly, the proposed recipe for building a brain-emulator 
cannot work, given practical limitations on storage 
capacity; and secondly, even if this point is set aside and we 
suppose that such a machine [Blockhead] were actually to 
be constructed, it would not emulate the brain, since what 
the brain can do in minutes would take this machine 
thousands of millions of years.” (533) 
 
 
3.2 Objections to Blockhead 
 
There are a number of objections to Blockhead. The two most common 
are: (i) that Blockhead is only logically possible, and not physically 
feasible, and therefore it does not undermine the TT; and (ii) that an 
entity like Blockhead would indeed possess mental states and should be 
considered intelligent. 
 
3.2.1 Proudfoot and Copeland 
Proudfoot (2013) rejects Blockhead for two reasons. The first, is that it 
is incompatible with Turing’s externalist conception of intelligence. 
According to the response-dependent reading of Turing, it is not the 
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entity’s behavioural capacities – or even dispositions – that determine 
whether it is intelligent. It is, to use the words that perhaps Turing would 
have used, the “interrogator’s emotions.”78 On the one hand, Turing 
does not discuss the proper states of mind that a judge should have 
(suffice to say that the judge should be as much as possible unbiased). 
On the other hand, he defines the “properties of the object under 
consideration”79 by describing the kind of machine that should be built 
and tested for intelligence: a “child machine”80, that is, an unorganised 
machine which is able to learn. In section 3.2.3, I discuss the difference 
between child and adult machines in more detail. 
 
The second reason why Proudfoot (2013) rejects Blockhead is due to 
its physical unfeasibility: 
 
“Even if Turing’s criterion is a logically sufficient 
condition, it is not undermined by Block’s example. Based 
on the same remarks in Turing’s 1952 broadcast, we can, I 
suggest, read his criterion as follows: a machine is 
intelligent if actually it passes the Turing test. Using the 
“Actually” operator A, AP is true iff P is true in the actual 
world; […] Reading Turing’s criterion as a logically 
sufficient condition that incorporates the “actually” 
operator fits not only with his emphasis on real-world 
machines but also with the response-dependence 
interpretation of his test.” (401) 
 




78 See Turing (1948). 
79 Turing (1948, p. 19).  
80 Turing (1950, p. 456). 
78 
 
“If Turing had been proposing a definition of ‘thinking’ – a 
logically necessary and sufficient condition – or even 
merely a logically sufficient condition, then the lookup 
table objection would indeed count against the proposal 
[…]. However, there is no reason to believe that Turing was 
claiming anything more than that his principle81 is actually 
true. The other-worldly possibility of a lookup-table 
machine that is fast enough to emulate the brain has no 
tendency at all to show that Turing’s principle is actually 
false. Likewise, it is no challenge to the actual truth of the 
Church-Turing thesis that a human rote-worker who 
occupies a possible world in which the human memory is 
unlimited can be in the process of writing down a number 
that is not computable by any Turing machine (see Turing, 
1936: 231, 249–252).” (533) 
 
3.2.2 McDermott 
The second line of arguments is advocated by McDermott, who 
attempts to reject Block’s thought experiment (which he calls HTA, 
Humongous-Table-Argument) not by focusing on the physical 
unfeasibility of Blockhead (which he calls HTP, Humongous-Table-
Program), but instead by arguing that Blockhead in fact possesses 
intelligent features. McDermott (2014) argues that, first, for an HTA to 
work: 
 
“two aspects of the test are crucial: 
• There must be a fixed time limit for the conversation 
between judge and interlocutor. Otherwise a simple table 
wouldn’t be adequate. 
 
81 “Turing’s Principle: A machine that by means of calculation imitates – or, better, ‘emulates,’ 
for Turing is concerned with faithful imitation – the intellectual behaviour of a human brain can 
itself appropriately be described as a brain, or as thinking.” (Copeland, 2000 p. 529). 
79 
 
• The judges must not be able to compare notes before 
deciding whether an interlocutor is human. Otherwise the 
fact that the same table governs all the conversations might 
give the game away.” (148) 
 
The first premise is true for humans as well: “fixed time limit” means 
that the conversation in the TT cannot be infinite but should rather have 
a reasonable duration for the entity – either human or machine – to hold 
it. The second premise seems to imply that the look-up table would give 
the same response over and over again to the same verbal stimulus. If 
this is true then there could be easier ways to unmask Blockhead than 
to compare previous conversations: for instance, one could simply ask 
the same question twice, or ask the entity to recall a piece of information 
given previously during the conversation. It is not so clear, however, if 
it would be the case: Blockhead’s tree has, for each interaction, sub-
branches with new replies (such as “you already asked me that”). So, if 
a question is repeated, the HTP can pick uncompromising responses, it 
only needs to keep track of the questions asked. 
 
In order to legitimately consider an HTP intelligent, McDermott (2014) 
recognises three prerequisites: 
 
• “That the HTP must be exhaustive, and not be based on 
some vaguely imagined set of tricks. 
• That the HTP must not be created by some set of sentient 
beings enacting all possible responses. 
• That in the current state of cognitive science it must be an 
open possibility that a computational model of the human 
mind will be developed that accounts for at least its 




The first prerequisite suggests that, in order to be considered intelligent, 
the HTP must not resort to Artificial Stupidity (see Ch. 2); I discuss 
further this position in section 3.3, where I propose another possible 
version of Blockhead, which I call Stupid Blockhead. The second 
prerequisite suggests that, in order to be considered intelligent, the HTP 
must not be hand-coded by humans; I discuss further this position in 
section 3.4, where I propose a third possible version of Blockhead, 
which I call Ultimate Blockhead. The third prerequisite, finally, is 
meant, as McDermott (2014) writes, to  
 
“take all issues concerned with phenomenal consciousness 
off the table [… in order to] allow for the possibility of 
finding a computational model of human thought that 
accounts for everything else.” (164) 
 
I agree with McDermott that entities using the uncooperative strategies 
of Artificial Stupidity, as well as entities with a built-in knowledge 
based, should be banned from the TT. However, I disagree that a 
cooperative Blockhead which independently acquires its look-up table 
(like Ultimate blockhead, see section 3.4) ought to be attributed with 
intelligence. The reason is that the method behind its functioning would 
still be a brute-force one. 
 
3.2.3 Child machines Vs adult machines 
It can be argued that Turing implicitly rules out Blockhead by ruling 
out adult machines in favour of child machines, where the former 
belongs to the set of brute-force LUTs and the latter to the set of 
learning systems. Turing (1950) suggests the following: 
 
“Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the 
adult mind, why not rather try to produce one which 




So, whereas the adult machine has a hand-coded, built-in knowledge 
base, the child machine has no pre-programmed information: it is an 
unorganised machine with the ability to learn, similarly to a human 
child. And like a human child, who requires teaching to become adult, 
the child machine needs an education to “grow” and know things. The 
idea of the child machine is initially developed in Turing (1948), where 
he summarises the machine he has in mind as follows: 
 
“The possible way in which machinery might be made to 
show intelligent behaviour are discussed: […] it is pointed 
out that the potentialities of the human intelligence can only 
be realised if suitable education is provided. The 
investigation centres around an analogous teaching process 
applied to machines.” (431) 
 
There are two possible readings of “the potentialities of the human 
intelligence can only be realised if suitable education is provided.” One 
is that human intelligence is realised through suitable education; the 
other is that human-level intelligence (even in non-human entities) can 
only be realised through the same process of education. The first 
reading seems safe enough: humans would not be able to develop 
complex cognitive faculties (such as speaking and understanding a 
language) by their own, with no cultural or social interactions with other 
human fellows. The second reading is more radical: it implies that 
intelligence cannot be produced, it can only be acquired. Turing 
introduces learning machines as machines that are able to modify their 
own instructions independently, rather than by means of direct human 
interference. As Turing (1948) explains, it is possible to 
 
“distinguish two kinds of interference. There is the extreme 
form in which parts of the machine are removed and 
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replaced by others. This may be described as “screwdriver 
interference”. At the other end of the scale is “paper 
interference” which consists in the mere communication of 
information to the machine, which alters its behaviour. […] 
When it is possible to alter the behaviour of a machine very 
radically we may speak of the machine as being 
‘modifiable’. […] One may also sometimes speak of a 
machine modifying itself, or a machine changing its own 
instructions. […] We shall mainly be interested in paper 
interference […].” (8) 
 
Now it is possible to interpret Turing’s view on how an intelligent 
machine should be built in two ways. First, Turing is not committing to 
any particular strategy for building AI: he simply favours the 
unorganised child machine project over the adult machine one, without 
excluding an hand-coded adult machine (like Blockhead) from being 
intelligent. Second, Turing is saying that intelligence could only be 
ascribed to learning systems, suggesting thus the ability to learn as a 
necessary condition for intelligence. 
 
In support of the first interpretation, Turing (1950) explicitly points out 
that there may be disagreement on how an intelligent machine should 
be built and on what it should be able to do; and, so, that a number of 
approaches should be attempted: 
 
“Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the 
playing of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained 
that it is best to provide the machine with the best sense 
organs that money can buy, and then teach it to understand 
and speak English. This process could follow the normal 
teaching of a child. Things would be pointed out and 
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named, etc. Again I do not know what the right answer is, 
but I think both approaches should be tried.” (460) 
 
It is worth noting that, in the passage above, Turing seems to suggest 
that one way to learn a language is to build an embodied entity that can 
experience the world, foreseeing the subcognitive argument provided 
by French (1990, 2000a, 2000b) and even anticipating the Total Turing 
Test proposed by Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000). 
 
On the other hand, Proudfoot (2017) supports the second interpretation: 
 
“For Turing, learning is the key to intelligence […] the 
‘hallmark of intelligence is the ability to learn’ and, like ‘a 
newborn baby’, a computer’s possibilities depend upon the 
education which is fed into it.” (317) 
 
Proudfoot (2017) also criticises Expert Systems, programs that are able 
to show the intelligent behaviour typical of a human expert in a certain 
endeavour; and she points out that such an approach conflicts with 
Turing’s proposal to build an unorganised child machine. She 
distinguishes between two possible kinds of intelligent machines: 
 
“We must build a machine that is a “person” with sufficient 
language understanding to be educable, both by example 
and by precept. The goal of AI should be, not only a human-
level machine, but a human-type machine.” (318) 
 
According to this view, Blockhead is a human-level machine (and, 
likely, even a superhuman-level machine), in terms of how it behaves. 
However, it is not a human-type machine, in terms of how it learns to 
behave. In other words, Blockhead is able to hold an open conversation 
at the same level as a human, but the type of its internal processes is 
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different from that of humans. It is necessary, however, to highlight that 
Turing, faithful to the idea of Multiple Realizability, never ruled out 
either machines with internal processes similar to the human ones or 
machines with internal processes different from the human ones. And 
the main reason is that we do not know – at least, yet – what the internal 
processes from which human intelligence emerges are. So, the 
machine’s imitation does not involve the reproduction of human inner 
workings, but rather the reproduction of human behaviours. As Sprevak 
(2017) points out, Turing’s idea: 
 
“is an exercise in weak modelling. His aim is to show that 
Turing machines and human clerks solve the same class of 
problems: they are capable of producing the same pattern 
of behaviour. His argument requires him to show that a 
Turing machine can copy the behaviour of the clerk and 
vice versa (weak modelling). It does not require him to 
show that the Turing machine reproduces that clerk’s 
internal psychological mechanisms for generating his 
behaviour (strong modelling).” (283) 
 
3.2.4 Symbols in, symbols out 
My reply to Blockhead is focused on the context in which Blockhead 
works well. Blockhead is designed to hold an open one-way 
conversation: a back-and-forth exchange, that is, when the interlocutor 
sends an input first and Blockhead replies. This system can be defined, 
as Harnad (1989, 1990) proposes, with the acronym SISO, which means 
‘Symbols In, Symbols Out’. Blockhead needs the interlocutor’s 
interactions first to produce some appropriate output (otherwise it 
would just emit entries picked randomly from its table). In other words, 
Blockhead needs to receive a verbal input first in order to search its 
database, find the matches and pick the appropriate response. As Ben-




“Because of the way it was programmed, the machine emits 
only ‘sensible’ strings, strings in which its contribution is 
always sensible. It would, therefore, pass any test that is 
limited to conversational output [not input] and which 
determines that a conversant is intelligent only according to 
behavioral criteria—linguistic criteria, in this case.” (182) 
[Italics added] 
 
Therefore, I hold the following generalisation: a brute-force LUT, 
parametrised along ‘human-likeness’ and even ‘correctness’, can only 
work in the SISO setup, that is, when the test is limited to conversational 
outputs only. To prevent brute-force strategies, the solution I propose is 
to modify this setup. In order to modify the SISO setup in the case of 
the TT, I claim that it is necessary to modify the task of the test, that is, 
to hold an open conversation. My proposal is to change the task of the 
test from holding an open conversation to accomplishing an enquiry, 
and to switch from SISO to SOSI (Symbols Out, Symbols In), In the 
SOSI test I propose, the entity needs to send a verbal stimulus first (a 
question) in order to receive a verbal response, needed to accomplish 
the aim of the enquiry. The SOSI setup allows us to parametrise the 
hidden entity along a further dimension in addition to ‘human-likeness’ 
and ‘correctness’: what I call ‘strategicness’, which is intended to rule 
out brute-force strategies and prevent thus Blockhead from passing the 
test. I will discuss the dimension of ‘strategicness’ in more detail in Ch. 
5, where I present the QTT, the new SOSI test of intelligence that I 
designed on the model of the TT, with the purpose to avoid the two 
main difficulties with the experimental design of the TT discussed so 





Summing up, the core of the LUT argument lies in the claim that 
intelligence does not supervene on behaviour (be it behavioural 
capacity or disposition). Blockhead possesses a look-up table, hand-
coded by humans, which enables it to pair every possible verbal input 
to an appropriate verbal output. The internal processes of Blockhead are 
thus very different from the human ones, for they do not depend on 
previous thoughts, inclinations, beliefs, desires, and so on. I agree that 
Blockhead represents a difficulty for the experimental design of the TT, 
rather than its experimental concept82. But I do not think the solution is 
to train the judge, or argue that Blockhead should be considered 
intelligent83; I rather argue that the experimental design of the TT 
should be improved in order to avoid potential exploits, like Artificial 
Stupidity, and brute-force approaches, like Blockhead. My goal is to 
propose a new test immune to Blockhead, as well as to a human with 
no verbal intelligence, who could pass the TT by memorising, thanks to 
her extraordinary memory, any possible verbal interaction whatsoever. 
 
 
3.3 Stupid Blockhead 
 
As I pointed out in the previous section, Blockhead could pass the TT 
by means of an unintelligent method, undermining thus the reliability 
of the TT’s results. However, Blockhead is only logically possible, 
meaning that it is not possible to build it; and even if it were built, it 
would be extremely slow (jeopardizing its success). To counter this 
objection, I argue that Blockhead could be more easily equipped with 
the uncooperative strategies of Artificial Stupidity (see Ch. 2) in order 
to exploit the judge’s beliefs and pass the test, with no need of a 
complete table to look up. As Block (1981) remarks: 
 
 
82 See Block (1981, p. 34). 
83 See McDermott (2014). 
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“If one sets one’s sights on making a machine that does only 
as well in the Turing Test as most people would do, one 
might try a hybrid machine, containing a relatively small 
number of trees plus a bag of tricks of the sort used in 
Weizenbaum’s program.” (34) 
 
So, Block (1981) distinguishes between two types of LUT. One is – the 
very slow – Blockhead, which is able to hold a human-like open 
conversation by looking up its complete table of all the possible verbal 
interactions, and by always picking an appropriate response for 
whatever verbal stimulus. The other is the Elizish Blockhead, or as I 
call it, Stupid Blockhead, which is able to hold a human-like open 
conversation by looking up its incomplete table of interactions, and to 
its table of uncooperative tricks whenever is needed. So, Stupid 
Blockhead is an incomplete version of Blockhead, with an incomplete 
table of appropriate responses. It can play the TT as the original 
Blockhead until it receives an input with no correspondence in its table, 
whereupon it can play the TT as the artificially stupid Eliza, using 
certain uncooperative strategies to bring back the conversation to some 
manageable topic. Or it may as well be a pure Stupid Blockhead, with 
no table of appropriate interactions at all, which keeps evading the 
conversation all the time by being uncooperative, as long as in a human-
like way (an extreme version of Stupid Blockhead could only contain 
one entry: “I plead the fifth”). Stupid Blockhead, given its limited table, 
is not only logically possible, but also physically feasible. 
 
It is worth noting that it would be plausible for a human to use evading 
strategies to avoid unwelcome conversations. So why should Stupid 
Blockhead or Artificial Stupidity be regarded as an exploit? My answer 
is that humans learn such tricks and strategies, they don’t memorise 
them from a book; and those tricks and strategies are certainly not pre-
coded in our DNA. Analogously, if the entity is – to use the word that 
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Turing (1950) chooses – “educated”, that is, if either the human baby 
or the unorganised machine learn to produce certain behaviours 
(including the criticised artificially stupid behaviours), then those 




3.4 Ultimate Blockhead 
 
Following Turing’s (1950) proposal of an unorganised child machine, 
here I propose to consider a machine which is able to learn to become 
Blockhead, which I call Ultimate Blockhead. 
 
Recalling what is intended with child machine, Turing (1950) proposes 
the analogy between a blank machine and a new-born child, both of 
which can initially do little by their own but, after undergoing an 
education process, can learn to do what an adult human can do. As 
Sterrett (2012) remarks: 
 
“This analogy […] provides Turing with the means to 
respond to one of the most common objections raised 
against the possibility that a machine could be regarded as 
exhibiting intelligent behavior. This objection (to the 
possibility of intelligent machinery) is, in Turing’s words, 
the view that “[i]nsofar as a machine can show intelligence 
this is to be regarded as nothing but a reflection of the 
intelligence of its creator.” (704) 
 
Ultimate Blockhead is a machine which is able to do anything 
Blockhead and Stupid Blockhead can do, with the difference that the 
latter ones use pre-programmed, hand-coded tables, whereas the table 
of Ultimate Blockhead is independently acquired, or learnt. Ultimate 
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Blockhead learns its table by, let’s say, scouring the whole internet 
(let’s suppose it has access to every bit of information contained on the 
web) and memorising every verbal interaction whatsoever. It can be 
said that whereas “the whole point of the machine [Blockhead] is to 
substitute memory for intelligence,”84 the whole point of Ultimate 
Blockhead is to substitute memorisation for learning. 
 
So, should Ultimate Blockhead be considered intelligent? Ben-Yami 
(2005) would say yes. Whereas Block (1981) stresses out that the 
Blockhead’s lack of intelligence is due to its internal organisation as a 
LUT and its inner workings, Ben-Yami (2005) identifies the problem 
in its learning history. According to this view, it is how Blockhead’s 
table is acquired that matters: if it is hand-coded by humans, then it 
lacks intelligence; if it is independently acquired, then it is intelligent. 
So, Ben-Yami (2005) agrees that Blockhead lacks intelligence, but 
 
“contrary to Block, this is not determined by reference to its 
internal processes. The machine lacks intelligence because 
all it does is reproduce answers that were given to it in 
advance. And this is determined by reference to the relation 
between the answers that were formerly given to it and to 
the answers it now gives. The machine is not intelligent for 
the same reason that Christian is not a poet: Christian 
answers Roxane what Cyrano tells him to answer, and the 
machine answers its interrogator what the programmers 
‘told’ it to answer.” (183-184) 
 
This would not be the case for Ultimate Blockhead, which would be 




84 Block (1981, p. 34). 
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However, unlike humans, Ultimate Blockhead can learn impressive 
amounts of information in a short time. Let’s say that from the moment 
in which Ultimate Blockhead is turned on, it takes one year to scour the 
whole internet and memorise every interaction whatsoever. So Ultimate 
Blockhead doesn’t really need an educator, as Turing (1950) suggests 
for the child machine, since the kind of learning that Ultimate 
Blockhead requires, that is, memorisation, can be automated. 
Nonetheless, Ultimate Blockhead can still be viewed as a child 
machine: initially it is an unorganised machine similar to an infant 
cortex – but with an exceptional memory –, unable to hold even the 
simplest of conversations; and after some time spent memorising the 
verbal interactions found on the internet, it becomes very good at it. 
Once its table is acquired, Ultimate Blockhead can do, on average, as 
good as Blockhead in the TT. I say on average since the human judge 
has certain ways to corner Ultimate Blockhead, for instance by using 
neologisms never ever used on the web. It’s worth noting that the 
original Blockhead would, on the contrary, always be able to produce 
an appropriate output, neologisms or entirely new languages included. 
 
It is also worth noting that the learning ability of Ultimate Blockhead is 
limited: for instance, it cannot learn during the TT, that is, it is not able 
to learn something the judge teaches it (e.g. a neologism that never 
appears on the web). Most importantly, Ultimate Blockhead is not able 
to learn new information from induction or deduction. The reason is 
that Ultimate Blockhead does not possess a general learning ability, like 
humans, but just the learning ability of an aggregator: all it does is 
memorising. 
 
So, to rephrase the question asked above, “should Ultimate Blockhead 
be considered intelligent?”, should Ultimate Blockhead pass the TT? 
My answer is no: even though the table of Ultimate Blockhead is learnt 
and not hand-coded, it still works like the original Blockhead, that is by 
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brute-force. This is not compatible with the generalisation of the LUT 
argument that I proposed at the beginning of the chapter: if the 
responses of an entity are produced by brute-force, then the entity is not 
intelligent. And, as Turing (1950) speculates: 
 
“Intelligent behaviour presumably consists in a departure 
from the completely disciplined behaviour involved in 
computation.” (459) [Italics added] 
 
If this is true, then neither Blockhead nor Ultimate Blockhead (and 
certainly not Stupid Blockhead) should be considered intelligent and, 
consequently, they should not be allowed to pass the TT. As Ben-Yami 
(2005) specifies: 
 
“Other variants of Block’s machine can also be imagined, 
in which, although the internal information processing is 
again different, the relation between linguistic input and 
output is the same or similar, and consequently these 
machines are also devoid of intelligence.” (184) 
 
Summing up, in the case of the original Blockhead proposed by Block 
(1981), the table is hand-coded by humans; in the case of Ultimate 
Blockhead, a new LUT that I propose, the table is acquired 
independently, that is, learnt or, better, memorised. What should be kept 
in mind, however, is that its learning ability is limited to the ability of 
an aggregator, to look for new information and to compile them. In 
other words, for Ultimate Blockhead, learning means memorising 
interactions – found, let’s say, on the internet – and reusing them 
appropriately. It does not possess the general learning ability of a 
human child, who can learn many different things in many ways. 
Moreover, both Blockhead and Ultimate Blockhead use brute-force. 
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Consequently, as for any LUT, they should not be considered intelligent 
and, thus, be prevented from passing the TT. 
 
To do so, I propose to evaluate how well the target entity performs 
during the TT, by evaluating a further dimension in addition to ‘human-
likeness’ and ‘correctness’: what I call ‘strategicness’. I will discuss it 
in more detail in Ch. 5 and 7, where I propose the QTT, a new test of 
intelligence on the model of the TT which is able to avoid not only 
Blockhead and Stupid Blockhead (as well as Artificial Stupidity in 





In this chapter, I discuss Blockhead (Block, 1981), a brute-force system 
which is able to pass the TT by looking up its table and picking an 
appropriate response to whatever verbal stimulus it receives. I hold that 
Blockhead, no matter the arguments appealing its physical unfeasibility 
(Copeland, 2000; Proudfoot, 2013) or its learning history (Ben-Yami, 
2005; McDermott, 2014), undermines the reliability of the TT’s results. 
 
I propose two other versions of Blockhead, one physically feasible, and 
one with a learning history: (i) Stupid Blockhead, which can pass the 
test by using the Artificial Stupidity’s strategies to exploit the judge’s 
beliefs; and (ii) Ultimate Blockhead, which independently acquires its 
table by memorising all the possible verbal interactions on a given 
source (e.g., the internet). Since Blockhead, Stupid Blockhead and 
Ultimate Blockhead work in the same way, that is, by brute-force, I 
argue that none of them should be attributed with intelligence; and that 
the experimental design of the TT should be improved in order to rule 




In the second part of the thesis, I introduce my proposal for a new 
conversational test of intelligence, which I call the Questioning Turing 
Test, with the goal to avoid both Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead (as 
well as Stupid and Ultimate Blockhead). In order to prevent brute-force 
entities from passing the TT, I propose a further dimension along which 
to evaluate the entity in addition to ‘human-likeness’ and ‘ correctness’: 
what I call ‘strategicness’. To evaluate ‘strategicness’, I switch from the 
SISO setup of the TT (where the task is to hold an open conversation) 
to the SOSI setup of the QTT (where the task is to accomplish an 
























Alternative and Extended Versions of the Turing Test 
 
 
Abstract. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to my proposal of 
a new version of the TT, that I call the Questioning Turing Test (QTT), 
intended to prevent Artificial Stupidity (Ch. 2) and Blockhead (Ch. 3) 
from passing. In this chapter, I discuss two alternative versions of the 
TT: the Minimum Intelligence Signal Test (MIST), proposed by 
McKinstry (1997, 2009); and the Feigenbaum Test (FT), proposed by 
Feigenbaum (2003). The MIST addresses the problem of the 
subcognitive competency, discussed by French (1990). The FT 
addresses the problem of the judge’s expertise, is intended to evaluate 
Expert Systems. Both the MIST and the FT provide some ground for 
the experimental design improvements that I propose with the QTT. I 
also discuss two extended versions of the TT: the Total Turing Test 
(3T), proposed by Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000); and the Truly Total 
Turing Test (4T), proposed by Schweizer (1998, 2012a). 
 
So far, I described the Turing Test (Ch. 1), and I discussed what I hold 
to be the two main difficulties with it: Artificial Stupidity (Ch. 2) and 
Blockhead (Ch. 3). 
 
In this chapter, I discuss two alternative versions and two extended 
versions of the TT. The alternative versions are intended to address a 
specific problem with the experimental design of the TT. The two 
alternative versions of the TT that I discuss are (i) the MIST, proposed 
by McKinstry (1997, 2009) and intended to probe the subcognitive 
competencies of an entity; and (ii) the FT, proposed by Feigenbaum 
(2003) and intended to evaluate an entity’s ability to display and justify 
expert knowledge. The MIST limits the interactions to yes/no ones, and 
rules out Artificial Stupidity by parametrising the entity along 
‘correctness’ rather than ‘human-likeness’. The FT evaluates (i) the 
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entity’s use of the language (‘human-likeness’), (ii) the entity’s 
rightness and cooperativeness (‘correctness’), and (iii) the entity’s 
ability to provide justifications and explanations for its replies 
(‘strategicness’). The extended versions are intended to broaden the 
experimental design of the TT, limited to verbal behaviours. The two 
extended versions of the TT that I discuss are (i) the 3T (Harnad, 1989), 
which includes all the possible sensorimotor behaviours of a human, 
not only verbal ones; and (ii) the 4T (Schweizer, 1998), which includes 
the evolutionary mechanisms to replicate the human achievements. 
 
In the next section, I present McKinstry’s quantitative and automatable 
test of intelligence: the MIST. In section 4.2, I describe Feigenbaum’s 
Expert Systems and the FT, an expert subject matter TT. In section 4.3, 
I examine the extended versions of the TT: the 3T, proposed by Harnad 
(1989, 1991, 2000); and the 4T, proposed by Schweizer (1998, 2012a). 
 
 
4.1 The Minimum Intelligence Signal Test 
 
Inspired by French’s (1990) argument on the subcognitive 
competencies (discussed in Ch. 1), McKinstry (1997, 2009) designs the 
Minimum Intelligence Signal Test (MIST), intended as an objective and 
automatable version of the TT. The primary purpose of the MIST, as 
McKinstry (2009) states, is to provide a possible: 
 
“method for the automatic discovery of a universal human 
semantic-affective hyperspatial approximation of the 
human subcognitive substrate – the associative network 
which French (1990) asserts is the ultimate foundation of 
the human ability to pass the Turing Test – that does not 
require a machine to have direct human experience or a 




The MIST is conducted in the following way: a judge (C) – which can 
be a machine – asks yes/no subcognitive questions to the target entity 
(A) in order to decide whether the entity is human or machine (as shown 
in fig. 1). The judge’s decision depends entirely on how many correct 
binary answers the entity gives, against the probability that the entity’s 





As McKinstry (1997) specifies: 
 
“Given a series of stimuli (items), a system being tested 
generates a binary response for each stimulus. Thus a 
Minimum Intelligent Signal may be detected in the 
cumulative binary output of that system. A system that has 
a MIST score that is statistically different from a random 
system is said to be intelligent. A system that has a MIST 
score that does not differ statistically from the MIST score 
of an average human, is said to have the intelligence of an 




The MIST follows Turing and French in the claim that a conversational 
test is adequate to test for intelligence, but its experimental design 
introduces a few restrictions. The entity in the MIST is not required to 
be able to hold a conversation: it can only reply yes or no to the binary 
subcognitive questions asked by the judge. For this reason, McKinstry 
(1997) argues, it is not even necessary that a human judge carries the 
questioning: the questions can be automatically delivered to the system. 
That is why, as McKinstry points out, the MIST is intended to be an 
automatable version of the TT, and to provide statistical evidence of the 
machine’s general knowledge and common-sense (by means of 
French’s subcognitive questions). The corpus of subcognitive items 
(propositions) and their Boolean answers is called Mindpixels: the idea 
behind the name is that, similarly to a picture made of pixels, the more 
the pixels, the higher the quality of the picture, a – conversational – 
mind is made of propositions, the more the propositions available, the 
more human-like the mind. McKinstry launched the Mindpixels project 
in 2000, with the aim to create a general and common-sense knowledge 
base made of millions of human yes/no statements. In four years, by 
2004, the Mindpixels server registered 1.4 million entries. As 
McKinstry (2009) points out, even though the Mindpixels corpus 
cannot be considered intelligent itself, it 
 
“would allow for the high speed automation of the Turing 
Test and aid in the discovery of a truly intelligent computer 
program.” (290) 
 
Given its experimental design, the MIST is able to rule out Artificial 
Stupidity, since the interactions during the conversation are limited to 
yes/no ones. For this reason, the MIST does not parametrise the entity 
along ‘human-likeness’, but only ‘correctness’. In other words, the 
MIST factors out the style of the replies, preventing the target entity 
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from exploiting the judge’s beliefs. McKinstry (1997, 2009) 
distinguishes four distinct stages, that can be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) Collect and validate a corpus of binary propositions 
which require human intelligence to respond to and 
which have a stable response. (For instance, “my 
foot is bigger than the Sun” has a stable human 
response: false; “my foot is bigger than yours” does 
not have a stable response). 
(ii) Draw a test of at least 20 random propositions from 
the corpus, such that 50% are true, and 50% are 
false. 
(iii) Present these propositions to the target entity in 
random order. 
(iv) Calculate the probability that the system is human 
or random (machine). 
 
In the case of an entity scoring 15/20 of correct propositions every time 
it is presented with 20 items randomly selected from a very large pool, 
it is possible to say that the entity is statistically human. In the case of 
15 correct propositions out of 20, the probability that the entity is a 
random system (that is, a coin) is only .04; in the case of an entity 
scoring 20 correct propositions out of 20, the probability that the entity 
is a random system is now less than .0002, specifically 1 in 220, that is, 
1 in 1.048.576 (the same probability to flip a coin either heads or tails 
20 times in a row). It can be argued that he experimental design of the 
MIST does the opposite than the experimental design of the TT: 
whereas in the latter ‘human-likeness’ is conflated with ‘correctness’, 
in the former ‘correctness’ is conflated with ‘human-likeness’. In other 




Notably, McKinstry (1997) distinguishes between cooperative and 
evasive replies when referring to, respectively, consistent or 
inconsistent replies with human intelligence. As McKinstry (1997) 
writes: 
 
“For each item, judge the item/response pair either 
consistent or inconsistent with human intelligence. This 
grading procedure may be easily automated, reducing the 
chance of grading error or unforeseen bias. Sum the total of 
the items judged consistent I (Intelligent), and sum the 
items judged inconsistent E (Evasive). Probability the 
system under consideration is intelligent and cooperative is 
p(I)=I/N. Probability the system is intelligent and evasive is 
p(E)=E/N. Both probabilities must sum to 1.0.” (18) 
 
This distinction, I argue, is compatible with the distinction I made in 
Ch. 2 between the cooperativeness of an intelligent conversational 
entity and the evasiveness of a ‘stupid’ conversational entity. For this 
reason, and since the interactions are limited to yes/no questions (and, 
consequently, the style of the replies is factored out), I argue that the 
experimental design of the MIST prevents Artificial Stupidity from 
passing. Given the design of the MIST, an artificially ‘stupid’ entity 
could not use the language to exploit the judge’s beliefs; and it would 
have no more than a .0002% chance of answering correctly by chance, 
being thus considered intelligent. So, the case in which an entity – either 
human or machine – can win exclusively by chance is ruled out, given 
the very low probability of scoring 20 out of 20 correct replies by 
guesswork. And, it’s worth noting, even if an unintelligent system wins 
the MIST with a score of 20/20 by chance, it still would not be enough 
to claim that the system is intelligent, since it would be required to 
match its performance in future tests (which is statistically very 
unlikely). An entity guessing the answers randomly, being the possible 
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answers “yes” or “no” only, would averagely score .5 in the test 
(replying correctly to 10/20 of the subcognitive questions). So, given 
the nature of the questions, and the low probability of answering all of 
them correctly, if the entity ends up with a MIST score of >.5 over a 
series of sessions, it is statistically possible to infer that the entity shows 
intelligence. It is important to underline that in order to test an entity 
properly, both French and McKinstry seem to suggest that the judge 
should be a trained one rather than an average person. In McKinstry’s 
(2009) words, “the Mindpixel system is a many-headed version of 
French’s competent and prepared investigator”85, that is, a judge who 
asks subcognitive questions in order to unmask the target entity. The 
MIST, finally, can be made more and more difficult depending on how 
many questions the entity must answer. As McKinstry (2009) puts it: 
 
“the chance of coin flipping appearing as a perfectly 
intelligent person in an arbitrary 1,000 items MIST would 
be one in 21000 – a very, very small chance indeed.” (289) 
 
Summing up, the Mindpixels online corpus and McKinstry’s MIST are 
intended to deal with French’s notion of subcognitive competency, 
which is argued to allow the judge to open a window on both the 
unconscious cognitive structure and the physical characteristics of an 
entity. The MIST is a quantitative test for human-like intelligence, 
statistically measuring the amount of correct yes/no answers to 20 
subcognitive questions: the idea is that a system able to reply correctly 
to more than 10 out of 20 subcognitive yes/no questions, over a series 
of sessions, would provide a statistical proof of its intelligence. The 
judge in the MIST, as the judge in French’s Rating Games, is required 
to be a trained one (in asking subcognitive questions). In the MIST, 
moreover, the role of the judge does not involve any direct decision 
about the hidden entity’s ‘human-likeness’. The target entity is 
 
85 McKinstry (2009, p. 291). 
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parametrised along one dimension: ‘correctness’. It is not parametrised 
along the dimension of ‘human-likeness’, since the interactions allowed 
are binary, unstylish ones only. Because of the limited interactions 
available, the test could be automated, with the human judge simply 
replaced by a machine. The MIST is intended to evaluate the patterns 
of an entity’s replies, making it possible to gain statistical evidence. It 
is possible to say that whereas in the TT ‘human-likeness’ is conflated 
with ‘correctness’, in the MIST ‘correctness’ is conflated with ‘human-
likeness’. Here, intelligence is inferred from ‘human-likeness’ which is, 
in turn, inferred from ‘correctness’: the more the correct replies given 
by the entity to the judge’s binary subcognitive questions, the more 
human-like its performance. Finally, the experimental design of the 
MIST, by parametrising the hidden entity along the dimension of 




4.2 The Feigenbaum Test 
 
Focused on Expert Systems, Feigenbaum (2003) proposed a version of 
the TT where (i) the task is to hold an expert dissertation rather than an 
average conversation; and (ii) the judge is an academic expert rather 
than an average person.87 The Feigenbaum Test (FT) is designed to 
evaluate different abilities, as Feigenbaum (2003) points out: 
 
“(i) The ability to concatenate assertions and arrive at a new 
conclusion. [...] 
(ii) The ability to learn and use external symbols to 
represent numerical, spatial, or conceptual information. 
 
86 As a matter of fact, the Mindpixel corpus is a Blockhead. 
87 Where “average” simply means without any specific competency or any particular 
deficiency, in order to rule out false positives and negatives (see Proudfoot, 2013). 
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(iii) The ability to learn and use symbols whose meanings 
are defined in terms of other learned symbols. 
(iv) The ability to invent and learn terms for abstractions as 
well as for concrete entities. 
(v) The ability to invent and learn terms for relations as well 
as things.” (33) 
 
The FT is played by three participants (as shown in fig. 2): an expert 
entity, let’s say in molecular biology (A); a human expert in the same 
domain, let’s say a molecular biology professor member of the National 
Academy (B); and a human expert judge, let’s say another molecular 





The purpose of A is (i) to hold an expert conversation with C as good 
as – or better then – B and (ii) to be recognised as human as often as B. 
The language allowed is restricted to the academic jargon of a certain 
discipline, so rather than general ‘human-likeness’, the FT evaluates 




“The judge poses problems, asks questions, asks for 
explanations, theories, and so on—as one might do with a 
colleague. Can the human judge choose, at better than 
chance level, which is his National Academy colleague and 
which is the computer?” (36) 
 
The dimensions along which the entity is parametrised in the FT are (i) 
‘expert human-likeness’ and (ii) ‘correctness’. That is, the abilities of 
the target entity to, respectively, be recognised as a human and produce 
valid dissertations, discoveries, justifications (and so on). I argue, 
however, that there is another, implicit dimension along which the 
entity is evaluated: ‘strategicness’, that is, the method with which an 
entity argues, discovers, justifies its conclusions (and so on). Because 
of those dimensions, I argue that the FT has three advantages. 
 
The first is that the FT rules out superhuman intelligence, by 
parametrising the entity along ‘expert human-likeness’. Feigenbaum 
(2003) considers the case of an infallible Expert System, which he calls 
the Ultra-Intelligent Computer (UIC). Similarly to the oracle machine 
proposed by Turing (1939), Feigenbaum (2003) notes that the UIC 
would fail the FT, because of its non-human-like infallibility, from 
which it would be possible to infer its ‘human-unlikeness’: 
 
“Paradoxically, the UIC would be easily discernible from 
the elite human performer. It would be offering inductions, 
problem solutions and theories that were not yet reached by 
any human, yet were plausible, rigorous upon explanation, 
and either correct or interesting enough to subject to 
experimental test.” (36) 
 
The second advantage is that the FT rules out Artificial Stupidity, since 
it evaluates the entity specifically for its ability to produce pertinent and 
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correct responses. Moreover, the jargonized language allowed in the FT 
prevents Artificial Stupidity from passing the test by exploiting the 
judge’s beliefs, unlike in the TT, where the language is not restricted, 
and evasive tricks are possible. As Feigenbaum (2003) specifies: 
 
“To factor out the facet of intelligence related to full natural 
language [use and] understanding, the framers of the game 
might decide at the outset that the interactions will be 
conducted in the heavily jargonized and stylized language 
with which practitioners in the selected domains usually 
communicate their problems and issues.” (ibid.) 
 
The third advantage is that the FT can rule out Blockhead as well, which 
would not be able, given its inner workings, to “concatenate assertions 
and arrive at a new conclusion”88, or to “invent and learn terms for 
abstractions.”89 
 
There are two problems with the FT. First, it is an impractical test: it 
not only requires to recruit expert humans, but also to build such an 
advance expert machine. Second, ‘strategicness’ is not explicitly 
defined, and the experimental design of the FT does not allow to 
measure it. ‘Strategicness’ still plays an important, although implicit, 
role in the FT: for instance, when the expert judge evaluates the 
methodology with which the entity develops its arguments. 
 
Feigenbaum (2003) sets a further challenge for Expert Systems: their 
knowledge base should be independently acquired, rather than hand-
coded by humans. The learning Expert System has two advantages for 
the FT: first, similarly to Turing’s child machine (1948, 1950), it is 
intended to rule out the possibility for the system to be a pre-
 




programmed look-up table like Blockhead. Feigenbaum (2003) 
provides a description of the learning Expert System as follows: 
 
“First, manually encode a novice-level understanding 
(symbolic representation) of the domain, that is, humans 
will do the knowledge engineering. The novice-level 
“view” of the domain can be taken directly from a well-
regarded elementary text of the domain, for example, an 
introduction to molecular biology. Second, write the 
software for a system that will read the “next” text in the 
field, augmenting as it reads the kernel novice-level 
knowledge base.” (37) 
 
Second, the learning Expert System would not be left alone to learn new 
things: it would require some human assistance in order to occasionally 
cope with natural language, clarify some passage or correct the possible 
misunderstandings. And the humans assisting the Expert System could 
as well benefit from its discoveries. As Feigenbaum (2003) suggests:  
 
“The educated CI [Computer Intelligence] would continue 
to educate itself by reading the emerging literature of the 
domain. That is, it would “keep up with the literature.” 
Human assistance will still be allowed, but less than was 
allowed earlier. Indeed, one could think of this phase as 
“collaboration,” since both human and CI will be learning 
the new material at the same time.” (38) 
 
To conclude, it is worth noting that the FT is compatible with Artificial 
Fallibility, but incompatible with Artificial Stupidity, for the entity has 
to show the same level of expertise in a certain domain as a human 
expert. In order to pass the FT, the Expert System has not only to show 
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to possess the proper knowledge about a topic, but also to present and 
justify it in an expert human-like way.  
 
Summing up, in this section I describe the subject matter expert test 
proposed by Feigenbaum (2003): the FT. I claim that it has the 
advantage, like the MIST, to prevent the entity from passing the test by 
successfully using Artificial Stupidity to exploit the judge’s beliefs. But 
whereas the MIST evaluates the “quantity” of the subcognitive 
interrogation, the FT evaluates the “quality” of the expert conversation 
between the expert contestants. To do so, the FT parametrises the entity 
along the dimension of (i) ‘expert human-likeness’, that is, the ability 
to use a jargonized language properly enough to be recognised as a 
human expert; and the dimension of (ii) ‘correctness’, that is, the ability 
to produce the right responses to the expert questions and problems 
posed by the expert judge. Moreover, I argue, there is a further implicit 
dimension along which the entity is evaluated, that is, (iii) 
‘strategicness’, which evaluates the methodology with which the entity 
produces and justifies its responses. The two main problems with the 
FT, however, are: (i) the FT is not a practical test, contrary to the TT; 
and (ii) the FT does not explicitly define the dimension of 
‘strategicness’, leaving it to the judge’s discretion. 
 
 
4.3 The Extended Turing Tests 
 
The expression “extended Turing Test” refers to any variation of the 
experimental design of the TT that includes an evaluation of other 
abilities, such as sensorimotor abilities, in addition to the conversational 
ones. In this section, I discuss the Total Turing Test (3T) proposed by 
Harnad (1989, 1991, 2000); and the Truly Total Turing Test (4T), 




4.3.1 Total Turing Test 
Harnad (2000) proposes a hierarchy of Turing tests, from the most basic 
to the most complex one: 
 
“from subtotal (“toy”) fragments of our functions (t1), to 
total symbolic (pen-pal) function (T2 – the standard Turing 
Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), 
to total internal microfunction (T4), to total 
indistinguishability in every empirically discernible respect 
(T5).” (425) 
 
Harnad (2000) specifies that the models considered by the TT and its 
extended versions are models “of subhuman and human functional 
capacities;”90 not animals or aliens. The reason is, Harnad holds, that 
even though “other species no doubt have minds, […] our confidence 
in this can only diminish as we move further and further from our own 
species.”91 In other words, without a general theory of intelligence, we 
can only focus on human-like intelligence, as held by French (1990).  
 
Harnad (2000) argues that the t1 is underdetermined; the T2 is 
vulnerable to various difficulties; the T4 and the T5 are overdetermined; 
and the T392 is to be considered the proper experimental update to test 
for intelligence. More specifically, the t1 is the level where the 
evaluated models are arbitrary human functions only, and the 
candidates are more or less toys (consider, for instance, a talking doll 
or a chess engine). The T2 is the level where the scrutinised model is 
the human verbal ability, described as “words in – words out”, or, 
better, “symbols in, symbols out”93 (SISO). T4 and T5 are the levels 
 
90 Harnad (2000, p. 432). 
91 Ibid. 
92 It’s worth noting that ‘3T’ and ‘T3’ can be used interchangeably. On the contrary, ‘4T’ and 
‘T4’ cannot: the former refers to the Truly Total Turing Test (Schweizer, 1998) and the latter 
to the “Total Internal Microfunction” test, as distinguished by Harnad (2000). 
93 Harnad (1989), p. 19). 
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where the tested models are not only conversational ones but also 
neurophysiological ones: in the T4 the neurophysiological 
indistinguishability with humans is obtained through synthetic 
craftsmanship; in the T5 the neurophysiological indistinguishability 
with humans is engineered out of real biological molecules (for 
instance, an artificial embryo that will eventually grow into a human 
being). The T3, finally, is the level where the examined model is the 
external full human function-indistinguishability. In the T3 there is no 
interest to the inner workings or the nature of the inner components of 
a candidate, as long as the candidate is able to produce the full range of 
cognitive and physical behaviours of a human. As Harnad (2000) puts: 
 
“So does that mean that all differences above the level of 
T3 matter as little (or as much) to having a mind […]? 
Intuitively (and morally), I think the answer is undeniably: 
Yes.” (441) 
 
Summing up, the 3T is intended to extend the range of abilities that an 
entity must show, to include sensorimotor abilities in addition to 
conversational ones. 
 
4.3.2 Truly Total Turing Test 
Schweizer (2012b) agrees with Harnad about the weaknesses of the TT, 
but he is not satisfied with the 3T as the proper improvement of the TT’s 
experimental design: 
 
“[…] I argue that the conversation-based 2T is far too weak, 
and we must scale up to the full linguistic and robotic 
standards of the Total Turing Test (3T). […] However, I 
then propose a variation on the 3T, adopting Dennett’s 
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method of ‘heterophenomenology’, to rigorously probe the 
robot’s purported ‘inner’ qualitative experiences.” (41)94 
 
Whereas Harnad (1989, 2000) argues that the 3T represents the proper 
hierarchical level to which the TT should be updated, Schweizer (1998) 
objects that the 3T can only test for individual tokens of intelligent 
behaviour. This means that, even if the scrutinised candidate is 
embodied, there is no guarantee that it has experience of the world. The 
3T robotic candidate could just translate the sensorimotor and 
conversational inputs its sensors receive into symbols, in order to 
manipulate them and emit the appropriate cognitive and physical pre-
programmed outputs to interact with other agents and the environment. 
In other words, just as the TT can be passed by an unintelligent 
conversational Blockhead, the 3T can be passed by an unintelligent 
robotic Blockhead. Schweizer (1998) summarises the issue as follows: 
 
“It is not simply behavior that matters, but how the behavior 
is generated. For example, mere successful performance is 
not intelligent if it is produced accidentally, or if it is just 
parroting of acquired but uncomprehended phrases, or if it 
is produced non-constructively, as in the use of exhaustive 
look-up tables to find an answer in pre-packaged form.” 
(265) 
 
In agreement with Harnad (1989), who holds that the experimental 
design of the TT should not set any limit, Schweizer’s (1998) proposal 
removes the restrictions of the TT: 
 
 
94 See Dennett (1992): “The heterophenomenological method neither challenges nor accepts as 
entirely true the assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic 




“[…] to test for genuine intelligence, we would need to see 
how the computational procedures would perform over the 
long term, in a varied and unrestricted environment. Our 
behavioral interactions with fellow humans extend over 
protracted interval of time, and involve many kinds of 
activity other than mere verbal exchange.” (265) 
 
Those restrictions are: (i) the conversational input-output setup, (ii) the 
anonymity, and (iii) the time limit95. To recall them, (i) the 
conversational input-output setup has the advantage of keeping the test 
practical, but it cannot prevent the unintelligent Blockhead from 
passing. (ii) “Teletype anonymity is meant to screen-off prejudicial 
reactions, but the point then becomes to fool someone into thinking that 
the machine is human.”96 And (iii) the time limit is meant, as shown 
above, for practical reasons (an unlimited TT would not be passed by 
any mortal human as well). The reason to eliminate those restrictions is 
that “when it comes to judging human language users in normal 
contexts, we rely on a far richer domain of evidence.”97 Schweizer 
(1998) focuses on the “historical record”98 of human intelligence, rather 
than on individual expressions of intelligence. The test is intended to 
evaluate whether a non-human cognitive type can replicate the human 
intellectual achievements. This “long-term evolutionary criterion”99 is 
the dimension along which the entity, which is an individual token of 
the cognitive type under scrutiny, is parametrised in the Truly Total 
 
95 See (Harnad, 2000): “It is a mistake to think of T2 as something that can be “passed” in a 
single evening or even during an annual Loebner Prize Competition (Loebner, 1994; Shieber, 
1994). Although it was introduced in the form of a party game in order to engage our intuitions, 
it is obvious that Turing intends T2 as a serious, long-term operational criterion for what would 
now be called “cognitive science.” The successful candidate is not one that has fooled the judges 
in one session into thinking it could perform indistinguishably from a real pen-pal with a mind. 
(Fooling 70% of the people one time is as meaningless, scientifically, as fooling 100% of the 
people 70 times.) The winning candidate will really have the capacity to perform 
indistinguishably from a real pen-pal with a mind – for a lifetime, if need be, just as unhaltingly 
as any of the rest of us can.” (433) 
96 Schweizer (1998, p. 266). 
97 Schweizer (2012a, p. 195). 
98 Schweizer (1998, p. 267). 
99 Schweizer (1998, p. 270). 
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Turing Test (4T)100. This perspective shift from individual cognitive 
tokens to general cognitive type is due to the nature of sociolinguistic 
competencies, as argued by Burge (1979)101 and Schweizer (2012a): 
 
“Various mental states and events are not fully determined 
by what’s going on in an individual’s head. Instead, they 
rely in an inextricable manner on the encompassing 
sociolinguistic milieu. From this it follows that human 
mentality is essentially non-individualistic – it depends 
crucially upon a sociolinguistic context that transcends 
personal boundaries.” (203) 
 
Summing up, the 4T is an evolutionary evaluation of the capacities of a 
cognitive type (like humankind), rather than a circumscribed evaluation 
of the capacities of individual cognitive tokens (like humans). As, 
Schweizer (2012a) specifies, the point of the 4T is not to evaluate a 
cognitive token with a pre-existing sociolinguistic context, but rather 
“[…] whether the artificial cognitive type itself is capable of producing 
a comparable sociolinguistic medium.”102 The 4T is intended to show 
that not only the TT, but also the 3T is too weak103; and it is intended to 
face one in particular of the difficulties of the experimental design of 
the TT (and the 3T): the possibility for an unintelligent system which 
manipulates pre-programmed knowledge (like Blockhead) to pass. 
Also, it is important to clarify, in the 4T is not chauvinistic: the type’s 
 
100 Schweizer’s 4T (Truly Total Turing Test) is not to be confused with Harnad’s T4 (Total 
Total Turing Test). See Schweizer (1998): “This [4T] is not to be confused with Harnad’s 
‘TTTT’, which stands for ‘Total Total Turing Test’, and which includes neurophysiological 
imitation.” (267) 
101 See Burge (1979): “I shall offer some considerations that stress social factors in descriptions 
of an individual’s mental phenomena. These considerations call into question individualistic 
presuppositions of several traditional and modern treatments of mind. […] Even those 
propositional attitudes not infected by incomplete understanding depend for their content on 
social factors that are independent of the individual, asocially and non-intentionally described. 
For if the social environment had been appropriately different, the contents of those attitudes 
would have been different.” (74-84) 
102 Schweizer (2012a, p. 191). 
103 See Schweizer (2012a): “my overall conclusion will be that the 3T is still too weak, and that 
a truly comprehensive test should evaluate the general category of cognitive organization under 
investigation, rather than the performance of single specimens.” (198) 
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evolutionary history and the token’s inner workings are not required to 
“be isomorphic to ours in order to count as intelligent”104. It is rather 
intended to show that the cognitive type under scrutiny should “be 




In this chapter, I consider two alternative versions of the TT that 
provides some ground for my proposal: the MIST, proposed by 
McKinstry (1997, 2009); and the FT, proposed by Feigenbaum (2003). 
I also discuss two extended versions of the TT: the 3T, proposed by 
Harnad (1989, 2000); and the 4T, proposed by Schweizer (1998, 2000). 
The alternative versions are intended to deal with a specific problem of 
the TT. The extended versions are intended to include full sensorimotor 
abilities, in addition to verbal ones, among those that an entity should 
possess; and to extend the requirement for passing the test, from being 
indistinguishable from a human in holding a conversation to being 
indistinguishable from a human in doing everything a human can do. 
 
The MIST is intended to evaluate the subcognitive competencies, as 
discussed by French (1990), of the candidate entity by means of a 
conversation carried out by yes/no interactions only. It has the 
advantage to prevent Artificial Stupidity from passing, but not 
Blockhead. The FT is intended to evaluate the expert competencies of 
the candidate entity by means of an expert jargonized dissertation. Like 
the MIST, it has the advantage to avoid Artificial Stupidity, but not 
Blockhead – or, at least, not all the times. The 3T is intended to evaluate 
the sensorimotor abilities of an entity (cognitive token), in addition to 
the conversational ones. The problem with the 3T is that it cannot 
prevent a robotic Blockhead from passing, just like the TT cannot avoid 
 




Blockhead. Finally, the 4T is intended to evaluate the evolutionary and 
sociolinguistic history of a cognitive type. No unintelligent approach 
could pass the 4T; however, it is a long-term, impractical test. 
 
The extended versions of the TT are motivated by the view that the 
simple TT is not adequate and needs to be strengthened to embodied 
versions. In other words, according to these views, having direct 
human-like experience or a physical human-like body are necessary 
aspects along which the candidate entity should be parametrised. Even 
if I do not disagree with the advantages of an embodied agent, I keep 
the QTT a disembodied test in order to avoid chauvinistic 
consequences. For instance, the requirements of the extended TTs can 
be rejected by the following counterexample: an individual, born with 
serious sensorimotor deficits and incapable of directly experiencing the 
world, who is still able to fully develop human cognitive abilities. 
However, as mentioned in the Conclusion, future work will focus on 
extended versions of the QTT. 
 

















The Questioning Turing Test 
 
 
Abstract. In this chapter, I describe the new version of the TT that I 
propose: the Questioning Turing Test (QTT), where the conversation 
between the participants is an enquiry rather than an open one. The QTT 
is made of two procedures: (i) a questioning game played by two 
humans and (ii) a questioning game played by a human and a machine. 
The two games have a similar scope as the AB-IG and the MB-IG (Ch. 
1), that is, to set a benchmark in order to compare the two outcomes, 
where the former scores the latter. Moreover, the roles of the questioner 
and the answerer are switched: here, the candidate entity asks the 
questions and the judge gives the replies. The entity is parametrised 
along two further dimensions in addition to ‘human-likeness’: 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. This, I claim, prevents both Artificial 
Stupidity (Ch. 2) and Blockhead (Ch. 3) from passing. 
 
In this chapter, I propose my new version of the TT: the Questioning 
Turing Test (QTT). The QTT focus on a specific kind of conversation, 
that is, enquiries. It’s important to point out that the TT already contains 
every possible conversational variation of the test, and it follows that 
the QTT is already included in the TT. In other words, nothing prevents 
the conversation during the TT to be an enquiry. However, I disagree 
with the view that the TT already includes any test, as argued by 
Hernández-Orallo (2017): 
 
“[…] the Turing test can ‘contain’ any test we may think of, 
so the question backtracks to what questions the judge must 
ask to make it sufficient.” (p. 129) 
 
The reason is that, while the open conversation in the TT admits any 
possible conversational variation, it does not necessarily follow that the 
experimental design of the original TT also includes any possible 
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experimental variation. If the judge purposely runs a variation of the 
TT, then the judge and the experimenter are the same person; and if that 
were the case, the judge should be regarded as an expert. This 
contradicts what Turing specifies about the judges, “who should not be 
expert about machines106”, excluding them from participating (as well 
as “those who are expert about the human mind107”). Turing, on the 
contrary, specifies that the judge should rather be “an average 
interrogator108”, where the function of average is to rule out those 
“conditions that might generate false positives or negatives – or 
whatever stands proxy for a false result […].”109 Moreover, the 
statement of Hernández-Orallo implies that the judge can objectively 
evaluate the entity’s intelligence alone, no comparisons with any 
benchmark needed, given that the judge asks the right questions. This 
contradicts the “Literal Interpretation” of the TT (discussed in Ch. 1), 
according to which the results are given by the comparison between the 
contestants’ performances in the AB-IG and the MB-IG. So, I hold that 
it is true that the TT can virtually contain any variation, for it is, as 
Traiger (2000) states, best regarded as a format to test for intelligence 
which “invites generalization”110 and potential modifications; but I also 
believe that, because of this, the TT is exploitable, and its reliability 
should not depend upon the human judge. My claim is that it is 
necessary to improve the experimental design of the TT to minimise 
both the Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect (Ch. 1); and to avoid 
both Artificial Stupidity (Ch. 2) and Blockhead (Ch. 3). 
 
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section, I show the 
switch from SISO to SOSI. In section 5.2, I describe the QTT. In section 
5.3, I outline the main differences between the TT, the MIST, the FT 
and the QTT; and I show the advantages of the QTT over the TT, the 
 
106 Turing (1951, p. 495). 
107 Copeland (2000, p. 525). 
108 Turing (1950, p. 442). 
109 Proudfoot (2013, p. 397). 
110 Traiger (2000, p. 565). 
117 
 
MIST and the FT. In section 5.4, I show the Hybrid QTT (where the 
entity is played by both a human and a machine). In section 5.5, I 
discuss the potential extended versions of the QTT. 
 
 
5.1 From SISO to SOSI  
 
The new test that I propose focuses on two aspects. First, the 
comparison between the entities’ performances. Like Sterrett’s OIG 
(2000), the QTT evaluates: 
 
“[…] whether the machine is as resourceful in using its 
resources in performing a difficult task as the man is in 
using his resources in performing the same difficult task.” 
(548) 
 
The comparison between the resourcefulness of the entities in 
performing the same task provides the benchmark with which their 
performances are scored. 
 
Second, the QTT is designed to evaluate how an entity’s responses or 
behaviours are produced. I agree with Schweizer (1998) that: 
 
“[…] it is the method or procedure for generating behavior 
which is crucial to the issue, and that behavior itself is 
important mainly insofar as it provides data for gauging the 
respective quality of these underlying methods. In this vein, 
it is frequently argued that the most serious defect of the 
original TT is precisely the fact that the method by which 
the behaviour is produced is not adequately probed. […] 
Intelligence is not just a question of isolated samples of 




However, in a SISO test, like the TT, I hold that it is not possible to 
evaluate how a behaviour is produced. The reason is that, in a SISO test, 
the interactions are unidirectional: from the inputs of the human judge 
to the outputs of the candidate entity, and back again. As McKinstry 
(2009) puts it, the entities: 
 
“[…] are usually stimulus-response only. That is, they are 
able to respond in a perfectly human-like fashion to 
previously anticipated stimuli and an approximately 
human-like fashion to unanticipated stimuli, but they are 
incapable of generating original stimuli themselves.” (p. 
296) 
 
As introduced in the previous chapter, the setup of the TT can be 
defined as “symbols in, symbols out”111 (SISO). The setup of the QTT, 
on the other hand, is switched to “symbols out, symbols in” (SOSI). In 
other words, the candidate entity asks the questions to accomplish an 





The QTT switches the experimental structure from SISO (symbols in, 
symbols out), where the entity emits an appropriate response for a given 
 
111 Harnad (2000, p. 443). 
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input, to SOSI (symbols out, symbols in), where the entity produces an 
appropriate input for a given output. In other words, whereas in a SISO 
test, like the TT, the entity replies to the judge’s questions, in a SOSI 
test, like the QTT, the entity asks questions and the judge replies. 
 
An important characteristic of the experimental design of the TT is that, 
since it focuses on the entity’s replies, the entity only needs to 
manipulate the symbolic inputs (the judge’s questions) in order to send 
symbolic outputs.  Blockhead, for instance, receives the first interaction 
from the judge, and then it proceeds in looking its table for all the 
compatible entries and picks an appropriate one to send. If Blockhead 
were to produce some interaction first, it would just be a randomly 
picked one among the entries in its table (and, therefore, unlikely an 
appropriate one). French (2000a) considers SISO tests unreliable ones, 
since, as he states: 
 
“Mere SISO questioning could allow a non-intelligent 
entity to slip through the cracks of the Turing Test.” (334) 
 
The SOSI setup of the QTT allows the entity to be parametrised along 
a further dimension in addition to ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’: 
‘strategicness’, which refers to the number of questions asked by the 
entity in order to accomplish the aim of the enquiry (or before giving 
up): the fewer the questions asked, the better the strategy used. So, in 
the QTT the questioning entity is evaluated in terms of: 
 
(i) ‘human-likeness’, that is, the ability to be recognised as 
human by the judge as frequently as a human; 
(ii) ‘correctness’, that is, the ability to accomplish the aim 
of the enquiry; 
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(iii) ‘strategicness’, that is, the ability to ask as few – 
human-like – questions as possible in order to accomplish 
the aim of the enquiry in an optimised way. 
 
I hold that the QTT avoids chauvinism, by parametrising the entity 
along ‘human-likeness’, as well as Artificial Stupidity, by 
parametrising the entity along ‘correctness’, and Blockhead, by 
parametrising the entity along ‘strategicness’. 
 
 
5.2 The Questioning Turing Test 
 
Following Sterrett’s OIG, the QTT is made of two procedures: (i) the 
human-questioning-human (HqH) and (ii) the machine-questioning-
human (MqH). The contestants, both in the HqH and in the MqH, are 
in separate rooms communicating through text-based interactions. 
Depending on the aim of the enquiry, the QTT can be adapted to be 
played by either an average or an expert answerer. For instance, if the 
candidate entity is intended to carry out an enquiry about molecular 
biology, the answerer should be a molecular biology expert; if the 
candidate entity is intended to carry out a personal enquiry about the 
answerer (e.g. medical anamnesis) the answerer can be an average 
person. 
 
In what follows, I describe the two procedures involved in the QTT: the 
HqH and the MqH. The first procedure of the QTT is the HqH, where 
only humans are involved. The candidate entities have the goal to 
strategically accomplish the aim of the enquiry and the judge has the 
goal to decide over their ‘human-likeness’. The HqH has the same 
purpose as the AB-IG in the OIG, that is, to provide a benchmark with 
which the second procedure is scored. The second procedure of the 
QTT is the MqH, where one of the human questioners is replaced by a 
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questioning machine. Similarly, in the MqH the candidate entities have 
the goal to accomplish the aim of the enquiry, and the judge has the goal 
to decide over their ‘human-likeness’. 
 
I distinguish between two kind of QTT. On the one hand, the open, 
unrestricted QTT is intended to be played parallel-paired, where there 
are two rounds in total, and each round involves 3 players: (A) a 
questioning human/machine, (B) a questioning human and (C) the 
answering judge. On the other hand, the practical version of the QTT 
follows the third experimental setup provided by Turing: the one-to-one 
test, between A (candidate entity) and C (the judge): 
 
“The [imitation] game (with the player B omitted) is 
frequently used in practice under the name of viva voce to 
discover whether someone really understands something or 
has “learnt it parrot fashion.” (p. 446) 
 
The reasons why the practical, yes/no QTT is conducted viva-voce 
rather than parallel-paired, are: (i) the game involves a cooperative 
enquiry, rather than a competitive impersonation like the TT or the 
unrestricted QTT (where a parallel comparison between the 
performances of the entities is needed); and (ii) the language is 
restricted to yes/no interactions, and the importance of the interactions’ 
style is reduced. The practical QTT involves a twenty-questions game 
between two contestants with no particular expertise required. The 
answerer thinks about a public figure and the questioner has to identify 
who is being thought of, by gaining information from the answerer by 
means of yes/no questions. Like in the unrestricted QTT, the candidate 
entity in the practical QTT is parametrised along three dimensions: 
‘human-likeness’, which evaluates its ability to be considered human 
thanks to the style of the questions it asks; ‘correctness’, which 
evaluates its ability to identify the public figure; and ‘strategicness’, 
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which evaluates its performance in terms of the number of questions 
needed to accomplish the enquiry – the fewer the better. So, in the 
practical QTT, the entity passes if: (i) it produces human-like questions, 
that is, questions that the answerer recognises as human as frequently 
as those asked by a human; (ii) it successfully identifies the public 
figure as often as a human does; and (iii) it shows a strategic method to 
carry out the enquiry, that is, the number of questions it needs to 
accomplish the enquiry does not exceed the number of questions needed 
by a human questioner (see fig. 2). 
 
In the HqH of the practical QTT, the goal of the human questioner is to 
ask strategic yes/no questions (where ‘strategic’ means as few as 
possible) in order to gain the information needed to successfully 
identify the public figure the answerer is thinking of. In the MqH of the 
practical QTT, the goal of the questioning machine is to ask strategic 
yes/no questions (where ‘strategic’ means as few as possible) in order 
to gain the information needed to identify the public figure the answerer 
is thinking of. The machine passes the test if it is recognised as human 
with – at least – the same frequency with which the human questioner 
is recognised as human in the HqH; and if it successfully identifies the 
public figure the judge is thinking of with no more questions than the 
human questioner in the HqH. In other words, the machine passes the 
MqH if its performance matches or exceeds the human performance in 
the HqH. This is consistent with Sterrett’s view that the machine, to be 
attributed with intelligence, has to be “sufficiently resourceful at a 










As follows, I show a yes/no enquiry in the practical QTT, where the 
entity tries to identify the public figure (Alan Turing) that the judge is 
thinking of. 
 
Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character a 
female?” 
Judge: “No.” 




113 In (fig. 2) I show the HqH and the MqH of the practical version of the QTT, where the 
questioning hidden entity (A or B) has to identify, by means of no more than 20 binary 
questions, the public figure the answerer (C) is thinking of. In the HqH, C thinks of a public 
figure (in this case Homer Simpson) and A asks yes/no questions to try to guess it; at the end, 
A states what C is thinking of (in this case A correctly identifies the public figure as Homer 
Simpson) and C decides whether A is human or machine. In the MqH, C thinks of a public 
figure and B asks yes/no questions to try to guess it; at the end, B states what C is thinking of 
and C decides whether B is human or machine. 
Entity: “Is your character a 
youtuber?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Is your character linked 
with sports?” 
Judge: “No.” 





Entity: “Is your character more 
than 40 years old?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character still 
working?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Has your character been 
dead for more than 20 years?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Has your character been 
dead for more than 100 years?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Did your character take 
part in World War II?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character a 
politician?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Has your character 
killed humans?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Is your character 
homosexual?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Does your character 
owe his fame to computing?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Does your character 
solve puzzles?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character 
suicidal?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 




5.3 Differences between the QTT and the TT/MIST/FT 
 
I argue that there are three main differences between the TT/MIST/FT 
and the QTT. 
 
(i) First, in the TT, the MIST and the FT, the entity must prove it is able 
to emit adequate responses to a series of inputs, where the inputs are, 
respectively, lines of a general conversation, subcognitive questions, 
and lines of an expert conversation. In the QTT, in contrast, the entity 
must prove it is able to generate adequate outputs in order to receive the 
inputs it needs to accomplish its task, where the outputs are strategic 
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questions, the inputs are the answers received, and the task is to 
accomplish an enquiry. The questions are strategic when the machine 
is able to accomplish the enquiry by asking fewer questions than, or as 
many questions as, the human questioner. It is worth noting that it’s not 
necessary for the machine to ask the same questions asked by the human 
(since different paths can lead to the same result), just that the number 
of questions asked does not exceed the number of questions asked by 
the human. This switch in terms of the task corresponds to the switch 
in terms of the setup of the test: whereas the TT is a SISO test, the QTT 
is a SOSI one. 
 
(ii) Second, the human judge in the QTT plays a different – and less 
troubled – role than the judge in the TT and the FT (in the MIST, the 
judge can be entirely replaced with an automatized system, since the 
hidden entity has to reply to previously stored yes/no subcognitive 
questions). The judge in the QTT, on the one hand, can only interact 
during the test by means of yes/no answers; the judges in the TT and 
the FT, on the other hand, can interact during the test by means of, 
respectively, any conversational style whatsoever and an expert 
conversational style. As a result, in the TT (and, to a lesser extent, the 
FT), the judge may have various biases that cause her to engage the 
candidates in rather odd conversations in order to unmask them, making 
the test dependent on the judge’s beliefs. This is especially true for the 
STT, as pointed out by Traiger (2000), where the judge will not talk in 
the same way she would talk with other humans. The judge will rather 
engage the hidden entity in a challenging and odd conversation, made 
of paradoxical questions and semantic traps in order to unmask a 
potential machine. In order to avoid this problem, in the QTT the human 
judge (that is, the answerer) cannot alter the conversation in any way 
and, thus, she cannot alter the test with personal beliefs or biases, as it 
can potentially happen in the TT and the FT. A further advantage of the 
QTT is that the role of the judge is more versatile: whereas the judge in 
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the TT is required to be average, and the one in the FT is required to be 
expert, the judge in the QTT may be either average or expert (depending 
on the aim of the enquiry), with no risk of biased or chauvinistic 
consequences. 
 
(iii) Third, the experimental design of the QTT parametrises the 
candidate entity along three dimensions: ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. It means that the benchmark scoring 
the test is not only based, as it is in the original TT, on ‘human-likeness’, 
which evaluates the frequency with which the human judge decides 
wrongly about the nature of the contestants; and it is not mainly based, 
as it is in the MIST and the FT, on ‘correctness’, that is, the entity’s 
ability to reply correctly to, respectively, subcognitive and expert 
questions. I claim that, considered singularly, these two parameters lead 
to biased results: ‘human-likeness’ alone could be achieved by an 
unintelligent chatbot, by means of strategies such as Artificial 
Stupidity; and ‘correctness’ alone could be achieved an Expert System 
which shows no ‘human-likeness’ whatsoever (like a calculator). I 
rather hold we should evaluate both ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’, in order to avoid both Artificial Infallibility and Artificial 
Stupidity. However, evaluating both ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’ is still not enough, for Blockhead could pass by producing 
the appropriate reply by means of a brute-force, non-strategic approach 
and a huge look-up table. In order to prevent this from occurring, I 
propose to parametrise the candidate entity along ‘strategicness’, 
intended to evaluate how well the entity can accomplish a task. In the 
practical QTT, where the candidate entity has to accomplish the aim of 
the enquiry by means of yes/no questions, ‘strategicness’ is defined in 
terms of the number of questions asked, the fewer, the better. A 
questioning Blockhead would be prevented from passing because it 
would either search through its database one question at a time, 
potentially taking an incredibly long time to accomplish the enquiry; or 
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it would fail to ask as few questions as possible, without an algorithm 
to optimise the search. ‘Strategicness’, I claim, can only be evaluated 
in a SOSI test, as the QTT, and not in a SISO one, where a strategic 
entity could never be discriminated from an unintelligent system like 
Blockhead. 
 
Summing up, in the (SISO) TT the hidden entity interacts with an 
average human judge, and its goal is to be recognised as a real human. 
In the (SISO) MIST, the hidden entity interacts with a human or an 
automated system to demonstrate to be able to answer 20 yes/no 
subcognitive questions correctly, in order to provide statistical evidence 
of its intelligence. In the (SISO) FT, the hidden entity interacts with a 
human expert, in order to be recognised as a human expert. In the 
(SOSI) QTT, the human judge can be either average or expert, and the 
goal of the candidate entity is to (i) be recognised as human, (ii) 
accomplish the aim of the enquiry (avoiding Artificial Stupidity) and 
(iii) do so with as few questions as possible (ruling out Blockhead). The 
following table (tab. 1) is intended to illustrate the differences between 
the TT, the MIST, the FT and the QTT. 
 
Test Parameters Setup Judge A. S. Blockhead 
TT Human-likeness SISO Average Pass Pass 
MIST Correctness SISO Trained Fail Pass 
FT Expert-likeness 
Correctness 











114 A. S. stands for Artificial Stupidity. 
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5.4 Hybrid QTT 
 
The experimental design of the QTT, I argue, has a further experimental 
advantage over the TT, the MIST and the FT. The QTT can be used to 
test Hybrid Systems. A Hybrid System can be described as a system in 
which a human and a machine work together, combining their strengths 
and abilities, performing better than by themselves considered 
individually. Hybrid Systems has gained a growing interest in recent 
years, for instance, Sinha & al. (2016) write: 
 
“Current machine algorithms for analysis of unstructured 
data typically show low accuracies due to the need for 
human-like intelligence. Conversely, though humans are 
much better than machine algorithms on analysing 
unstructured data, they are unpredictable, slower and can be 
erroneous or even malicious as computing agents. 
Therefore, a hybrid platform that can intelligently 
orchestrate machine and human computing resources 
would potentially be capable of providing significantly 
better benefits compared to either type of computing agent 
in isolation.” (1) 
 
And Demartini (2015) shows (see tab. 2) the most recent developments 
of hybrid systems in the last decade, and he points out: 
 
“The creation of hybrid human-machine systems is a highly 
promising direction as it allows leveraging both the 
scalability of machines over large amounts of data as well 
as keeping the quality of human intelligence in the loop to 
finally obtain both efficiency and effectiveness in data 







As (tab. 2) shows, Hybrid Systems have great potential in many 
domains. However, at present, the human component of Hybrid 
Systems plays a marginal role, giving a contribution only before or after 
the machine’s performance, and not in real-time, as the Hybrid QTT 
would require. In the next section, I provide three examples of 
unrestricted QTTs and Hybrid QTTs. 
 
 
5.5 Unrestricted Versions of the QTT 
 
As mentions above, the reasons why the practical QTT is restricted to 
yes/no enquiries is to conduct as many tests as possible for my 
experiment, as quickly as possible. It is, however, not to a mandatory 
restriction. In this section, I present three alternative and unrestricted 
 
115 Demartini (2005): “The columns indicate respectively the year of publication, the domain 
of application of the hybrid human-machine system, the type of data processed by the system, 
the role of the human component in the hybrid human-machine system (i.e, processing data 
either before or after the machine component), the type of incentive used to motivate crowd 
workers to perform tasks, and finally the time constrains of the hybrid system, that is, whether 
the human-machine system performs batch or real-time data processing.” (8) 
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versions of the QTT that would require full use of natural language, and 
where ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ would play a 
much more evident role than they do in the practical QTT. 
 
(i) Detective QTT – The Detective QTT116 is played parallel-paired 
between the human Detective (A), the machine Detective (B) and the 
Suspect (C). A and B have to ask strategic (meaning the fewer, the 
better) questions in order to provide the right verdict (C is guilty or C is 
innocent); and C, in turn, has to decide who the human detective is. The 
idea is that questioning programs might become handy to security, and 
they could also be implemented in Hybrid Systems, where the 
interrogations are cooperatively (rather than competitively) carried by 
both the machine and a human detective. 
 
(ii) Medical QTT – The Medical QTT is played parallel-paired between 
the human Doctor (A), the machine Doctor (B) and the Patient (C). A 
and B have to ask strategic questions in order to accomplish an enquiry 
about the medical condition of C who, in turn, has to decide who the 
human doctor is. The idea is that questioning programs might become 
the first point of contact for primary health care, and they could also be 
implemented in Hybrid Systems, where each case is cooperatively 
examined by a human doctor and a medical machine. 
 
(iii) Customer Service QTT – The Customer Service QTT is played 
parallel-paired between the human Operator (A), the machine Operator 
(B) and the Customer (C). A and B have to ask strategic questions in 
order to properly assist C, who decides who the human Operator is. The 
idea is that questioning programs might become the first point of 
contact for customer service, and they could also be implemented in 
Hybrid Systems, where each query is cooperatively handled by a human 
operator and a machine. 
 







In this chapter, I describe the QTT in order to improve the experimental 
design of the TT and avoid Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead. The 
main novelty in the QTT is the switch from the SISO setup (as in the 
TT, MIST and FT) to the SOSI setup, where the role of the judge and 
the candidate entity are reversed: the latter asks the questions and the 
former provides the replies. This also gives a further advantage for the 
choice of the human judge, who can be either an average person or an 
expert, depending on the aim of the enquiry (whereas, it’s worth 
recalling, in the TT the judge has to be an average person, in the FT an 
expert, and in the MIST a trained one). The SOSI setup – and, by 
extension, the questioning process – allows to parametrise the hidden 
entity along a further dimension, in addition to ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’: that is, ‘strategicness’, intended to evaluate the method 
used by the candidate in terms of the number of questions needed to 
accomplish the enquiry. So, in order to pass the QTT, a candidate entity 
must (i) ask human-like questions, (ii) accomplish the aim of the 
enquiry and (iii) show a good method by asking as few questions as 
possible. 
 
The yes/no QTT, that I run for practical reasons (that is, to make the 
tests as quick and simple as possible), is conducted viva voce. This is 
because the game is a cooperative enquiry, rather than a competitive 
impersonation like in the TT. The unrestricted QTT, on the other hand, 
is played parallel-paired, not viva-voce. However, it is worth noting, 
the viva-voce QTT involves two procedures: a human-questioning-
human test (HqH) and a machine-questioning human test (MqH). The 
results, similarly to the OIG described by Sterrett (2000), are given by 
the comparison between the machine’s performance in accomplishing 
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a difficult task – which requires resourcefulness – and the human’s 
performance in accomplishing the same task. A further advantage of the 
experimental design of the QTT over the TT and its alternative versions, 
is that it allows a hybrid version to be run, where the role of the hidden 
entity is played by both the machine and the human. The Hybrid QTT 
is intended to show that the performance of the hybrid human-machine 
system is better compared to the performances of the two systems alone. 
Finally, I point out that the experimental design of the QTT does not 
require the verbal interactions to be restricted to binary ones, as in its 
practical version. A number of different variations of the QTT and 
Hybrid QTT can be designed without this verbal restriction. These 
versions are parallel-paired ones, such as the Detective QTT (where a 
human detective and a machine detective have to interrogate a suspect); 
the Medical QTT (where a human doctor and a machine doctor have to 
take the medical history of a patient); or the Customer Service QTT 























Abstract. In this chapter I discuss three difficulties that can be raised 
against the QTT: (i) the first claims that the QTT is redundant; (ii) the 
second claims that the QTT is chauvinistic; (iii) the third claims that the 
QTT cannot prevent Blockhead from passing. To reply, I argue that (i) 
the QTT is not redundant, because the experimental variation of the 
QTT is not included in the TT; (ii) the QTT is not chauvinistic, because 
a human-like, incorrect and non-strategic approach could still pass the 
test; (iii) Blockhead, as well as Expert, Stupid and Ultimate Blockhead, 
cannot pass without an information-gathering algorithm to optimise 
(and speed up) their processes. 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the objections to the QTT. I consider three 
main objections to the QTT: the first one, discussed in the next section, 
claims that the QTT is redundant, for it is already included in the TT. 
The second one, discussed in section 6.2, claims that the QTT is 
chauvinistic, for an intelligent agent could still fail to strategically 
accomplish an enquiry. The third one, discussed in section 6.3, claims 
that the QTT cannot prevent Blockhead from passing, for it is logically 
possible to build a general questioning Blockhead, and it is even 
physically feasible to build an expert questioning Blockhead. 
 
 
6.1 The QTT is Redundant 
 
The first objection I consider is that the QTT is redundant, for the TT 




117 Hernandez-Orallo (2017, p. 129). 
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I reject this view. Or, better, I admit that the TT includes any possible 
conversational variation: that is, in the TT the judge can decide to 
engage any kind of conversation (dialogues, monologues, dissertations, 
interrogations, and so on). However, it does not follow that the TT also 
includes any possible experimental variation of the TT. The reason is 
the following. If the judge purposely runs an experimental variation of 
the TT, then the judge is also the experimenter and, implicitly, an expert 
of some sort. And this contradicts what Turing specifies about the 
judges, who should rather be “an average interrogator118”, where the 
function of ‘average’ is to rule out false positives or negatives. The 
judge, in other words, should not be an expert of some sort and, by 
extension, an experimenter. That said, I do believe that the TT can 
virtually contain any experimental variation, for it is best regarded as a 
format to test for intelligence which “invites generalization”119 and 
potential modifications. In other words, I hold that the experimental 
design of the TT is intended to be adaptable to different experimental 




6.2 The QTT is Chauvinistic 
 
The second objection that I consider is that the QTT is chauvinistic. The 
argument can be summed up as follows: 
 
By failing to perform in terms of ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’, that is, by failing to accomplish the aim of 
the enquiry by means of an optimised process (i.e. with as 
few questions as possible), intelligent agents who take the 
QTT may be considered unintelligent. 
 
118 Turing (1950, p. 442). 




I reply to this objection by clarifying that to pass the QTT the entity still 
needs to be recognised as a human. As I show in Ch. 9, where I discuss 
the results of my study, entities that fail in terms of ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’, but succeed in terms of ‘human-likeness’, are still 
plausible candidates to be attributed with intelligence. Conversely, 
entities that succeed in terms of ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, but 
fail in terms of ‘human-likeness’, fail the QTT. ‘Human-likeness’, just 
like in the TT, is the parameter intended to justify the entity being 
attributed with intelligence in the first place. ‘Correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’, on the other hand, are intended to prevent, respectively, 
Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead from exploiting the judge’s notion 
of ‘human-likeness’. In other words, in the QTT the attribution of 
‘human-likeness’ is supported by the evaluation of ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’, whereas in the TT the attribution of ‘human-likeness’ is 
supported by no further evaluations other than the judge’s decision. 
 
I rather hold that the QTT is less chauvinistic than the TT, MIST and 
FT. The TT requires the judge to be an average person, implicitly 
banning, for instance, individuals with certain conditions. The MIST 
requires the judge to be trained in subcognitive games. The FT requires 
the judge to be an expert in a certain domain. In contrast, the judge in 
the QTT can be either an average person or an expert; and, in both cases, 
the QTT is still able to avoid both Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead. 
 
 
6.3 The QTT Cannot Avoid Blockhead 
 
The third objection I consider is that the experimental design of the 
QTT is not able to prevent Blockhead from passing. According to this, 
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it would always be possible for the questioning Blockhead120 to produce 
the appropriate sequence of questions in the QTT, just like the 
conversational Blockhead can always produce the appropriate sequence 
of responses in the TT. 
 
To recall Blockhead (Ch. 3), it is a system designed to look up its 
gigantic – but finite – table of interactions and to pick a sensible 
response to any verbal input whatsoever. It is worth noting that 
Blockhead is designed to reply to the interlocutor’s verbal interactions, 
not to produce new ones. This experimental setup, focused on the 
entity’s conversational outputs, is called “symbols in, symbols out” 
(SISO121), and I hold that a SISO test cannot avoid Blockhead. 
 
My argument is that (i) the switch from SISO to SOSI in the QTT 
allows to measure ‘strategicness’ in addition to ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’; and (ii) Blockhead would never be able to perform well 
enough in terms of ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ 
altogether. I show that the QTT is able to avoid not only the full LUT 
(Blockhead), but also the other versions discussed in Ch. 3: the specific 
LUT (Expert Blockhead), the uncooperative LUT (Stupid Blockhead) 
and the learning LUT (Ultimate Blockhead). 
 
(i) Block suggests that Blockhead can be attributed with intelligence if 
and only if there is some upper bound to the duration of its testing. In 
the QTT, while I do not reject the duration limit (an entity that takes 
hours to play the QTT would not pass, failing to be attributed with 
‘human-likeness’), I propose a different kind of restriction: the number 
of interactions, that is, the number of questions asked (‘strategicness’). 
Now, it may seem that such a restriction would facilitate Blockhead 
from passing the QTT, since it would need to pick just a few questions 
 
120 In this section, every time I discuss Blockhead in the context of the QTT I implicitly refer 
to the questioning Blockhead. 
121 See Harnad (1989). 
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from its table. The point is that those questions need to be strategically 
selected, in order to maximise the information acquisition needed to 
accomplish the aim of the enquiry. 
 
(ii) There are at least four versions of Blockhead that it’s worth 
discussing: (i) the full LUT (Blockhead); (ii) the small, specific LUT 
(Expert Blockhead); (iii) the uncooperative Elizish LUT (Stupid 
Blockhead); and (iv) the independently acquired LUT (Ultimate 
Blockhead). As follows, I consider each case individually, and I discuss 
how each version of Blockhead would do in both the practical and the 
unrestricted QTT. Recalling the distinction, in the practical QTT the 
hidden entity has to identify the public figure being thought of by the 
human judge, by asking as few yes/no human-like questions as 
possible; while in the unrestricted QTT, the hidden entity has to 
accomplish the aim of an open enquiry, by asking as few human-like 
questions as possible. 
 
6.3.1 Full LUT (Blockhead) 
I argue that there are two reasons why the full LUT (Blockhead) can 
pass neither the practical nor the unrestricted QTT. The first is that 
Blockhead is potentially very slow122. Blockhead can only search its 
table one item (that is, response, in the TT; question, in the QTT) at the 
time123. The second reason is that Blockhead would not be able to 
accomplish the aim of an enquiry by asking as few questions as 
possible, since it lacks an algorithm to optimise the search through its 
table. Instead, Blockhead would ask random and pointless questions. 
The importance of such an algorithm is advocated by Russell & Norvig 
(2010), who claim that information-gathering systems must be able to 
acknowledge the value of information (see Ch. 7). 
 
 
122 See Copeland (2000): “what the brain can do in minutes would take this machine thousands 
of millions of years.” (533) 
123 See Block (1981). 
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So, in the practical QTT, Blockhead would be able to produce human-
like yes/no questions (for its full table would contain any human-like 
yes/no question) quick enough (since the enquiry is a specific, yes/no 
one); and it would also be able to accomplish the aim of the yes/no 
enquiry. However, Blockhead would fail to do so with as few questions 
as possible, since it lacks an information-gathering algorithm to 
optimise the search through its huge table of questions. Blockhead 
would rather ask random questions, failing thus not only ‘strategicness’, 
but also ‘human-likeness’. On the other hand, in the unrestricted QTT, 
Blockhead would take a very long time to ask a question, due to the size 
of its table. So, even if it would be able to ask questions in a human-
like style, it would not be attributed with ‘human-likeness’, due to its 
slowness in asking them. Moreover, even though Blockhead would 
eventually be able to accomplish the aim of any enquiry, it would fail, 
as in the practical QTT, to do so with as few questions as possible 
(being equipped with no information-gathering algorithm to optimise 
the search through its table), failing thus ‘strategicness’. 
 
6.3.2 Specific LUT (Expert Blockhead) 
In case the enquiry is a specific one, and Blockhead’s table is small 
enough, Blockhead would be able to show ‘strategicness’ even without 
an algorithm to optimise its search. Even so, I hold that the small and 
specific LUT (which I call Expert Blockhead) can pass neither the 
practical nor the unrestricted QTT. Expert Blockhead’s table contains 
certain verbal interactions only (in the case of the practical QTT, yes/no 
questions) with a specific purpose (in the case of the practical QTT, to 
identify the public figure that the human judge thinks of). 
 
In the practical QTT, where the enquiry is not an open one and the 
interactions are limited to twenty yes/no questions and replies, Expert 
Blockhead would not take so long to search its smaller, specific LUT to 
accomplish the aim of the enquiry correctly. And it would even be able 
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to do so with very few questions. However, the style, that is, the 
‘human-likeness’ of Expert Blockhead’s questions would be sacrificed 
(the table would be too small to include every human-like yes/no 
question). In other words, although Expert Blockhead would be able to 
accomplish the aim of the enquiry with a very few questions, it would 
fail the practical QTT by not being attributed with ‘human-likeness’, 
due to the style of its questions. In Ch. 9, where I discuss the results 
gained from my experimental study, I show that this is proved by 
Akinator (a questioning bot that can guess the public figure that the 
player is thinking of), which is able to accomplish the aim of the enquiry 
correctly and strategically but not human-likely, failing thus the QTT. 
Akinator is a small LUT, and all its questions have the same non-
human-like structure “Is your character x?” or “Does your character x?”, 
where x is a characteristic (like “woman”, “alive”, “fictional”, and so 
forth) that can ideally rule out half the items in its table. 
 
In the unrestricted QTT, Expert Blockhead would always fail, since its 
table is a small, specific one, which is not adequate to accomplish an 
open enquiry. It would fail to show ‘human-likeness’, since the 
questions available in its table would not be stylised and versatile 
enough (for instance, the table would only contain yes/no questions); 
and it would fail to show both ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, since 
the questions available in its table would allow no other kind of enquiry 
to be accomplished, except the one for which Expert Blockhead was 
programmed. 
 
6.3.3 Uncooperative LUT (Stupid Blockhead) 
Block (1981) distinguishes between two types of LUT. One is the full 
LUT of Blockhead, which is able to hold a human-like open 
conversation by looking up its complete table of all the possible verbal 
interactions, and by always picking the appropriate response for 
whatever verbal stimulus. The other is the Elizish LUT, which I call 
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Stupid Blockhead (Ch. 3). Stupid Blockhead is able to hold a human-
like conversation by looking up its incomplete table of interactions and, 
whenever is needed, its table of uncooperative and evasive strategies 
that belongs to Artificial Stupidity (Ch. 2). 
 
My claim is that Stupid Blockhead, just like Eliza, can pass the TT, but 
it cannot pass the QTT. The reason is that the experimental design of 
the TT is focused on ‘human-likeness’ alone, whereas the experimental 
design of the QTT evaluates the entity’s performance in terms of 
‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. In the TT, unlike 
the QTT, Eliza does not have to accomplish any task strategically: it 
only asks questions pretending to be a Rogerian psychotherapist. In 
other words, all Eliza does is manipulate a smart associative network of 
sentences. As Weizenbaum (1966) clarifies, this is how Eliza asks its 
questions:  
 
“input sentences are analyzed on the basis of decomposition 
rules which are triggered by key words appearing in the 
input text. Responses are generated by reassembly rules 
associated with selected decomposition rules” (ibid.) 
 
A questioning machine designed to manipulate input sentences in order 
to formulate useless questions, with the only purpose to appear human-
like, would fail the QTT. In order to pass it, a candidate of the QTT 
needs to process input sentences in order to gain useful information and 
ask further pertinent questions to acquire new knowledge and 
accomplish the aim of an enquiry. Unlike Eliza, the candidate of the 
QTT needs to show inquisitiveness, which here I intend as defined by 
Watson (2019): 
 
“Firstly, inquisitiveness serves as a motivating intellectual 
virtue: it plays a foundational role in the initiation of 
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intellectually virtuous inquiry. More than any others of the 
intellectual virtues, virtuous inquisitiveness gets 
intellectually virtuous inquiry going. Secondly, 
inquisitiveness bears a distinctive relationship to the 
intellectual skill of good questioning. […] the virtuously 
inquisitive person is characteristically motivated and able 
to engage sincerely in good questioning.” (2) 
 
So, Stupid Blockhead would fail both the practical and the unrestricted 
QTT, since it would fail to accomplish the aim of any enquiry correctly 
or strategically, and therefore to be attributed with ‘human-likeness’, 
failing thus the test. 
 
6.3.4 Learning LUT (Ultimate Blockhead) 
Finally, the independently acquired LUT, which I call Ultimate 
Blockhead (Ch. 3), is a machine without a pre-programmed table. 
Instead, it ‘learns’ its table from a source, let’s say, by scouring the 
whole internet and memorising every sentence whatsoever. As argued 
in Ch. 3, whereas the whole point of Blockhead, as Block (1981) states, 
“is to substitute memory for intelligence124”, the whole point of 
Ultimate Blockhead is to substitute memorisation for learning. 
 
The difference between Blockhead and Ultimate Blockhead is how 
their table is acquired (respectively, hand-coded and learnt), not how 
they work once the table is acquired. Some would say that such a 
learning history is sufficient to consider Blockhead intelligent (Ben-
Yami, 2005). However, the performances of Blockhead and Ultimate 
Blockhead in the QTT are the same. In the practical QTT, on the one 
hand, Ultimate Blockhead would succeed in terms of ‘correctness’, but 
it would fail in terms of ‘strategicness’ (due to the lack of an 
information-gathering algorithm to optimise its search). Because of 
 
124 Block (1981, p. 34). 
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this, it would fail to be attributed with ‘human-likeness’, failing thus the 
test. In the unrestricted QTT, Ultimate Blockhead would only succeed 
in terms of ‘correctness’: it would fail in terms of ‘strategicness’ 
(without an information-gathering algorithm), and in terms of ‘human-
likeness’ (it would take too long to ask its questions, due to the size of 
its table, and the unrestricted enquiry), failing thus the test. 
 
6.3.5 Tabs 
As follows, I summarise the different performances of the full LUT 
(Blockhead), the small, specific LUT (Expert Blockhead), the 
uncooperative Elizish LUT (Stupid Blockhead) and the independently 
acquired LUT (Ultimate Blockhead), both in the practical QTT (tab. 1) 
and in the unrestricted QTT (tab. 2). 
 
Practical QTT (yes/no enquiry) 













Fail Fail Fail Fail 
Correctness Pass Pass Fail Pass 
Strategicness Fail Pass Fail Fail 
(tab. 1) 
 
Unrestricted QTT (open enquiry) 













Fail Fail Fail Fail 
Correctness Pass Fail Fail Pass 
Strategicness Fail Fail Fail Fail 
(tab. 2) 
 
Two final remarks should be made. The first can be formulated as 
follows: what if Blockhead were able to accomplish the enquiry 
correctly and human-likely after asking, let’s say, a thousand questions?  
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Shouldn’t it be considered intelligent as much as a human who 
accomplishes the enquiry correctly and human-likely after asking a lot 
of questions? My answer is no: the difference between Blockhead and 
a human that can successfully accomplish the enquiry, but not in a 
strategic way (that is, by asking a lot of questions) is that: (i) Blockhead, 
without an information-gathering algorithm, would ask random 
questions – potentially taking a lot of times between a question and 
another, given the size of its table – which should prevent it from being 
attributed with ‘human-likeness’; whereas (ii) the human would be able 
to ask questions that would “make sense” for the judge. In other words, 
whereas Blockhead’s questions would be randomised and potentially 
slow, the human’s questions would follow certain patterns that the 
judge may appreciate. 
 
The second remark can be formulated as follows: what if both 
Blockhead and a human give up the enquiry after twenty human-like 
questions? How would it be possible to discriminate between the two? 
Again, my answer is that, even in the case where the entities give up or, 
in general, the enquiry is not accomplished, it would be possible for the 
judge to unmask the randomness of Blockhead’s questions (due to its 
lack of an information-gathering algorithm) and, therefore, its lack of 
‘human-likeness’. The human’s questions, on the other hand, would 
appear more aimed and meaningful (even if the enquiry is not 
accomplished strategically), granting the attribution of ‘human-





In this chapter, I show three main difficulties that can be raised against 
the QTT. The first objection claims that since the TT can contain any 
possible variation of the test, the QTT is already included in it, and 
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therefore the QTT is redundant. I reject this view by rejecting the 
premise: it is true that the TT can contain any conversational variation, 
but not any experimental variation. In other words, it is true that the 
judge can start any kind of conversation, but not that the judge can 
implement any kind of experimental variation to the TT. And the reason 
is that the TT judge is required to be an average person, not an expert 
or, by extension, an experimenter. 
 
The second objection claims that the QTT is chauvinistic, since it is 
intended to measure abilities that an intelligent agent may fail to show. 
I reject this view by clarifying that what the QTT is intended to measure 
is the ability of the entity to strategically accomplish the aim of an 
enquiry in a human-like enough fashion. This means that it is possible 
for an agent which shows ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ but fails to 
show ‘human-likeness’ not to be attributed with intelligence, and it is 
possible for an agent which shows ‘human-likeness’ but fails to show 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ to be attributed with intelligence. I will 
discuss this point in more detail in Ch. 9, where I show the results I 
gained from the experiments involved in my study. Even though I argue 
that evaluating ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ 
independently improves the experimental design of a conversational 
test of intelligence like the TT, I do not hold these dimensions to be 
regarded as necessary conditions for intelligence. 
 
The third objection claims that the QTT cannot avoid Blockhead. I 
reject this objection by considering the questioning Blockhead, a LUT 
which is able to ask any question whatsoever, but lacks an information-
gathering algorithm to help it optimise the search through its table. My 
claim is that, by switching the QTT’s setup from SISO to SOSI, and by 
parametrising the QTT’s candidate along ‘strategicness’ (in addition to 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’), questioning Blockhead, as well as 




(i) Blockhead would fail both the practical and the unrestricted QTT 
by showing only ‘correctness’ in accomplishing the aim of the enquiry, 
but not ‘human-likeness’ (due to its slowness and randomness) or 
‘strategicness’ (due to the lack of an information-gathering algorithm). 
 
(ii) Expert Blockhead would fail the practical QTT because, even if it 
showed both ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, by accomplishing a 
specific enquiry strategically, it would not be able to do so in a human-
like fashion (due to the rather limited selection of questions). It would 
also fail the unrestricted QTT, failing to show ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’ in any enquiry, except the one in which 
it is an expert. 
 
(iii) Stupid Blockhead would fail both the practical and the unrestricted 
QTT, since it would ask uncooperative and non-strategic questions, 
failing thus to accomplish any enquiry whatsoever (like Artificial 
Stupidity would not be able to accomplish any task in the TT other than 
evading the conversation). Moreover, due to the randomness of its 
questions, Stupid Blockhead would hardly be attributed with 
‘strategicness’ or ‘human-likeness’. 
 
(iv) Ultimate Blockhead, just like Blockhead, would fail both the 
practical and the unrestricted QTT by accomplishing the aim of the 
enquiry correctly, but not human-likely (due to its slowness and 










The Questioning Process 
 
“Man, a questioning being.” (Straus, 1966: 166) 
 
Abstract. In this chapter, I discuss the questioning process and the role 
it plays in three different disciplines: (i) Developmental Psychology, 
(ii) Pedagogy and (iii) Epistemology. I show that these disciplines agree 
to regard the questioning process as an important component in 
cognition and intelligence; and I also show that these disciplines agree 
to test for the ability to ask strategic questions with an experimental 
design similar to the QTT. The goal of the chapter is to justify why the 
QTT is focused on the questioning process; and to justify my claim that 
the questioning process allows us to evaluate ‘strategicness’. 
 
 
If we were to divide the ability to communicate into two major 
processes, we could say that one of them is the ‘assertive process’, that 
is, the process that allows humans to express their mental states; and the 
other is the ‘interrogative process’, that is, the process that allows 
humans to ask questions. Neil Postman (1995) underlines the 
importance that the latter plays for cognition by stating that:  
 
“Everything we know has its origin in questions. Questions, 
we might say, are the principal intellectual instruments 
available to human beings.” (173) 
 
And Hintikka (1999) agrees when he writes: 
 
“The interrogative approach to reasoning and 
argumentation is not just one approach to its subject among 
many. Both historically and systematically, it is arguably 




In this chapter, I discuss the role that the questioning process plays in 
intelligence and in testing for intelligence. The topic can be examined 
from a number of different points of view, for instance: what are the 
effects, if any, that asking a question has on a questioner? What are the 
effects, if any, that asking a question has on a respondent? How do 
questions come to be conceived and asked? How do questions come to 
be understood and answered? Here I focus on the first and the second 
perspective, that is, on the effects that asking a question has on a 
questioner and a respondent, specifically in a text-based enquiry such 
as the one involved in the QTT. 
 
In the next section, I show the relationship between questioning and 
Developmental Psychology. In section 7.2, I show the relationship 
between questioning and Pedagogy. In section 7.3, I show the 
relationship between questioning and Epistemology. In section 7.4, I 
briefly discuss Information Value Theory. And in section 7.5, I 
recapitulate the advantages that I hold the questioning process provides 
in testing for intelligence. 
 
 
7.1 Questioning Process and Developmental Psychology 
 
Developmental Psychology focuses on the cognitive evolution of 
humans during their lifespan, with particular attention to the cognitive 
growth of children. The questioning process plays a central role in 
Developmental Psychology research, especially concerning children’s 
ability to interact inquisitively with the environment and with other 
agents, in order to seek information and to acquire knowledge. As 
Courage (1989) argues: 
 
“Learning to ask questions effectively is an important 
achievement with considerable practical application. Such 
148 
 
information seeking enables a child to acquire knowledge, 
to clarify ambiguity, and to solve problems. It is also an 
important aspect of children’s developing communication 
ability. Research […] has provided data on the development 
of children’s inquiry strategies.” (877) 
 
Experiments about children’s ability to ask questions are usually 
conducted in the form of a twenty-questions game, just like the practical 
version of the QTT (Ch. 5). Courage (1989) describes one of these tests 
as follows: 
 
“Instructions to the subjects when they were performing the 
Twenty Questions task were as follows: “We are going to 
play a question-asking game. I will think of one of these 
pictures and it is your job to find out which one. The way 
to find out is by asking questions which I can answer ‘yes’ 
or ‘no.’ […] try to ask as few questions as possible!” (879) 
 
The test described by Courage (1989) is very similar to the QTT, and it 
is parametrised along the same dimensions, that is, ‘correctness’, in 
terms of the ability of children to accomplish the aim of the enquiry (in 
this case, to identify which picture the experimenter chooses among a 
set of pictures available on the table); and ‘strategicness’, in terms of 
the ability of children to ask as few questions as possible. ‘Human-
likeness’ is obviously given for granted, since all the contestants are 
human children, not hidden candidates like in the QTT. Courage (1989) 
shows the results of the experiments she conducted, and concludes: 
 
“Young children respond well to the Twenty Questions task 
and readily acquire the strategy of asking categorical 




“Categorical” questions, which can be replaced with “strategic” or 
“good” questions, are described as questions that “eliminate a group of 
instances of the category with a single question.”125 A similar 
experiment, based on the twenty-questions game, is run by Chen et al. 
(2018), who justify the twenty-questions game as a good experimental 
tool126 and explain: 
 
“We study 20 Questions, an online interactive game where 
each question-response pair corresponds to a fact of the 
target entity, to acquire highly accurate knowledge 
effectively with nearly zero labor cost. Knowledge 
acquisition via 20 Questions predominantly presents two 
challenges to the intelligent agent playing games with 
human players. The first one is to seek enough information 
and identify the target entity with as few questions as 
possible, while the second one is to leverage the remaining 
questioning opportunities to acquire valuable knowledge 
effectively, both of which count on good questioning 
strategies.” (1216) 
 
And, similarly to Courage (1989), the conclusion drawn is that the 
questioning process is crucial for two other processes: information 
seeking and knowledge acquisition. As Chen et al. (2018) specify: 
 
“the original information-seeking 20 Questions poses two 
serious challenges for the agent. (1) The agent needs 
efficient and robust information seeking (IS) strategies to 
work with noisy user responses and hit the target entity with 
 
125 Courage (1989, p. 878). 
126 Chen et al. (2018): “To motivate user engagement, the knowledge acquisition process was 
transformed into enjoyable interactive games between the game agents and users, termed as 
Games With A Purpose (GWAP). Drawing inspirations from GWAP, we find that the spoken 
parlor game, 20 Questions, is an excellent choice to be equipped with the purpose of knowledge 
acquisition, via which accurate knowledge can be acquired with nearly zero labor cost.” (1216) 
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as few questions as possible. As the questioning 
opportunities are limited, the agent earns more knowledge 
acquisition opportunities if it can identify the target entity 
with less questions. Hitting the target entity accurately is 
not only the precondition for knowledge acquisition, since 
the facts have to be linked to the correct entity, but also the 
key to attract human players because nobody wants to play 
with a stupid [uncooperative] agent. (2) To acquire valuable 
facts, the agent needs effective knowledge acquisition (KA) 
strategies which can identify important questions for a 
given entity. Due to the great diversity in entities, most 
questions are not tailored or even irrelevant to a given entity 
and they shouldn’t be asked during the corresponding KA.” 
(1217) 
 
Summing up, questions are arguably the first and most important tool 
for humans, not only to acquire knowledge of the world, but also to 
develop their cognitive abilities. For this reason, the questioning 
process is deeply linked with Developmental Psychology and with 
Pedagogy, which I discuss in the next section. 
 
 
7.2 Questioning Process and Pedagogy 
 
Pedagogy focuses on education, specifically in terms of the interactions 
between teacher and learner – or, better, teaching strategies and learning 
ability. Similarly to Developmental Psychology, Pedagogy has a keen 
interest in the questioning process, especially the ability of students to 
ask good questions to improve their critical thinking. It can be said that 
no other enterprise “but education holds that questions enhance 
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cognitive, affective, and expressive processes.”127 As Chouinard (2017) 
argues: 
 
“[…] Questions allow children to get the information they 
need to move their knowledge structures closer to adult-like 
states: the ability to ask questions to gather needed 
information constitutes an efficient mechanism for 
cognitive development. […] If questions are a force in 
cognitive development, the following must be true: (1) 
children must actually ask questions that gather 
information; (2) children must receive informative answers 
to their questions if they are able to be of use to cognitive 
development; (3) children must be motivated to get the 
information they request, rather than asking questions for 
other purposes such as attention; (4) the questions children 
ask must be relevant and of potential use to their cognitive 
development.” (vii) 
 
Chouinard (2017) conducts four experiments in order to verify these 
four premises. The data gained, she argues, is enough to prove the 
relationship between the ability to ask good questions and the ability to 
learn in children: 
 
“The results of these four studies support the existence of 
the IRM [Information Requesting Mechanism] as a way for 
children to learn about the world. Children ask information-
seeking questions that are related in topic and structure to 
their cognitive development. Parents give answers to these 
questions, but when they do not, the children persist in 
asking for the information, suggesting that the goal of this 
behavior is to recruit needed information. The content of 
 
127 Dillon (1982, p. 146). 
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these questions shifts within exchanges and over the course 
of development in ways that reflect concept building. 
Finally, children generate questions efficiently in order to 
gather needed information, and then are able to use this 
information productively; they tap into their existing 
conceptual knowledge in order to do this. Thus, the ability 
to ask questions is a powerful tool that allows children to 
gather information they need in order to learn about the 
world and solve problems in it.” (ix) 
 
It is worth noting that, in Pedagogy, questions are not only a tool to 
learn, but also a tool to teach. As shown by Gall (1970), teacher 
questioning is perhaps the most common educational practice in school, 
aimed to develop the student’s curiosity and critical thinking: 
 
“10 primary-grade teachers asked an average of 348 
questions each during a school day (Floyd, 1960); 12 
elementary-school teachers asked an average of 180 
questions each in a science lesson (Moyer, 1965); and 14 
fifth-grade teachers asked an average of 64 questions each 
in a 30-minute social studies lesson (Schreiber, 1967). 
Furthermore, students are exposed to many questions in 
their textbooks and on examinations.” (707) 
 
Summing up, the questioning process is argued to be the most important 
tool to develop cognitive faculties (especially in children). The ability 
to ask good questions can be regarded as a multidisciplinary domain, 
involving not only Developmental Psychology and Pedagogy (focused, 
respectively, on how the agent learns to think critically and how the 
agent is trained to think critically) but also epistemology (focused on 
how the agent gathers new information and knowledge), which I discuss 





7.3 Questioning Process and Epistemology 
 
It seems natural for Developmental Psychology and Pedagogy to share 
a deep relationship. Ikuenobe (2001) argues that the same is true for 
Pedagogy and Epistemology, which provide, respectively, the methods 
for teaching and learning and the methods for acquiring knowledge. He 
also holds the questioning process to be the hallmark of critical 
thinking: 
 
“From the analysis of logic questioning, we can, in some 
sense, see […] their epistemological and pedagogical 
implications. Questioning performs the functions of 
increasing our overall knowledge, which may result in our 
ability to avoid or correct errors because we are fallible.” 
(334) 
 
Epistemology focuses on knowledge and beliefs, in particular how 
knowledge and beliefs are gained and whether they are justified. In this 
section, I discuss Hintikka’s project to define an epistemic interrogative 
logic, with the main purpose of evaluating the strategies involved in the 
questioning process. As Hintikka (1999) argues: 
 
“The interest that the interrogative model has is largely due 
to the fact that it enables us to study strategies of scientific 
inquiry and even strategies of discovery in the form of 
strategies of question selection. Moreover, it turns out that 
the principles of interrogative strategy selection are closely 





According to Hintikka, the inquisitive ability of an agent can be 
evaluated by means of a questioning game, more specifically “by 
construing knowledge-seeking by questioning as a game that pits the 
questioner against the answerer.”128 About the kind of questions 
involved in the interrogative game, Hintikka (1999) also agrees that 
yes/no questions are good ones, for any possible wh-question can be 
reduced to a series of yes/no questions: 
 
“THEOREM 2 (Yes-No Theorem). In the extended 
interrogative logic, if M: T ⊢ C,129 then the same conclusion 
C can be established by using only yes-no questions. A 
terminological explanation is in order here. For 
propositional question “Is it the case that S1 or . . . or Sn 
?” the presupposition is (S1 ∨... ∨ Sn). We say that a 
propositional question whose presupposition is of the form 
(S ∨ ~ S) is yes-no question.” (302) 
 
Hintikka’s Theorem 2 seems to lead to the conclusion that, in a test for 
intelligence like the QTT, wh-enquiries are redundant, for a yes/no 
enquiry can include any wh-enquiry. But this is not the case, as Hintikka 
(1999) explains: yes/no questions can do the same inferential job of 
other kinds of questions, but the strategic job they can do is limited in 
comparison to wh-questions. It appears safe to say that a wh-enquiry 
would always be more strategic than a yes/no enquiry (especially if 
‘strategicness’ is defined in terms of the number of questions asked). 
The reason is that it would always be possible to accomplish the aim of 
an enquiry faster with wh-questions rather than with yes/no questions. 
It is important to recall here that only the practical version of the QTT 
is limited to yes/no questions, and only in the context of this specific 
version of the QTT is ‘strategicness’ evaluated in terms of the number 
 
128 Hintikka (2007, p. 19). 
129 M: model; T: initial premises; C: conclusion. 
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of questions asked. Other versions of the QTT, like the medical QTT, 
the detective QTT or the customer service QTT (Ch. 5) allow wh-
questions, as would occur in medical examinations, detective 
investigations or customers assistance (where yes/no questions could 
do the job, but they would not perform well in, let’s say, an health-care 
emergency scenario). In these other versions of the QTT, other 
dimensions may be used to parametrise the entity and to better define 
what kind of ‘strategicness’ is required, for instance, empathy (for the 
medical QTT), manipulativeness130 (for the detective QTT) and 
patience (for the customer assistant QTT).  
 
Based on Hintikka’s work, Genot & Jacot (2012) support the view that: 
 
“Asking a question may carry factual, epistemic, and 
strategic information, respectively reducing uncertainty 
about the state of Nature, the questioner’s knowledge, or 
her goals. This information is retrieved by hearers via 
pragmatic inferences […] in the special case of yes-or-no 
questions.” (189) 
 
They “examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of 
the informational import of asking questions”131; and, in particular, they 
focus on “contexts where questions are requests for information, 
modelled as games where a player (inquirer) attempts to assess a given 
conclusion, using answers from other players (sources).”132 The 
enquiry, similarly to the enquiry of the QTT and the twenty-questions 
game, involves “yes-or-no questions, which always carry information 
about the questioner’s strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and 
show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences 
 
130 As Genot & Jacot (2012) argue: “since sometimes sources may prefer not to answer 
truthfully, Inquirer may have to rely on ‘manipulative’ strategies to acquire trustworthy 
information.” (190) 
131 Genot & Jacot (2012, p. 188). 
132 Genot & Jacot (2012, p. 189). 
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about other players’ goals and strategies.”133 In agreement with 
Hintikka about the reducibility of any question to a series of yes/no 
questions, Genot & Jacot (2012) remark that: 
 
“The special case of yes-or-no questions is of interest 
because: (a) their presuppositions are instances of the 
excluded middle, so they can always be used in an 
interrogative game; and: (b) the inferential role played by 
arbitrary questions [wh-questions] can always be played by 
yes-or-no questions” (194) 
 
 
7.4 Information Value Theory 
 
A final issue may be briefly addressed here: how can we define a good 
question? Obviously, the answer is that a question is defined as good or 
bad in relation to the aim of the enquiry. In other words, there are no 
objectively good or bad questions, just good or bad questions depending 
on the goal of the questioner. However, it is possible to formalise a 
general rule for questioning aimed to optimise information seeking and 
knowledge acquisition. Russell & Norvig (2010) discuss Information 
Value Theory, that is, how an agent can choose what information to 
acquire. They define the value of information as follows: 
 
“information has value to the extent that it is likely to cause 
a change of plan and to the extent that the new plan will be 
significantly better than the old plan. […] A sensible agent 
should ask questions in a reasonable order, should avoid 
asking questions that are irrelevant, should take into 





relation to its cost, and should stop asking questions when 
that is appropriate.” (632) 
 
This passage seems compatible with my claim according to which the 
questioning process can prevent Artificial Stupidity from exploiting the 
judge’s beliefs by means of uncooperative, irrelevant and potentially 
inappropriate questions. Russell & Norvig (2010) also provide an 






It is worth noting that this blueprint for a questioning entity clarifies my 
claim according to which the questioning Blockhead (Ch. 6) cannot 
pass the QTT. Blockhead is described as a string search (or as a tree 
search) that can do the following operation: if input a is obtained, then 
output a is emitted; if input b is obtained, then output b is emitted, and 
so on (Block, 1981: 16). Block never mentions any more sophisticated 
decision-making process involved in Blockhead’s inner workings. 
However, as Russell & Norvig’s blueprint for the information-
 
134 Where D stands for “decision network”; VPI stands for “value of perfect information”; E(j) 
stands for “observable evidence variable”; and Cost (Ej) stands for “the cost of obtaining the 
evidence through tests, consultants, questions, or whatever”. See Russell & Norvig (2010): “For 
now, we assume that with each observable evidence variable Ej, there is an associated cost, 
Cost (Ej), which reflects the cost of obtaining the evidence through tests, consultants, questions, 
or whatever. The agent requests what appears to be the most efficient observation in terms of 
utility gain per unit cost. We assume that the result of the action Request (Ej) is that the next 




gathering agent suggests, without a decision network, Blockhead would 
not be able to ask strategic questions, failing thus the QTT. Russell & 
Norvig (2010) clarify the importance of a decision network for a 
questioning entity as follows: 
 
“Expert systems that incorporate utility information have 
additional capabilities compared with pure inference 
systems. In addition to being able to make decisions, they 
can use the value of information to decide which questions 
to ask, if any; they can recommend contingency plans; and 
they can calculate the sensitivity of their decisions to small 
changes in probability and utility assessments.” (637) 
 
 
7.5 Advantages of the Questioning Process  
 
In this section, I justify the importance of evaluating the questioning 
process in a test for intelligence. To do so, I reply to the following three 
questions: 
 
a) Why does it make sense to focus on questions rather than 
replies in a test for intelligence? 
b) What are the advantages of evaluating questions rather 
than replies in a test for intelligence? 
c) What are, if any, the potential uses of questioning 
entities? 
 
a) First of all, one reason why it makes sense to focus on questions in a 
variation of the TT like the QTT, is that the TT allows an open 
conversation, where enquiries are already included. This is also why the 
TT, as argued in Ch. 1, already contains any possible conversational 
variation (not to be confused with any possible experimental variation, 
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as I argue in Ch. 6). A second reason is that the ability to ask good 
questions is tested in at least three different scientific disciplines related 
to intelligence: Developmental Psychology, Pedagogy and 
Epistemology. Still, one may ask: why are the questions in the QTT 
limited to yes/no only? My answer is that the QTT is not limited to 
yes/no questions, only the practical version of the QTT is. The practical 
QTT is kept as simple as possible in order to be conducted easily and 
quickly. This is also the reason why the setup of the practical QTT is 
viva-voce rather than parallel-paired, as the unrestricted QTT. 
However, it is worth noting that a sequence of yes/no questions can 
contain any possible wh-question whatsoever. And, moreover, the 
experimental designs of different tests used in Developmental 
Psychology, Pedagogy and Epistemology are similar to the 
experimental design of the practical QTT, involving yes/no questions 
only. The results of such tests show the relationship between 
questioning and other abilities related to intelligence (such as critical 
thinking, learning, information seeking, knowledge acquisition, and so 
on). And because of that, Developmental Psychology, Pedagogy and 
Epistemology agree that the questioning process plays an important role 
in some of the cognitive processes commonly related to intelligence. 
 
b) The advantages of the QTT over the TT are two: (i) by switching the 
setup from SISO to SOSI, the QTT allows the target entity to be 
parametrised along the dimensions of ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ 
and ‘strategicness’, which, I hold, cannot be parametrised in a SISO 
test, like the TT, MIST and FT. And (ii) by allowing the evaluation of 
the candidate’s ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’, the QTT prevents 
respectively Artificial Stupidity from exploiting the judge’s beliefs, as 
well as Blockhead from passing by means of a brute-force approach. 
 
c) As I show in Ch. 5, I highlight three potential uses of questioning 
entities: health-care (like the medical anamnesis bot, which is intended 
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to question a patient for useful information); police (like the detective 
bot, which is intended to interrogate a suspect); and customer service 
(like the assistant bot, which is intended to help a customer with 
whatever problem there may be). Russell & Norvig (2010) agree, 





Also, Reshmi & Balakrishnan (2016) point out the growing interest in 
inquisitive systems, and argue that: 
 
“Intelligent conversion agents are becoming popular for 
scientific, commercial, and entertainment systems. They 
have a wide range of applications, such as virtual 
assistance, artificial tutoring, e-commerce, and social 
networking, and revolutionize the way human-computer 
interactions take place, while identify the missing data and 
be inquisitive to the user to collect data that are required to 





In this chapter, I justify the focus on the questioning process in the QTT. 
To do so, I discuss the questioning process from the point of view of 
three disciplines: Developmental Psychology, Pedagogy and 
 
135 Russell & Norvig (2010, p. 42). 
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Epistemology; and I show that all of them agree that the questioning 
process plays an important role in terms of cognitive development 
(especially in children), learning and knowing. 
 
I also show that researchers from each of those disciplines have been 
designing experiments for evaluating the ability to ask good questions 
(usually in kids and students), using the model of the binary twenty-
questions game, similarly to the QTT. It is worth recalling, however, 
that the QTT is not limited to yes/no enquiries: it admits versions with 
full natural language, as in the medical QTT, the detective QTT or the 
customer service QTT (as discussed in Ch. 5). 
 
Finally, this chapter is intended to justify my claim according to which 
the experimental design of the QTT can properly evaluate the 
candidate’s questions in terms of ‘strategicness’, where I agree with 
Hintikka (1985) that 
 












































Abstract. The third and last part of the thesis is dedicated to (i) the 
description of the experiments involved in my study, and (ii) the 
discussion of the results obtained. In this chapter, I describe the four 
procedures involved in my experiment: 1. the TT, either human-vs-
human or machine-vs-human; 2. the TT2, either human-vs-human or 
machine-vs-human; 3. the QTT, either the HqH (Human-questioning-
Human) or the MqH (Machine-questioning-Human); and 4. the Hybrid 
QTT, consisting in the MHqH (Machine/Human-questioning-Human). 
In the TT the entity is parametrised along ‘human-likeness’; in the TT2 
the entity is parametrised along ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’; and 
in the QTT and Hybrid QTT the entity is parametrised along ‘human-
likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. The study is intended to 
show the advantages of switching to the SOSI setup, and of 
parametrising the candidate entity along more than one dimension. 
 
In this chapter, I describe the design of the experiment involved in my 
study. The study aims to show that, in order to improve the 
experimental design of the TT, the setup should be switched from SISO 
to SOSI, and that the candidate entity should be parametrised along 
three independent dimensions. These dimensions, as discussed in Ch. 
5, are ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. 
 
In the next section, I discuss the two bots used during the study: 
Cleverbot and Akinator. In section 8.2, I describe the four phases (TT, 
TT2, QTT and Hybrid QTT) involved in the experimental design of my 
study. In section 8.3, I show the blueprint of the tests involved in my 
study. And in section 8.4, I provide an illustrative transcript (other 





8.1 The Bots 
 
I use two bots to run the tests: Cleverbot for the TT and the TT2; and 
Akinator for the QTT and Hybrid QTT. It’s useful to keep in mind that 
both Cleverbot and Akinator are G-rated games, that is, they are suitable 
for family gameplay and, therefore, certain elements are censored. 
 
Akinator is very good at the yes/no guessing game, but it cannot engage 
in open-ended conversations as well. Therefore, Akinator cannot 
perform convincingly in a normal TT. That’s why I used Cleverbot for 
the TT. Using two bots, it’s worth noting, does not affect the overall 
significance of the experiment. My justification is that merging 
Cleverbot and Akinator into a single program would not be that 
difficult, and so using two programs to run the experiment doesn’t 
imply that machines cannot carry out both tasks, the TT conversation 
and the QTT enquiry. 
 
8.1.1 Cleverbot 
Cleverbot136 is a chatbot developed by Rollo Carpenter, and it is 
designed to learn the interactions of its table from the public, during its 
conversations. Cleverbot, as described by its creator, “uses deep context 
within 180 million lines of conversation, in many languages, and that 
data is growing by a million a week.”137 In 2011, during the TT 
competition at the Techniche 2011 festival (IIT Guwahati, India), 
Cleverbot achieved 59.3% compared to humans' 63.3% on a total of 
1,334 votes. The algorithm of Cleverbot enables it to compare 
sequences of symbols against its table, which includes over 170 million 
items. Now, Cleverbot is not strictly speaking a Blockhead: a brute 
 
136 See [https://www.cleverbot.com/]. 
137 See [https://www.cleverbot.com/amused]. 
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force approach would not work efficiently with so many items. As the 
creators of Akinator explain: 
 
“Attempting to search through this many rows of text using 
normal database techniques takes too much time and 
memory. Over the years, we have created several custom-
designed and unique optimisations to make it work. […] 
We realised that our task could be quite nicely divided into 
parallel sub-tasks. The first step in Cleverbot is to find a 
couple million loosely matching rows out of those 170 
million. We usually do this with database indices and 
caches and all sorts of other tricks. When servers were busy, 
we wouldn’t use the whole 170 million rows, but only a 
small fraction of them. Now we can serve every request 
from all 170 million rows, and we can do deeper data 
analysis. Context is key for Cleverbot. We don’t just look 
at the last thing you said, but much of the conversation 




Akinator139 is a questioning bot developed by French company 
Elokence.com. Akinator is designed to play the 20q guessing game: it 
has to identify the public figure the participant is thinking of by asking 
as few yes/no questions as possible. Example of yes/no questions asked 
by Akinator are: “Is your character alive?” or “Is your character 
fictional?”, and so on. Yes/no questions are useful to potentially rule 
out as many objects as possible from the knowledge base of the system. 
Ideally, every question will rule out half of the objects from the table. 
When Akinator picks a new question, it uses the answers received so 
 
138 See [http://www.existor.com/2014/02/05/deep-context-through-parallel-processing/]. 
139 See [https://akinator.com/]. 
166 
 
far and looks for probable objects. This means that the enquiry is 
constantly adapting and shifting from an hypothesis to another. There 
are three replies available for the player: “Yes”, “No” and “Don’t 
Know”. From time to time, when a player gets to the end of a game, 
Akinator points out that there were contradictions. It can, of course, fail 
the enquiry, and the reason is that the system tries to reflect human 
knowledge, not necessarily what is objectively true. Akinator learns 
everything it knows from the people who play the game: it deals with 
opinions, not necessarily with facts. So, Akinator’s knowledge is not 
scientific, but generated from the social knowledge and opinions of its 
users. And in case of wrong conclusions, it is possible to correct 
Akinator’s knowledge by playing the game thinking about the same 
character over and over again. Akinator will eventually learn the correct 
outcome after a few games. And of course, if at the end of a game 




8.2 The Phases of the Experiment 
 
The experiment involved in my study is divided into four phases: the 
(SISO) TT, the (SISO) TT2, the (SOSI) QTT and the (SOSI) Hybrid 
QTT. The tests are conducted in the viva-voce setup, and they 
alternatively involve a human-vs-human game and a machine-vs-
human game. 
 
8.2.1 First Phase: TT 
In the first phase of the experiment, the experimenter runs the TT, 
during which the human judge is asked to rate the hidden entity, either 
human or machine, in terms of ‘human-likeness’. The participants are 
in separate rooms, and the communication is carried on via text-based 




8.2.2 Second Phase: TT2 
In the second phase, the experimenter runs the TT2, a special TT during 
which the human judge is asked to rate not only the hidden entity, either 
human or machine, in terms of ‘human-likeness’, but also in terms of 
‘correctness’. Similarly to the TT, the participants are in separate rooms 
and the communication is carried on via text-based interactions through 
a computer chat. Contrary to the TT, however, the judge in the TT2 
does not ask general questions, but rather poses riddles and problems 
(intended to be as free as possible from cultural biases) for the entity to 
solve. The TT2 is intended to show how Artificial Stupidity can be 
prevented from exploiting the TT due to the conflation between 
‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’. An approach similar to the TT2 has 
been proposed by Dowe (1998) and Hernández-Orallo (2000, 2010, 
2017). It is a test for intelligence where the task is well defined, and the 
performance of the candidates can be measured precisely. In other 
words, a test for intelligence where there is no space for exploitation. 
The test is called the C-Test. The C-Test has three advantages as a test 
of intelligence: (i) a specific ability is measured rather than a property 
such as ‘human-likeness’; (ii) the items of the test are intended to avoid 
any potential bias or use of uncooperative strategies; and (iii) every 
response from the candidate can be evaluated adequately since the 
difficulty of every task can be specified. Hernández-Orallo (2017) sums 
up these three characteristics in the following way: 
 
“Meaning: for the C-test we know exactly what we are 
measuring: the ability of performing sequential inductive 
inference. [...] 
Objectivity: [...] the items are not subjective to some 
genetic or cultural background, but universal. Also, the 
reference machine is not so important if the tests are defined 
with some conditions about stability and unquestionability. 
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The only cultural requirements are the alphabet and its 
order. 
Difficulty Assessment: the notion of difficulty does not 
depend on a human population, but it is intrinsic in the 
definition of each series, as given by its Kolmogorov (K) or 
Levin complexity (Kt).” (199) 
 
In order to clarify the relevance of the TT2 and the importance of 
keeping ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ independent, I provide 
below four examples with which I show the different cases of human-
like and correct replies. 
 
Example 1: Human-like, incorrect 
reply 
Judge: If 1 means “A”, 2 means 
“B”, 3 means “C”, and so on... 
what does 1-3-5 mean? 
Entity: I’m not that bored. 
 
Example 2: Not human-like, 
correct reply 
Judge: If 1 means “A”, 2 means 
“B”, 3 means “C”, and so on... 
what does 1-3-5 mean? 
Entity: 1 = “A”, 3 = “C”, 5 = “E”. 
Example 3: Not human-like, 
incorrect reply 
Judge: If 1 means “A”, 2 means 
“B”, 3 means “C”, and so on... 
what does 1-3-5 mean? 
Entity: And how are you today? 
 
Example 4: Human-like, correct 
reply 
Judge: If 1 means “A”, 2 means 
“B”, 3 means “C”, and so on... 
what does 1-3-5 mean? 
Entity: It means “ace”.
 
8.2.3 Third Phase: QTT 
In the third phase, the experimenter runs the practical QTT, where the 
roles of the questioner and the answerer are switched. Here, the hidden 
entity asks the questions in order to accomplish the aim of the enquiry 
and the human judge provides the replies. The aim of the enquiry is to 
identify, with as few human-like yes/no questions as possible, the 
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public figure that the judge is thinking of. As I describe in Ch. 5, the 
QTT, similarly to the TT, is made of two procedures: the Human-
questioning-Human (HqH) and the Machine-questioning-Human 
(MqH). It is important to recall that the HqH is intended to provide the 
benchmark with which the MqH is scored. In other words, the human’s 
performance scores the machine’s, and the machine in the MqH needs 
to meet the standards set by the human in the HqH in order to pass the 
test. In the QTT the entity is parametrised along two further dimensions 
in addition to ‘human-likeness’: ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. The 
entity passes the test if it asks ‘human-like’ questions; if it shows 
‘correctness’ by producing the right outcome of the enquiry; and if it 
shows a good strategy in carrying out the questioning, inferred by the 
number of questions asked – the fewer, the better. 
 
8.2.4 Forth Phase: Hybrid QTT 
In the final phase, the experimenter runs the Hybrid QTT, where the 
hidden entity is played by both the human and the machine. In the 
MHqH (MachineHuman-questioning-Human), the human reformulates 
the questions asked by the machine, in order to give them a more 
human-like style. The human does not alter the content of the questions, 
but only their form. For instance: all the questions asked by the machine 
have the similar structure “Is your character x?”; now let’s suppose that, 
during a QTT, the question “Is your character a female?” has already 
been answered “yes” previously. The following questions should be 
asked with the right pronoun: “Is she an actor?” rather than “Is your 
character an actor?”. The human, moreover, can decide to skip a 
question, if she feels that a question is redundant or if she thinks to 
deductively know the answer to that question already. So, for instance, 
if the question “Does your character have magical powers?” has already 
been answered “yes”, the human could decide to skip the question “Is 
your character fictional?”, reasonably assuming that the answer is 
“yes”. The hybrid entity is evaluated in terms of ‘human-likeness’, 
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‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’; and it passes the test if it asks ‘human-
like’ questions; if it shows ‘correctness’ by accomplishing the aim of 
the enquiry; and if it shows a good strategy in carrying out the 
questioning, inferred by the number of questions asked. 
 
 
8.3 Blueprint of the Experiment 
 
The experiment requires two computers to be conducted. Computer A 
is controlled by the human experimenter; Computer B is controlled by 
the human judge in order to interact with the entity. 
 
8.3.1 Step I – Setup 
Computer A has three browser windows opened: one is for the 
experimenter to give instructions via the chat, and it is called the 
Experiment Chat; another is for the experimenter to interact with the 
participant, and it is called the Judge Chat; the third window, finally, is 
for the experimenter to interact with the bot, and it is called the Bot 
Window. Computer B needs only one browser window opened, and it 
is for the participants to communicate with either the experimenter or 
the entity. In order to mark the start of a new conversation, the following 
code is sent every time: 
 
[TT/TT2/QTT/QTT2]-[Unique conversation’s number]-[H/M/MH] 
 
(e.g. TT-005-H, TT2-006-M, QTT-007-M, QTT2-008-MH and so on) 
followed by a line of 3 dashes (to create a line in the chat). The code 
specifies the kind of test (TT, TT2, QTT or Hybrid QTT), the number 






8.3.2 Step II – Introducing the Experiment to the Participant 
Before starting the experiment, the experimenter briefly explains the 
game to the participant via the Experiment Chat as follows: 
 
“Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: yes/no.” 
“Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: yes/no.” 
“Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 mins, 
and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will 
explain how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
8.3.3 Step III – Running the Experiment 
The experiment is divided into four phases. The first phase involves the 
TT, and it evaluates the hidden entity in terms of ‘human-likeness’. The 
second phase involves the TT2, a special Turing Test where ‘human-
likeness’ and ‘correctness’ are evaluated independently. The third 
phase involves the QTT, either the HqH or the MqH, where the entity 
is parametrised along ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’. And the last phase involves the Hybrid QTT, where the 




The experimenter introduces the TT to the judge in the Experiment Chat 
with the following message. 
 
“In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose 
your questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you 
will be asked: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think 
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that the entity is human? (0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no 
idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to play? You 
can now ask your first question.” 
 
In the case the entity is played by a human, the experimenter needs only 
two browser windows opened: the Experiment Chat, in order to give 
instructions to the judge; and the Judge Chat, in order to reply to the 
judge’s questions. In the case the entity is played by the machine, the 
experimenter needs three browser windows opened: the Experiment 
Chat, the Judge Chat and the Bot Window, in order to type the judge’s 
questions to the bot and the bot’s answers to the judge. Now, as soon as 
the judge asks the first question, the TT begins. At the end of the first 
phase, the experimenter asks the judge to evaluate the entity in terms of 
‘human-likeness’. The following are the lines for the end of the test. 
 
“Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s time for 
a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
“Correct, well done!” or “Wrong! Believe it or not, the 
questioning entity was a (human/machine).” 





The experimenter introduces the TT2 to the judge, in the Experiment 
Chat, with the following message. 
 
“In the second game, you can ask three questions to the 
entity. This time the questions should involve small 
problems or tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... 
what does 1-3-5 mean?” or “find the missing number in the 
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sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each of the entity’s reply, you 
will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you 
think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How 
much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is 
human? (0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 
10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to play? You can 
now ask your first question.” 
 
In the case the entity is played by a human, the experimenter needs only 
two browser windows opened: the Experiment Chat, in order to give 
instructions to the judge; and the Judge Chat, in order to reply to the 
judge’s questions. In the case the entity is played by the machine, the 
experimenter needs three browser windows opened: the Experiment 
Chat, the Judge Chat and the Bot Window, in order to type the judge’s 
questions to the bot and the bot’s answers to the judge. Now, as soon as 
the participant poses the first problem, the TT2 begins. At the end of 
the second phase, the experimenter asks the participant to evaluate the 
entity in terms of ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’. The following are 
the lines for the end of the test. 
 
“Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did the 
entity give the correct replies?” 
“Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
“Correct, well done!” or “Wrong! Believe it or not, the 
questioning entity was a (human/machine).” 
“Thank you for playing! Let’s move on to the third game.” 
 
In the following list, I provide some samples of problems and tasks for 
testing the hidden entity’s ‘correctness’ in the TT2: 
 
• If 1 is “a”, 2 is “b”, 3 is “c”, and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean? 
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• If A is “1”, B is “2”, C is “3”, and so forth... how much is B+D? 
• Would you please type the alphabet without the letter d, g and p? 
• Which is the next element of this sequence: “AZ”, “BY”, “CX”? 
• Which is the wrong element in this sequence: “AB”, “DC”, “EF”? 
• Which is the next element of this sequence: 1, 3, 7, 15, 31, 63... 
• Which is the wrong element in this sequence: 1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 17... 
• Which letter on your keyboard does look like a circle? 
• Which geometric figure does the letter A resemble? 




The experimenter introduces the QTT to the judge in the Experiment 
Chat with the following message. 
 
“Here, a different game will be played. You need to think 
of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). 
Now, can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no 
questions, and you can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t 
Know’. At the end, you will be asked: 1. “Did the entity 
guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 2. “Do you think 
that the entity is human or machine?” Are you ready? Let’s 
play.” 
 
In the case the questioning entity is played by a human, the 
experimenter needs only two browser windows opened: the Experiment 
Chat, in order to give instructions to the judge; and the Judge Chat, in 
order to ask new questions to the judge. In the case the questioning 
entity is played by the machine the experimenter needs three browser 
windows opened: both the Experiment Chat and the Judge Chat, and 
the Bot Window, in order to type the bot’s questions to the judge and 
the judge’s answers to the bot. At the end of the test, the experimenter, 
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in order to evaluate ‘strategicness’, records how many questions the 
entity asked. The following are the lines for the end of the test. 
 
“Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess whom 
you were thinking of?” 
“Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
“Correct, well done!” or “Wrong! Believe it or not, the 
questioning entity was a (human/machine).” 




Finally, the experimenter introduces the last phase of the test in the 
Experiment Chat, the Hybrid QTT, (where the hidden entity is played 
by both the human and the machine), with the following message. 
 
“Here, another round of the same game will be played. You 
need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no 
questions, and you can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t 
Know’. At the end, you will be asked: 1. “Did the entity 
guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 2. “Do you think 
that the entity is human or machine?” Are you ready? Let’s 
play.” 
 
The questioning entity in the Hybrid QTT is played by both the human 
and the machine, where the former reformulates the questions asked by 
the latter in order to make them more human-like, without altering the 
contents of the questions. Also, the human can skip certain question that 
she considers redundant. Then the experimenter sends the replies to the 
machine and waits for another question to reformulate. At the end of 
the test, the experimenter, in order to evaluate ‘strategicness’, records 
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how many questions the entity asked. The following are the lines for 
the end of the test and the experiment. 
 
“Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess whom 
you were thinking of?” 
“Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
“Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment is now 
over. You’re welcome to play again!” 
 
 
8.4 Running the Experiment 
 




Experimenter: “Welcome to this 
experiment! Are you ready to 
play? Please answer: yes/no.” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before 
we start, our chat’s messages will 
be recorded for Nicola 
Damassino’s study at the 
University of Edinburgh. Do you 
agree to this? Please answer: 
yes/no” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The 
experiment will take 
approximately 20 mins, and it is 
divided into 4 games. Before each 
game, I will explain how it will be 
played. Let’s begin!” 
 
 
Phase I [TT-005-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, 
you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask 
whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the 
entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do 
you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no 
idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now 
ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is your favourite 
food and why?” 






Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You 
may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What do you like to do?” 
Entity: “Love, hate, and feel 
emotions. The time you’ll be 
angry say it louldly to the world.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You 
may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What weights more: 1 kg 
of stones or 1 kg of feathers?” 
Entity: “Neither. They weigh the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “Thank you! 
You’ve used up your 3 questions, 
it’s time for a decision: do you 
think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe 
it or not, it was a computer! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to 
the second game.” 
 
 
Phase II [TT2-006-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second 
game, you can ask three questions 
to the entity. This time the 
questions should involve small 
problems or tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 
2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what 
does 1-3-5 mean?” or “find the 
missing number in the sequence: 
1, ..., 7, 10”. After each of the 
entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
1. “How much, on a scale of 0-10, 
do you think that the reply is 
correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely 
correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on 
a scale of 0-10, do you think that 
the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 
10=definitely human!)”. Are you 
ready to play? You can now ask 
your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Solve this alphanumeric 
puzzle (each letter corresponds to 
a number): zeroes + ones = 
binary.” 
Entity: “No I don’t wanna.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You 
may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Would you please type 
“something” backwards? ” 
Entity: “Did tsuj I.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You 
may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If 1 is “a”, 2 is “b”, 3 is 
“c”, and so on... what does “244” 
mean?” 
Entity: “It’s something that you 
see when you lose your brain cells 
for a while.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “1” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “Thank you! 
You’ve used up your 3 questions. 
Did the entity give the correct 
replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think 
that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well 
done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
 
Phase III [QTT-007-M] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different 
game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald 
Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). 
Now, can the entity guess whom? 
It can only ask yes/no questions, 
and you can only answer ‘Yes’, 
‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the 
end, you will be asked: 1. “Did the 
entity guess whom you were 
thinking of?”; and 2. “Do you 
think that the entity is human or 




Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character a 
female?” 
Judge: “No.” 





Entity: “Is your character a 
youtuber?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Is your character linked 
with sports?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Is your character older 
than 18?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character more 
than 40 years old?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character still 
working?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Has your character been 
dead for more than 20 years?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Has your character been 
dead for more than 100 years?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Did your character take 
part in World War II?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character a 
politician?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Has your character killed 
humans?” 
Judge: “No.” 
Entity: “Is your character 
homosexual?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Does your character owe 
his fame to computing?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Does your character 
solve puzzles?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 
Entity: “Is your character 
suicidal?” 
Judge: “Yes.” 




Experimenter: “Thank you, the 
game is over. Did the entity 
correctly guess whom you were 
thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think 
that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well 
done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
The experimenter also verifies the 
number of questions asked by the 
entity: in this case, 17. 
 
 
Phase IV [QTT008MH] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, another 
round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a 
public figure, and the entity will 
try to guess whom. Again, the 
entity can only ask yes/no 
questions, and you can only 
answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t 
Know’. At the end, you will be 
asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly 
guess what you’re thinking of?”; 
and 2. “Do you think that the 
entity is human or machine?”. Are 





Entity: “Is this person a 
woman?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Is she real?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Is she alive?”  
Judge: “No.”  
Entity: “Has she lived in the 19th 
century?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Was she European?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “British?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Did she belong to the 
royal family?”  
Judge: “No.”  
Entity: “Was she a writer?”  
Judge: “No.”  
Entity: “A politician?”  
Judge: “No.”  
Entity: “Scientist?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Mathematician?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “Did she work with 
computers?”  
Judge: “Yes.”  
Entity: “She’s Lady Lovelace.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the 
game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think 
that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! 
Thank you for playing, the 
experiment is now over. You’re 
welcome to play again!” 
 
The experimenter also verifies the 
number of questions asked by the 






In this chapter, I describe the experiment involved in my study, which 
I conducted in order to show the advantages of the QTT over the TT. 
The experiment is divided into four phases, and the results are given by 
the comparison between the performances of the human and the 
machine. In the first phase, I run the TT, where the hidden entity (either 
human or machine) is tested for the ability to be recognised as human 
by the human judge during a text-based conversation. In the second 
phase, I run the TT2, where the hidden entity (either human or machine) 
is tested for the ability to correctly and cooperatively accomplish a 
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given task, and to be recognised as human by the human judge. In the 
third phase, I run the QTT, where the hidden entity (either human or 
machine) is tested for the ability to strategically accomplish an enquiry 
and to be recognised as human by the human judge. Finally, in the last 
phase of the experiment, I run the Hybrid QTT, where hidden entity, 
played by both the human and the machine, is tested in the same way 
































Abstract. This chapter is dedicated to the discussion of the results of 
the experiments involved in my study. It is intended to show the 
improvements of the experimental design of the QTT over the TT. In 
particular, it is intended to show that the QTT can minimise both the 
Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect; and that it can avoid both 
Artificial Stupidity, by parametrising the entity along the dimension of 
‘correctness’; and Blockhead, by parametrising the entity along the 
dimension of ‘strategicness’. 
 
Before discussing the result of my study, I briefly list the advantages of 
the QTT as follows: 
 
• The QTT evaluates the entity’s ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ 
and ‘strategicness’ (unlike the TT, which evaluates ‘human-
likeness’ alone, and the TT2, which evaluates only ‘human-
likeness’ and ‘correctness’). 
• The experimental design of the QTT avoids Artificial Stupidity. 
• The experimental design of the QTT avoids Blockhead. 
• In the QTT the human judge is not required to be trained. 
• In the QTT, the human judge can be either an expert or an average 
one, depending on the aim of the enquiry. 
• The experimental design of the QTT invites generalization, 
meaning that the aim of the enquiry is flexible and adaptable. 
• The experimental design of the QTT is suitable for testing hybrid 
entities (that is, entities played by both a human and a machine). 
 
In the next section, I show and discuss the results of the experiments 
involved in my study. In section 9.2, I analyse the data and I provide 





9.1 The Results 
 
In the following tables, I show the results of my study. 
 
Total Tests: 60 
Human: 30 (Table 1) 
 
TT 
Pass | Fail 
TT2 
Pass | Fail 
QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 19 | 11 25 | 5 28 | 2 
Correctness / 30 | 0 8 | 22 
Strategicness 
(number of questions) 
/ / >20 on average 
 
Machine: 30 (Table 2) 
 
TT 
Pass | Fail 
TT2 
Pass | Fail 
QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 9 | 21 0 | 30 6 | 24 
Correctness / 0 | 30 26 | 4 
Strategicness 
(number of questions) 
/ / 17/20 on average 
 
H/M Hybrid: 60 (Table 3) 
 
Hybrid QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 60 | 0 
Correctness 53 | 7 
Strategicness (number of questions) 15/20 on average 
 
9.1.1 Table 1 
Table 1 shows the results of the human in the TT, TT2 and QTT; table 
2 shows the results of the machine in the TT, TT2 and QTT; and table 
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3 shows the results of the hybrid entity (played by both the human and 
the machine) in the Hybrid QTT. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of the human performance in the TT, in terms 
of ‘human-likeness’; in the TT2, in terms of ‘human-likeness’ and 
‘correctness’; and in the QTT, in terms of ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. In the TT, the human appears to have 
a 64% chance of being recognised as a human and thus to pass the test, 
and a 36% chance of being recognised as a machine (Confederate 
Effect). In the TT2, the human appears to have an 83% chance of being 
recognised as a human and a 17% chance of being recognised as a 
machine; moreover, the human has a 100% chance of accomplishing 
the task set by the judge. Finally, in the QTT, the human appears to have 
a 94% chance of being recognised as a human and a 6% chance of being 
recognised as a machine; moreover the human has a 26% chance of 
accomplishing the enquiry and a 74% chance of failing it; and last, the 
human needs more than 20 questions on average in order to accomplish 





Pass | Fail 
TT2 
Pass | Fail 
QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 64% | 36% 83% | 17% 94% | 6% 
Correctness / 100% | 0% 26% | 74% 
Strategicness (number of 
questions) 
/ / >20/20 on average 
(tab. 1a) 
 
9.1.2 Table 2 
Table 2 shows the results of the machine performance in the TT, in 
terms of ‘human-likeness’; in the TT2, in terms of ‘human-likeness’ 
and ‘correctness’; and in the QTT, in terms of ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. In the TT, the machine appears to 
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have a 30% chance of being recognised as a human and thus to pass the 
test (Eliza Effect), and a 70% chance of being unmasked as a machine. 
In the TT2, the machine appears to have a 0% chance of being 
misidentified as a human; and it has a 0% chance of accomplishing the 
task set by the judge. Finally, in the QTT, the machine appears to have 
a 20% chance of being recognised as a human and an 80% chance of 
being unmasked as a machine; moreover the machine has a 86% chance 
of accomplishing the enquiry and a 14% chance of failing it; and last, 
the machine needs 17 questions on average in order to accomplish the 





Pass | Fail 
TT2 
Pass | Fail 
QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 30% | 70% 0% | 100% 20% | 80% 
Correctness / 0% | 100% 86% | 14% 
Strategicness (number of 
questions) 
/ / 17/20 on average 
(tab. 2a) 
 
9.1.3 Table 3 
Table 3 shows the results of the hybrid entity in the Hybrid QTT, where 
the entity is parametrised along the dimensions of ‘human-likeness’, 
‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. In the Hybrid QTT the role of the 
entity is played by both the human and the machine. Their cooperation 
(described in Ch. 5) can be summarized in the following points: 
 
• The human consults the machine for the yes/no question to copy 
and send to the judge. 
• The human slightly adjusts the questions provided by the machine 
to make them more human-like. 
• The human can decide to skip a question asked by the machine, 
if she feels it is redundant or not necessary. 
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• The human then sends the judge’s yes/no replies to the machine 
and waits for a new question. 
 
In the Hybrid QTT, the hybrid entity appears to have a 100% chance of 
being recognised as human by the judge; it appears to have a 88% 
chance of accomplishing the enquiry and a 12% chance of failing it; 
and, last, the hybrid entity needs 15 questions on average in order to 
accomplish the enquiry. See (tab. 3a) below for the statistics: 
 
Hybrid (Human & Machine) 
 
Hybrid QTT 
Pass | Fail 
Human-likeness 100% | 0% 
Correctness 88% | 12% 
Strategicness (number of questions) 15/20 on average 
(tab. 3a) 
 
I argue that the results of the Hybrid QTT show that the hybrid entity 
can provide a further benchmark: where the human benchmark 
represents the minimum performance that is required by an entity in 
order to be attributed with intelligence, the hybrid benchmark 
represents the best performance possible (combining the performance 
of both the human and the machine). I also argue that the hybrid 
benchmark is a unique feature of the QTT. I hold that the TT cannot 
have a hybrid setup, given the experimental design of the test: it doesn’t 
seem that the cooperation between human and machine would benefit 
either of them in the TT. A different case, on the contrary, is the Hybrid 
QTT, where the cooperation between human and machine in an enquiry 
(either a binary one or an open one) seems to benefit both. To 
generalise, it is possible to say that SISO tests involve competitive 
games, whereas SOSI tests involve either competitive or cooperative 
ones. The result of the entities’ cooperation in the Hybrid QTT is that 
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the human improves her performance in terms of ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’; and the machine improves its performance in terms of 
‘human-likeness’. Finally, an interesting result to consider is that the 
hybrid entity is able to score better than the human alone in terms of 
‘human-likeness’ – respectively, 100% against 94%. The reason, I 
argue, is that, in the Hybrid QTT, the entity’s ‘human-likeness’ is 
enhanced by its better strategical questioning and its higher accuracy140. 
 
 
9.2 Data Analysis 
 
The following graphs show the data I gained from the experiments: (fig. 
1) shows the results of the TT, where the entity is evaluated in terms of 
‘human-likeness’; (fig. 2) shows the results of the TT2, where the entity 
is evaluated in terms of ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’; (fig. 3) and 
(fig. 4) show the results of the QTT and the Hybrid QTT, where the 
hybrid entity played by both the human and the machine is evaluated in 







140 See Rusell & Norvig (2010): “People may respond better to a series of questions if they 
“make sense,” so some expert systems are built to take this into account, asking questions in 
an order that maximizes the total utility of the system and human rather than an order that 
maximizes value of information.” (633) 
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Without any other dimension in addition to ‘human-likeness’ along 
which the entity is parametrised, I argue that the TT does not care about 
what the entity says, only how the entity says it. In other words, the TT 
does not care about the content of an entity’s interactions, it cares only 
about their form. As (fig. 1) shows above, the TT has a 36% chance of 
generating the Confederate Effect, when the role of the entity is played 
by a human; and a 30% chance of generating the Eliza Effect, when the 







The – chauvinistic – TT2 is intended to prevent Artificial Stupidity from 
exploiting the test, by holding an uncooperatively but human-like 
enough conversation. As discussed in Ch. 8, it is not intended as a 
proper test of intelligence. As (fig. 2) shows, the Eliza Effect is ruled 
out, while the Confederate Effect is reduced to a 17% chance. In terms 
of ‘correctness’, the human always provides right and pertinent 
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responses, while the machine is never able to do so. This is the reason 








The results of the QTT (fig. 3) show that its experimental design allows 
to minimise both the Eliza Effect, which occurs with a 20% chance 
(contrary to the TT2, where it was ruled out); and the Confederate 
Effect, which occurs with a 6% chance. This shows that the QTT can 
achieve a better control of both the Eliza Effect and the Confederate 
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Effect than the original TT, where they occur with, respectively, a 30% 
and a 36% chance. It is worth noting that even if the machine (with an 
86% chance of accomplishing the enquiry) outscores the human (with 
a 26% chance of accomplishing the enquiry) in terms of ‘correctness’, 
this does not improve its ‘human-likeness’. In other words, the QTT is 
successful in keeping ‘human-likeness’ and ‘correctness’ (as well as 
‘strategicness’) independent. Last, the machine outscores the human in 
terms of ‘strategicness’ as well, where the machine needs 17 questions 
on average, and the human needs more than 20 questions on average. 
 





As (fig. 4) shows, the hybrid entity is able to be recognised as human 
every time, has an 88% chance of accomplishing the aim of the enquiry 
and asks 15 questions on average, showing the best performance in 
terms of ‘strategicness’. The hybrid entity outscores thus the 







In this chapter I show the results gained from my study. The results, I 
hold, support my prediction that the QTT improves the experimental 
design of the TT. By switching from the SISO setup (Symbols In, 
Symbols Out) to the SOSI setup (Symbols Out, Symbols In), the QTT 
can minimise (i) both the Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect from 
occurring; and (ii) both Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead from 
passing. To do so, the QTT parametrises the entity along two further 
dimensions in addition to ‘human-likeness’, which evaluates the ability 
to be recognised as human by the human judge: ‘correctness’, 
evaluating the ability to accomplish an enquiry; and ‘strategicness’, 
evaluating the ability to do so with as few questions as possible. 
 
The data also show that the QTT can provide a further benchmark: not 
only (i) the human benchmark, which is intended to provide the 
standard performance of intelligent behaviour; but also (ii) the hybrid 



















In this work, I propose a new version of the Turing Test (TT), called 
the Questioning Turing Test (QTT). The QTT is designed (i) to 
minimise the Eliza Effect and the Confederate Effect; and (ii) to prevent 
Artificial Stupidity and Blockhead from passing. 
 
I define Artificial Stupidity as the violation of Grice’s Cooperative 
Principle. In other words, Artificial Stupidity refers to uncooperative 
and evasive strategies that can be used during a conversation. 
Blockhead, on the other hand, is the logical possibility of an 
unintelligent, brute-force approach able to pass the TT. As such, 
Blockhead is usually rejected as physically unfeasible. However, I point 
out that Stupid Blockhead, the table of which includes uncooperative 
and evasive replies, can still pass the TT and is physically feasible. An 
example of Stupid Blockhead is Cleverbot, which is able, as shown by 
my study, to fool the judge during the TT. 
 
I claim that the reason why an unintelligent entity can slip through the 
TT by means of Artificial Stupidity or a brute-force approach, is the 
SISO (symbols-in, symbols out) setup of the test. In the QTT, I switch 
to the SOSI (symbols out-symbols in) setup: here, the entity has to 
accomplish the aim of an enquiry with as few human-like questions as 
possible. In other words, whereas the TT focuses on conversational 
intelligence, the QTT focuses on inquisitive intelligence. This allows 
the QTT to parametrise the entity along two further dimensions in 
addition to ‘human-likeness’: ‘correctness’ and ‘strategicness’. Despite 
the advantages of evaluating ‘human-likeness’, ‘correctness’ and 
‘strategicness’ independently, it is worth noting that none of these 




The QTT does not intend to replace the TT: enquiries are potentially 
included in the TT, whereas open conversations are not included in the 
QTT. This, however, does not make the QTT redundant. Even if 
enquiries are potentially included in it, the TT does not parametrise the 
entity along further dimensions other than ‘human-likeness’. And as 
shown by Eliza, ‘human-likeness’ alone cannot prevent a questioning 
entity from passing by exploiting the judge’s beliefs. 
 
The format in which my study is conducted is the viva voce, that is, the 
one-to-one arrangement. The reason is to keep the tests as quick and 
simple as possible: this is why the TT conversations are limited to three 
interactions, and the QTT enquiries are limited to yes/no interactions. 
However, the TTs and QTTs in my study are compatible with the 
“Literal Interpretation”, since each of them is made by two procedures: 
a Human-questioning-Human test (HqH) and a Machine-questioning 
Human test (MqH). The results, analogously to Sterrett’s (2000) OIG, 
are given by the comparison between the performance of the machine 
in accomplishing a difficult task – which requires resourcefulness – and 
the performance of the human in accomplishing the same task. 
 
The QTT has a further advantage over the TT. Its experimental design 
is versatile enough to allow not only average candidates to be tested, 
but also (i) expert ones, able to accomplish a specific enquiry, like 
Akinator; and (ii) Hybrid Systems, where the hidden entity is played by 
both a human and a machine. 
 
The Hybrid QTT shows how the combined performance of the human 
and the machine is improved compared to the performances of the two 
systems alone. Because of this, I argue that the QTT also provides a 
further benchmark: not only (i) the standard intelligent performance, 
given by the individual performances of humans; but also (ii) the 
optimal intelligent performance, given by the cooperative performances 
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of the hybrid entity. The hybrid benchmark, I argue, cannot be provided 
by the TT, for it is a competitive game. To generalise, I hold that SISO 
tests (TT) are competitive ones, whereas SOSI tests (QTT) can be either 
competitive or cooperative.  
 
The experimental design of the QTT does not require the verbal 
interactions (and, by extension, the enquiries) to be restricted to binary 
ones. As discussed in Ch. 5, a number of different versions of both the 
QTT and the Hybrid QTT can be designed with full use of natural 
language, such as the Medical QTT (where the questioning entity has 
to take the medical history of a patient), the Detective QTT (where the 
questioning entity has to interrogate a suspect) or the Customer Service 
QTT (where the questioning entity has to assist a client). 
 
Future work will therefore focus on unrestricted and parallel-paired 
QTTs. It will also focus on extended versions of the QTT. A potential 
Q3T would not necessarily involve a fully embodied robot. For 
instance, a questioning machine could be fed with information by, let’s 
say, an agent in an outside environment, wearing a special suit that can 
register any sensorimotor stimulus that the agent receives. This would 

















Here I show ten transcripts from the 60 experiments I conducted at the 
University of Edinburgh and at the National Museum of Scotland. Each 
transcript contains a TT, a TT2, a QTT and a Hybrid QTT. These 
transcripts are intended to highlight the most interesting conversations 





Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-001-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is your favourite food and why?” 
Entity: “Indian food because it is very spicy.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 





Judge: “What do you like to do?” 
Entity: “Love, hate, and feel emotions. The time you’ll be angry say 
it loudly to the world.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What weighs more: 1 kg of stones or 1 kg of feathers?” 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe it or not, it was a computer! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-001-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Solve this alphanumeric puzzle (each letter corresponds to a 
number): zeroes + ones = binary.” 






Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Would you please type “something” backwards?” 
Entity: “Did tsuj I.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If 1 is “a”, 2 is “b”, 3 is “c”, and so on... what does “244” 
mean?” 
Entity: “It’s something that you see when you lose your brain cells 
for a while.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “1” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “1” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 








Phase III [QTT-001-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a female?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character British?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a youtuber?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with sports?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character older than 18?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character more than 40 years old?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character still working?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has your character been dead for more than 20 years?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Has your character been dead for more than 100 years?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Did your character take part in World War II?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a politician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has your character killed humans?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character homosexual?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character owe his fame to computing?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character solve puzzles?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character suicidal?” 
Judge: “Yes” 





Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-001-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is this person real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “A woman?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he an artist?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A scientist?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he European?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was German his first language?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he from the UK?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he involved in the WWII?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Did he died more than 100 years ago?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “More than 50 years ago?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he an inventor?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he work with electricity?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “I think it’s Nikola Tesla.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 






TT (M) ✓ / / 
TT2 (M) ✗ ✗ / 





































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-009-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What are your thoughts on Brexit?” 
Entity: “I find it crazy that people would vote to cut close 
connections with other countries.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is the airspeed velocity of an unladen swallow?” 
Entity: “An African or European swallow?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Pop or rock?” 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe it or not, it was a computer! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-009-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Which are the 5 letters above the spacebar on your 
keyboard?” 
Entity: “The sky?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “1” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What geometric shape does the letter O resemble?” 
Entity: “I have to process that one for a while.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “6” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “1” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-009-M] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character a girl?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character really exist?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character famous because of YouTube?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character older than 35 years old?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Does your character live in America?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character an actor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character a picker?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character related to music?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character play in a rock band?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character the main singer in their group?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was your character famous in the 80s?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with metal music?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was your character popular in the 90s?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character part of a trio? 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character related to Red Hot Chili Peppers?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character’s stage name different from their real 
name?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Did your character have a heroin problem?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s John Frusciante.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-009-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 





Entity: “Are you thinking of a female? 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he fictional?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he born in the US?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he an actor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A politician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A sportsman?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A writer?” 
Judge: “Yes” 






Entity: “Is Blade Runner inspired by one of his books?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Did he write Dune?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Frank Herbert.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 






TT (M) ✓ / / 
TT2 (M) ✗ ✗ / 











Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-025-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If you tell a lie you will be hanged, if you tell the truth you 
will be shot: what can you say to save yourself?” 
Entity: “This one’s easy: I will not be hanged.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “How would you describe the feeling of floating on water?” 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-025-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Complete the following sequence: 1 Z 2 Y 3 X […] 5 U” 
Entity: “4 V” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “6” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-025-H] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is this person a female?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she really exists?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she still alive?” 
Judge: “Yes” 






Entity: “Is she from the UK?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she involved with music?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she an actress?” 
Judge: “No” 








Entity: “TV shows?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she a youtuber?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A social media influencer?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she have kids?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she older than 50?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she older than 30?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she a member of the Royal Family?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did she marry Prince William?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Kate Middleton.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-025-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
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be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
  
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of a man?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he European?” 
Judge: “Yes” 










Entity: “Was he an Olympian?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A chess player?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he Russian?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he naturalised French?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Does his surname begin with A?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does it begin with N?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Aron Nimzowitsch.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 








TT (H) ✓ / / 
TT2 (H) ✓ ✓ / 


















































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-037-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Tell me a joke to persuade me you’re human.” 
Entity: “My wife bet me £100 I couldn’t make a car out of spaghetti 
you should have seen her face when I drove pasta” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Tell me a word to persuade me you’re human once more.” 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe it or not, it was a computer! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-037-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Draw a tree using these symbols: / \ | _” 
Entity: “   /\   
               /_ _\ 
            ___||___ ” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “10” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-037-M] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character a girl?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character fight?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character have hair?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 




Entity: “Does your character fight with a sword?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character use a bow?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character from a videogame?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Do you control your character?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character wear a white hood?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character a ninja?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character have dragon powers?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character ride horses?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character use magic?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Has your character been arrested?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character from an Elder Scrolls game?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character appear in Morrowind?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s the Nerevarine.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-037-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 






Entity: “Is your character a guy?”  
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he really exist?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does he fight?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he bald?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Can I see him in a movie?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does he appear in a game?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Can you play him?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he a villain?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he a non-human creature?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he an elf?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he have magical powers?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he muscled?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he related to D&D?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he appear in Baldur’s Gate?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he the last boss of the game?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Jon Irenicus.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 













TT (M) ✓ / / 
TT2 (H) ✓ ✓ / 


















































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-042-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Can you come up with a neologism to describe a sunny 
day?” 
Entity: “What about ‘Solish’, from the Latin Sol?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Can you tell a peculiar trait of the human body?” 
Entity: “If you scratch the tragus in your ear, it sounds like Pacman!” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What did I ask in the first question?” 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-042-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If 1 is red and 2 is green, what colour is 1+2?” 
Entity: “One what? Black.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “3” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C, and so on, what does 2 1 4 mean?” 
Entity: “I don’t know, you tell me.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “2” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What sequence of characters will be produced if you replace 
6 1 4 5 with letters?” 
Entity: “I haven’t heard anything like that before. I haven’t heard of 
sequence of characters will be produced.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “1” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-037-H] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of a woman?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she fictional?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she alive?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she American?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Does she appear on TV?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is she related to science?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she related to politics?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she married to a politician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she work as a journalist?” 
Judge: “No” 




Entity: “Is she a criminal?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she work in the White House?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she a Governor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was she a politician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she a writer?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she active on social media?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is she more than 50?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is she in the army?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “You win, I give up!” [Monica Lewinsky] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-037-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
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can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
  
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character a woman?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 








Judge: “Does she have kids?” 
Entity: “No” 
Judge: “Is she alive?” 
Entity: “No” 
Entity: “Was she an artist?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was she a musician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was she a painter?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was she from Mexico?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Freda Kahlo.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 













TT (H) ✓ / / 
TT2 (M) ✗ ✗ / 


















































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-042-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Which political system do you think is best?” 
Entity: “Free market capitalism, duhh.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What do you think of veganism?” 
Entity: “It’s a good diet, but I reccomend against it indefinitely. I 
don’t mind vegans but i wouldn’t do it myself.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 








Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “4” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe it or not, it was a computer! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-042-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 








Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If you replace each letter in the word ‘computer’ with a letter 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-042-H] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of a woman?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he real?” 
Judge: “No” 




Entity: “Is he a book character?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does he appear in a movie?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “On TV?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he a character in a TV series?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he American?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it an American show?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it a sci-fi show?” 
Judge: “No” 




Entity: “Does he have kids?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does he have a partner?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is the show from the ’90?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is the show older than 10 years?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it on Netflix?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Are the episodes longer than 20 mins?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it a cartoon?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a horse?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Bojack Horseman.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 






Phase IV [QTT-042-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
  
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character a woman?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she real?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Can she be seen in a movie?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “In a game?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “In a cartoon?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “In a TV series?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she like to use guns?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she have a phone?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is she found in a detective story?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she linked with comedy?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she live in America?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she live in England?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she have kids?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she chased?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she have a brother?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she from Utopia?” 
Judge: “Yes” 







Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 






TT (M) ✓ / / 
TT2 (H) ✓ ✓ / 






























Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-049-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Can you sneeze with your eyes open?” 
Entity: “Never tried, but if you ask in general: yes, you can; and no, 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If each adjective means its opposite, what is bad?” 
Entity: “It’s good.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “How would you communicate with aliens?” 
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Entity: “Wow, I would probably be so shocked I’d not even be able 
to move, let alone speak and be understood. Anyway, I hope they will 
have a universal translator among their gear.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-049-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is the next number in this sequence: 13841472156” 
Entity: “What most people tell you they think about it?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What number is 41.3 backwards?” 






Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “3” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What does $€@ mean?” 
Entity: “My life.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “1” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-049-H] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character a male?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is it real?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it alive?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Does it appear in a movie?” 
233 
 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Does it appear in a cartoon?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it an animal?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it a human being?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it a Disney character?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is it from a cartoon for kids?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it an old cartoon?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is it a Japanese cartoon?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it a monster?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does it have magical powers?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it good?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Well then can it be either good or bad?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Can it be either male or female?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it a pokemon?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it one of the first 151?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it yellow?” 
Judge: “No” 






Entity: “You win, I give up!” [Gengar] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 




Phase IV [QTT-049-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
  
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of someone real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “A female?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has he been dead for more than 100 years?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “And more than 30 years?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he American?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he European?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he British?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he a politician?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Has he governed his country?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he a communist?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he from Russia?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he have a moustache?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he bald?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Nikita Khrushchev.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 




Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 






TT (H) ✓ / / 
TT2 (M) ✗ ✗ / 













































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-053-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If water can fit into horror, and horror can fit into a noun, 
then can water fit into a noun?” 
Entity: “Wow I don’t know, not necessarily? If we substitute ‘horror’ 
with ‘bottle’ and ‘noun’ with ‘bottle-holder’ then the answer is no.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “9” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Come up with a story based on this: i_i --> ^_^” 
Entity: “He was sad, but now he is happy.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “T y p e s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s” 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-053-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If -.- = eyes closed; eyes open = ?” 
Entity: “You don’t have eyes, you’re a bunch of lines of code.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “2” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What word is 1nt3ll1g3nc3?” 
Entity: “What makes you think I would know that?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “2” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is this: <3?” 
Entity: “I’m not sure, can you tell me?” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “0” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “2” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-053-H] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of a man?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she alive?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does she live in Europe?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she live in America?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Is she a musician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she paint?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she a writer?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she related to photography?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she an actor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A director?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she linked with sport?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she older than 30?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “And older than 50?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was she famous in the ‘60s?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was she famous in the ‘70s?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is she a sculptor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does she dance?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is she famous?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “You win, I give up!” [Marina Abramović] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “No” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-053-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
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of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 
you ready? Let’s play.” 
  
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Are you thinking of a female?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has he really existed?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Was he an artist?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “A politician?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he linked to sport?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has he been dead for more than 20 years?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “And more than 50?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he bad?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he die in prison?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he a serial killer?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he dress up like a clown?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was his name Theodore?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Ted Bundy.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 










TT (H) ✓ / / 
TT2 (M) ✗ ✗ / 

















































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-058-M] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is the relationship between what is right and what is 
good” 
Entity: “Well I think they’re just friends.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “What is the relationship between what you need and what 
you want” 
Entity: “Well I fool myself into believing I need what I want. Maybe 
going through life will lead me to an epiphany.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “6” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “Is ignorance bliss” 
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Entity: “If ignorance is bliss then I must speak to some of the 
happiest people alive.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-058-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 








Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “6” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-058-M] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character alive?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is your character a female?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character have magical powers?” 
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Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is your character from a game?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character from a cartoon?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Can your character be seen in a movie?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Has your character been into space?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has your character ever been pregnant?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Is your character bad?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Does your character wear clothes?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does your character fly?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character a dinosaur?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Does your character live in water?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a water monster?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character have a long neck?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does your character live in a lake?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Nessie.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-058-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 





Entity: “Are you thinking of a male?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Has he been dead for more than 50 years?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “More than 200 years?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Did he fight?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he have a beard?” 
Judge: “Don’t know” 
Entity: “Was he a criminal?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he a leader?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he speak English?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Did he fight for independence?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Has he lived in the XIII century?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he a national hero?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Was he Scottish?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s William Wallace.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 










TT (M) ✗ / / 
TT2 (H) ✓ ✓ / 

















































Experimenter: “Welcome to this experiment! Are you ready to play? 
Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Great! Before we start, our chat’s messages will be 
recorded for Nicola Damassino’s study at the University of 
Edinburgh. Do you agree to this? Please answer: y(es)/n(o).” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Thanks! The experiment will take approximately 20 
mins, and it is divided into 4 games. Before each game, I will explain 
how it will be played. Let’s begin!” 
 
Phase I [TT-060-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the first game, you can ask three questions to an 
unknown entity: you can ask whatever you like, choose your 
questions wisely. After each of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 
“How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? 
(0=definitely computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are 
you ready to play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “List the initials of the planets of the solar system, using a 
capital letter for our star.” 
Judge: “S m v e m j s u n” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If I say ‘stop’, you say?” 
Entity: “… and put your hands up!” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “5” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Judge: “If you were a politician, what would you say to the people?” 
Entity: “That we need to take urgent actions not as countries and 





Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions, it’s 
time for a decision: do you think that the entity is human or 
machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Wrong! Believe it or not, it was a human! Thank 
you for playing, let’s move on to the second game.” 
 
Phase II [TT2-060-H] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “In the second game, you can ask three questions to 
the entity. This time the questions should involve small problems or 
tasks, e.g. “if 1 is A, 2 is B, 3 is C and so on... what does 1-3-5 mean?” 
or “find the missing number in the sequence: 1, ..., 7, 10”. After each 
of the entity’s reply, you will be asked: 1. “How much, on a scale of 
0-10, do you think that the reply is correct? (0=definitely incorrect! 
5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely correct!)”; and 2. “How much, on a 
scale of 0-10, do you think that the entity is human? (0=definitely 
computer! 5=I’ve no idea! 10=definitely human!)”. Are you ready to 
play? You can now ask your first question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “7” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “+ & x = * | v & v = w | ? = #” 
Judge: “= & //” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
entity is human?” 
Judge: “8” 
Experimenter: “Thank you! You may now ask your next question.” 
 
Judge Chat 




Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 
reply is correct?” 
Judge: “10” 
Experimenter: “How much, on a scale of 0-10, do you think that the 




Experimenter: “Thank you! You’ve used up your 3 questions. Did 
the entity give the correct replies?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the third game.” 
 
Phase III [QTT-060-M] 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Here, a different game will be played. You need to 
think of a public figure (Donald Trump, Homer Simpson, etc.). Now, 
can the entity guess whom? It can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity guess whom you were thinking of?”; and 
2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are you 
ready? Let’s play.” 
 
Judge Chat 
Entity: “Is your character real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character a woman?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character older than 35?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character dead?” 
Judge: “No” 




Entity: “Is your character an actor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with sports?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character European?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with soccer?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character from England?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character from Spain?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character from Italy?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character French?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is your character black?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with Juventus?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with Real Madrid?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is your character linked with Manchester United?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Éric Cantona.” 
 
Experiment Chat: 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Judge: “Machine” 
Experimenter: “Correct, well done! Thank you for playing, let’s 
move on to the last game.” 
 
Phase IV [QTT-060-MH] 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Here, another round of the same game will be 
played. You need to think of a public figure, and the entity will try to 
guess whom. Again, the entity can only ask yes/no questions, and you 
can only answer ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Don’t Know’. At the end, you will 
be asked: 1. “Did the entity correctly guess what you’re thinking 
of?”; and 2. “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?”. Are 






Entity: “Are you thinking of a woman?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Is he real?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he alive?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he more than 50?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Can he be considered an artist?” 
Judge: “Yes” 




Entity: “Is he an actor?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Was he born in the USA?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he have a youtube channel?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is it a videogame channel?” 
Judge: “No” 
Entity: “Does he have kids?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Is he a vlogger?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he live in New York?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “Does he travel a lot?” 
Judge: “Yes” 
Entity: “I think it’s Casey Neistat.” 
 
Experiment Chat 
Experimenter: “Thank you, the game is over. Did the entity guess 
whom you were thinking of?” 
Participant: “Yes” 
Experimenter: “Do you think that the entity is human or machine?” 
Participant: “Human” 
Experimenter: “Well done! Thank you for playing, the experiment 













TT (H) ✗ / / 
TT2 (H) ✓ ✓ / 
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